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Local fiscal policy needs to take into account particular characteristics of a 
region and its level of development.  Each locality has its own particular 
combination of resources, capabilities and needs.  Firstly, this work estimates the 
impact of fiscal policy through a number of income and expenditure variables on 
output per capita growth and employment/unemployment using fixed-effects 
panel data econometric methodology in 32 states and 2,247 municipalities of 
Mexico from 1994 to 2010, and country data in 20 Latin American economies 
during the same period.  Secondly, this analysis computes the impact on growth 
of the 1998 Federal Reform to the Fiscal Coordination System in Mexico, since it 
is the most significant reform in the decade regarding transfers from central to 
local governments.  Finally, this research discusses the linkage between policy 
makers’ perception, public finances and the local inhabitants’ opinion regarding 
public services provided -considering a self-developed survey in the 32 Mexican 
states and Latinobarómetro surveys from 2008 to 2010. 
 
The main result in this research is that local fiscal policy is inaccurate if it does 
not take into account income and expenditure components simultaneously when 
analysing the effect of fiscal policy variables on Gross Domestic Product per 
capita (GDP per capita) and employment/unemployment at a sub-national level.  
This research intends to be a pragmatic application of fiscal policy management.  
My work shows that the impact of fiscal policy variables is not equal among the 
different levels of government.  My results are consistent with Devarajan et al. 
(1996) that find that current expenditure can boost growth in less developed 
economies, and the relationship between government capital expenditure and 
growth is negative in developing countries due to misallocations of public 
spending.  The current study shows that the 1998 Federal Reform has a positive 
effect, particularly on low income localities in Mexico, while some negative 
effects in more developed municipalities.  According to the results of my self-
developed survey in Mexico during 2014-2015, government officials considered 
that fiscal policy had a significant effect on growth (up to 65%) and only (2-5%) 
thought it was not significant.  With respect to the analysis of Latinobarómetro 
 XI 
surveys 2008-2010 for localities in Mexico, I utilise an ordered probit regression 
where the dependent variable reflects the response to questions regarding taxes, 
confidence and satisfaction of local services and the independent variables in my 
model are the fiscal variables.  In my understanding, there has not been a similar 
exercise in establishing a relationship between taxpayer’s satisfaction and fiscal 
policy variables.  My results show a lack of confidence in the local government 
and poor taxpayer satisfaction with municipal services. 
 
Overall, my research suggests that 1) policy makers need to account for local 
population needs and disparities to overcome regional inequalities; 2) a lack of 




List of Abbreviations 
CONEVAL National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy 
ECLAC Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
FAEB Fund of contributions for basic education and Normal  
FAETA Fund and Technological Education of Adults  
FAIS Fund of contributions for the Social Infrastructure  
FAM Multiple contributions fund  
FASP Fund of contributions for Public Security of the States and the Federal District  
FASSA Fund contributions for health services  
FE Fixed Effects 
FISE Fund for State Social Infrastructure  
FISM Municipal Social Infrastructure Fund  
FORTAMUN Fund of contributions to the strengthening of municipalities  
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GMM Generalised Method of Moments 
ILOSTAT International Labour Organization 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IMSS Mexican Institute of Social Security 
INEGI National Institute of Statics and Geography 
ISSSTE State’s Employees´ Social Security and Social Services Institute 
IV Instumental Variable 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement  
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OLS Ordinary Least Squares 
PMG Pooled Mean Group 
SHCP Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público 
UN United Nations 





Fiscal Policy in the context of Mexican and Latin American 
economies 
After the great recession of 2008-2009 and considering 2016 modest 
development, growth is not enough to reduce inequality and improve citizens’ 
well-being.  Proper regulation and low policy uncertainty is necessary to enhance 
investment, growth, employment and an adequate and efficient allocation of 
resources.  Fiscal initiatives should focus on reducing inequality, benefit people 
in need and try to overcome regional disparities, while keeping sound public 
finances.  In this context, each country, region and locality requires its own 
meaningful and consistent policy package to improve productivity, synergies, 
growth, employment, and inclusiveness (OECD, 2017, p.2-5).  Targeted and 
assertive fiscal policies need to be re-evaluated under the lenses of the particular 
characteristics of a locality, the interaction between resources, public provision, 
market structure and citizens´ satisfaction.  Developing economies can be at risk 
if they do not implement accurate fiscal policy as a possible tool to stimulate the 
economy under a complex and dynamic macroeconomic scenario.  Fiscal 
policies should be effective in order to apply countercyclical policies and local 
governments would have to promote plausible and well-designed institutional 
framework, such as fiscal rules, stabilisation funds, and medium-term 
expenditure agendas, which can help build fiscal space and fortify policy results 
(Huidrom et. al, 2016, p.1).  Furthermore, efforts to strengthen the rule of law 
and fight against corruption, increase government accountability and 
transparency, coherent and realistic policy making, enhance public and private 
investment, training and coaching programs for workers can boost economic 
growth in the long-run (OECD, 2017, p.4-6).  In a scenario of economic 
difficulty where income derived from non-renewable natural resources is 
decreasing in Latin American countries, the implementation of precise fiscal 
reform measures, the efficient use of available resources that guarantees the 
satisfactory provision of public services and an adequate institutional framework 
is imperative to promote economic growth (ECLAC, 2016, p.5-7). 
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Considering that neoclassical growth theory is simplified and contains theoretical 
assumptions as perfect competition and constant returns to scale that do not hold 
in real life, it is much more sensible to consider that economic growth is an 
endogenous consequence of the interaction of several variables within the 
economic system, where private and public sector play a key role in the 
development of the economy (Romer, 1994, p.3).  Every day public policy 
decisions do not come with a manual of precise assumptions, statistics and data; 
however, it is possible to use the available evidence in a pragmatic way in order 
to understand the institutional framework and the determinants of growth.  The 
aim of this thesis is to analyse fiscal policy with a realistic approach. 
 
In the extant literature, several growth studies focus either in the income or in the 
expenditure side when analysing the development of economies.  Moreover, due 
to the lack of availability of data and time series, previous studies have 
predominantly focused on developed economies at a country level.  Considering 
income studies, Ormaechea (2012), Johansson et al. (2008) and Angelopoulos et 
al. (2012) find that reducing direct taxes while increasing indirect taxes have a 
positive impact on growth.  However, Huang and Frentz (2014) find that there is 
no clear evidence that tax increases harm growth, particularly at a state level (p.8, 
10).  Arvate and Rocha (2013), Kappeler et al. (2013) and Binswanger-Mkhize et 
al. (2012) illustrate the positive effect of transfers on growth and local 
investment.  Regarding expenditure research, Guillemette (2010), Angelopoulos 
et al. (2008), Nijkamp and Poot (2004) and Bose et al. (2003) find positive 
growth effects of productive expenditure for transport & communication, 
education & health, research & development.  Only some authors have 
considered the simultaneous development of income and expenditure variables as 
Gemmell et al. (2012 and 2009) and Kneller et al. (1999).  This current study 
recognises the importance of considering both set of variables in the balance 
sheet (available resources and sources of funding) when analysing localities in 
Mexico.  Specifically, this work stipulates that effective local fiscal policy needs 
to take into account particular characteristics of a region and its level of 
development.  Evidence presented in this thesis, suggests that each locality has 
its own particular combination of resources, capabilities and needs.  Furthermore, 
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as an innovative approach, this study discusses the linkage between policy 
makers’ perception, public finances and the local inhabitants’ opinion regarding 
public services provided in Mexican States.   
 
The importance of public finance to promote the development of localities has 
been widely discussed in the literature (Rosen, 2002, p.4).  Economic 
development refers to all economic activities within a locality which promote 
higher growth and investment, an adequate allocation of resources, better 
distribution of income, equity, efficiency, welfare as well as the wellbeing of the 
population.  Hence, in this study I focus on growth in 32 states and 2,247 
Mexican municipalities, and in 20 Latin American economies from 1994 to 
2010, measured as GDP per capita with the limitations of data availability. The 
selection of Mexico at 2 different levels of government and Latin American 
economies refer to developing countries with similar economic and geographic 
characteristics, where the allocation of limited public resources is essential for 
policy making decisions.  After Latin American colonies achieve their 
independence they become primary-exporter economies, however, during the XX 
century, they implement policies of industrialization by import substitution; and 
in the 1980s-debt crisis enforce reform policies which generate a new socio-
economic structure in the region (Hidalgo A., 2000).  This work considers the 
relevance of understanding the dynamics of fiscal policy in the region as a 
geopolitical and geo-strategic scheme at a subnational level, particularly in 
Mexico, where the analysis is focused on the 32 states and 2,247 municipalities. 
This thesis corroborates the complexity and heterogeneity at a local level in the 
region, in clear divergence from developed economies.  The period of study 
begins in 1994 because it is when the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) is signed between Mexico, Canada and USA, and ends in 2010 
because in 2011 the implementation of different accounting practices between 
municipalities, states and federal government in Mexico takes place.  Although 
the General Law on Government Accounting, which applies to all levels of 
government was approved by the Congress in December 2008 as a base to 
harmonise accountability, its operation gradually applies during 2009 when the 
new Federal Accountability Law is introduced and in 2010 when the accounting 
 4 
framework and regulations are delineated so that in 2011 entities would be able 
to begin the accounting registration in a harmonised way (Khagram and De 
Renzio, 2013).  Additional reforms take place in 2012 in order to establish the 
parameters to determine indicators and compliance goals. More accurate 
financial, programmatic, budget and fiscal reporting takes place between 2013 
and 2015.  In 2016 the full accounting, programmatic and budget legislation and 
harmonization among states and municipalities is formalised. 
 
As it will be further demonstrated, the significance of fiscal variables will 
increase, the lower the level of government, thus, at a municipal level, this works 
finds surprising results, while at a country level, the significance of fiscal 
variables is lost due to combining countries with different context and 
circumstances, regardless of having similar level of development.  This research 
considers that an effective fiscal policy should focus on the simultaneous 
analysis of the main components of income and expenditure, since the traditional 
measurement of primary and operational balance is not sufficient for 
understanding the way resources are derived and channelled. Likewise, it is 
essential to take into account the particular characteristics of a certain locality in 
order to implement an accurate fiscal policy. 
 
As mentioned earlier, there are two main streams of economic thought related to 
the role of fiscal policies on growth.  On the one hand, there are neoclassical 
growth models (Solow 1956) which do not recognize a long-term impact on 
growth from fiscal policy manoeuvring and on the other hand, endogenous 
growth models that consider human capital, technology and innovation relevant 
to growth development and therefore there is some scope for fiscal policy 
planning (Kneller et al. 1999, p, 171-173).  This current study refers to the latter 
and the importance of including the main components of income and expenditure 
when evaluating fiscal policy impact on GDP per capita growth and employment. 
 
The means of financing the provision of goods and services in a locality, in the 
different layers of government, is relevant for the development of a healthy and 
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sustainable budget.  On average, transfers from central to local governments in 
14 Latin American economies increased from 2.3 percent of GDP in 2000 to 3.9 
percent in 2014, while own source income accounted for 2.6 and 3.2 percentage 
points, during the same period.  Revenue from property taxes has remained stable 
in around 0.4 percent of GDP between 2000 and 2014.  In 9 Latin American 
countries, where information was available, local taxable income has been in the 
range of 2 and 5 percent of total taxable income in the countries analysed with 
the exception of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia (15 percent).  The poor 
evolution of subnational taxable income relates to the weakness and structure of 
tax bases and taxing power. Mostly, taxable income at a subnational level in 
Latin American economies refers to taxes on immovable property, taxes on 
consumption, taxes on production and services and taxes on motor vehicles 
(OECD, 2017 p.130-148).  
 
During 2014 in Mexico, for instance, more than 8 percent of GDP belongs to 
transfers from central to local governments.  Particularly, payroll taxes are an 
important source of local Mexican income, which account for about 41 percent 
of total subnational income, while taxes on immovable property signifies 23 
percentage points and taxes on the use of goods and services represent 13 percent 
of local income.   Although the administration and monitoring of payroll tax is 
easy, it inhibits formal employment. Concerning property taxes, cadastral 
registration and valuation is responsibility of each municipality.  The Mexican 
Constitution establishes that localities are able to collect additional taxes, 
division, consolidation, translation and improvement of immovable property.  
Tax on motor vehicles (transferred exclusively to local governments in 2012) has 
represented a stable basis of revenue, since the increase of the number of cars is 
similar or greater than population growth and it relates to individuals with higher 
purchasing power (ibidem).  As it will be analysed in chapters two and three, 
indirect taxes do not affect relative prices and present a higher burden for low 
income families because the marginal propensity to consume decreases when 
income increases, hence high-income families utilise less proportion of income 
for consumption. The impact is not the same among regions which have distinct 
patterns of consumption.  High income states reflect a positive impact on growth, 
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while at a municipal level middle and high income reflect a positive impact as 
well. Although, property taxes have been raised, they have not been exploited at 
their full potential so there is an opportunity to use them to increase local 
revenue. 
 
Considering that indirect taxes are neutral with respect to the decision of present 
and future consumption, and do not punish or reward savings and investment, 
then, when the tax burden increases, growth can be achieved if the government 
strengthens the capacity of public spending thinking of the dynamism of thriving 
sectors, which, in turn, require stimulus to consolidate their positive tendency 
(Henríquez, 2014).  Although the increase in indirect taxes penalises 
consumption and business margins, it achieves its main goal to raise revenue, 
particularly in high income states and municipalities where the overall capacity 
and infrastructure is larger than in low income localities. 
 
Nations and provinces face enormous challenges in a complex and dynamic 
environment (Auerbach et al., 2009).  In a scenario of fiscal austerity where 
income derived from non-renewable natural resources is decreasing in Latin 
American economies, the efficient use of available resources and fiscal reforms 
is imperative.  Expanding the tax base has become relevant but also increasing 
the effective tax paid by the highest decile of income in order to diminish 
inequality, since capital effective tax is lower than labour effective tax.  Between 
2011 and 2015 the highest decile burden in Latin America has been on average 
around 6 percent, in contrast with 25 percent in European countries.  The fiscal 
strategy should also focus on accountability, transparency, effectiveness of tax 
collection at a local level, particularly in relation to property tax, reduction of 
inefficiencies of public spending, promotion of a tax culture and fight against tax 
evasion and fraud.  In 2014, non-compliance accounts for 2.2 percentage points 
of GDP in value added tax and 4.1 percent in income tax; and even in some 
countries, corporate tax evasion can reach 70 percent.  Fiscal manoeuvring shall 
prioritise investment that enhances growth and minimizes volatility in the 
provision of public goods and services.  Furthermore, the use of new 
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technologies can facilitate the audit and control of taxpayers and at the same time 
improve transparency and accountability of public spending (ECLAC, 2016, p.5-
7).   
 
Tax reforms have increased domestic revenue by utilising specific taxes, 
expanding the tax base, improving tax administration and promoting 
transparency, therefore, taxable income has augmented 0.2 percentage points of 
GDP.  Although Mexico has a higher GDP per capita than other Latin American 
economies, tax revenue is lower than other countries with similar level of 
development.  Likewise, tax revenue in Latin America is half of the European 
Union and 15 percentage points below OECD countries between 1990-2014.  In 
this same period, Latin American direct tax revenue accounts for 4 percentage 
points and indirect tax revenue comes to 9 percentage points of GDP.  During 
2015, for instance, capital spending decreased in 12 Latin American countries. 
Oil producing economies reduced public investment by 1.4 percentage points of 
GDP, while food production countries decreased by one percentage point.  On 
average, in 2015, after several years of continuous current spending increase, oil 
producing economies declined this type of expenditure by one percentage point 
of GDP, nonetheless, food production nations present a significant rise in current 
spending.  Further actions have to be undertaken in order to establish a clear 
separation of current and capital expenditure, enhance investment and restraint 
current spending. Improve efficiency in the procurement processes and 
performance in the acquisition cycle. Make and exhaustive revision to ongoing 
subsidies and transfers (ECLAC, 2016 p.5-65).   
 
Subsidies to producers or consumers have been utilised to promote specific 
agricultural or industrial activities, employment, research, education, art or 
culture, but they are not always transparent or justifiable.  Industrialised 
countries focus on agricultural, transport and manufacture activities, while 
developing economies use them for energy, water and primary activities (Pearce, 
2003). In this study, subsidies exhibit a positive impact in middle and low-
income localities and although I don´t differentiate among several types of 
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subsidy, the message is clear, they are positive for localities with lower level of 
development and thus, necessary to overcome regional disparities.  Subsidies 
have redistributive goals; however, it is desirable to achieve a balance between 
the benefits they provide to specific sectors and their cost.  Low income localities 
can be subsidised for a certain period of time until they reach a better level of 
development.  Local governments have to be cautious on which sectors of the 
local economy could be enhanced in order to promote economic activity and 
growth by lowering the cost of production to the local producers so that they can 
increase output. 
 
In this respect, when implementing subsidies, governments should be aware of 
their purpose and design, beneficiaries, types or nature, instruments, the way they 
are channelled, the market distortions and evaluation (Steenblik, R.,2003).  It is 
important to consider subsidies only for a specific timeframe, otherwise, they can 
affect private investment, consumption and local development in the medium and 
long term; thus, assistance programs foster unproductiveness and lack of 
innovation (Clements et al., 2013).  In June 2016, considering regional disparities 
in Mexico, the Federal Law of Special Economic Zones was promulgated to 
stimulate economic growth, reduce poverty, grant the provision of basic services, 
and broaden the opportunities in the low development regions of the country, 
through the improvement of investment, production, distribution of income, 
competitiveness and employment.  Benefits will be temporary (minimum 8 
years) and will decrease with time. 
 
Reforms to improve the fiscal intergovernmental relations among different levels 
of government diminish volatility in the provision of public services and 
guarantee the maintenance of basic infrastructure.  Solid institutions, 
accountability, integrity, transparency and macroeconomic stability in times of 
negative economic shocks could contribute to a better provision of public 
services (ECLAC, 2016).  Corruption and quality of bureaucracy determine the 
quality of governance and have a sizable impact on public spending effectiveness 
and efficiency.  Therefore, public spending does not necessarily produce the 
 9 
expected outcomes and the empirical differences in public expenditure can be 
explained by the quality of governance and developing countries in particular 
have poor governance (Rajkumar, A. and Swaroop, V., 2008).  D’Agostino et al. 
(2016) show in a panel of 106 countries that there is a strong and negative impact 
between corruption and investment, hence policies that reduce corruption would 
have a positive impact on growth.  Developing countries with ineffective 
governments could benefit from public investment since private investment 
would be discouraged and government investment could be a substitute for 
private investment (Butkiewicz, J. and Yanikkaya, H., 2011). 
 
As it will be analysed in the subsequent chapters two and three, there is a 
significant difference in the composition of public spending between more 
developed and less developed localities, in terms of infrastructure, subsidies and 
transfers. Surprisingly, current spending has a positive relationship with growth 
while public capital spending reflects a negative effect.  This result is consistent 
with Devarajan et al. (1996) and Gregoriou and Ghosh (2009).  The later finds 
that current expenditure on wages, salaries, subsidies and pensions in 15 
developing countries can be very heterogeneous, and in my perspective, this 
outcome can be applied to localities in developing countries as well, considering 
the differentiated results in my work from states and municipalities.   
 
Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008, p.510-512) point out that the traditional logic of 
spending in capital goods does not work in developing countries not because they 
have overspent as Devarajan has explained, but as a result of a difference in 
productivity related to distorted stimulus framework, governmental inefficiencies 
and corruption.  High corruption is associated with high public capital spending 
and low operational and maintenance disbursement, since capital spending 
implies new projects that could be compromised to self-interested agents, bribery 
and fraud, and consequently to a low productivity of public capital expenditure.  
Likewise, corruption can increase tax evasion, promote a poor tax administration 
and generate low tax revenues.  Therefore, current, operational and maintenance 
expenditure could enable full capacity utilisation and expand output.  There is a 
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huge task for developing economies to perceive correctly public expenditure 
productivities of the different types of outlays.  According to Bayraktar et al. 
(2015), the strong link between growth and public expenditure applies to 
countries with macroeconomic stability, therefore expenditure policy should take 
into account core sectors in an integrated way, with the interconnection between 
their current and capital components and specific country characteristics should 
be addressed to derive any recommendations. 
 
Local governments can provide several types of goods and services directly to 
the population, invest in physical or social infrastructure, increase productivity of 
the factors of production or apply transfers/subsidies to specific sectors. 
Significant expenditure refers to administration, wages and salaries where 
efficiency of the public sector can promote private investment if public spending 
is channelled to complimentary goods and services of private production, 
particularly in developing economies.  If public spending is allocated to 
consumers, income effect can affect labor effort and impact negatively economic 
activity, however, if it is directed to social and capital infrastructure while 
improving the marginal productivity of capital, then economic production 
increases.  Social benefit should be higher than its costs and any alternative use 
of resources; budget planning should focus on the social and production needs of 
a locality within an adequate institutional framework. Besides, if government 
spending decreases private enterprise costs, then competitiveness increases and 
growth. Nonetheless, the relationship between public investment and 
employment is heterogeneous and there is no clear pattern (Hernández Mota, 
2010). 
 
The proper equilibrium between taxes and transfers is essential at a subnational 
level, thus transparency, efficiency, stability and equity should be properly 
coordinated as well.  Higher local income should promote responsibility in 
spending, economic development and fiscal discipline. Nevertheless, higher tax 
collection at a subnational level, increases regional disparities because high 
income urban localities would be able to handle them but not rural localities, 
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therefore, central government transfers could compensate this effect and equalise 
the differences in regional development.  In Mexico, where transfers represent 
more than eighty percent of total income (as it will be analysed in chapters two 
and three), localities income is not stable and fluctuates according to central 
government transfers; hence, municipalities can decrease the fiscal effort to 
collect local revenues, increase spending and debt because mayors perceive 
transfers as fixed.  An increase in central government transfers generates a higher 
expenditure than the one generated with the same income derived from local 
taxes because there is a substitution effect where local government maximises its 
budget.   
 
Blochliger and Charbit (2010) find a negative relationship between transfers and 
fiscal effort and a positive relationship with spending and debt.  Although it 
would be desirable that transfers were distributed according to the real needs of 
localities and stabilised local income when fluctuations in the economic cycle 
occur, their effect is rather destabilising, particularly in localities which receive 
high transfers and have low fiscal capacity.  The increments in transfers from 
central government are systematic but reductions seem difficult to handle 
politically.  Preferably, it is desirable that municipal public service provision is 
linked to its costs, therefore, property taxes that are stagnant, not distributive nor 
cyclic, not exportable and with a uniform tax base should be fully exploited at a 
local level.  Nonetheless, a proper mix of property, consumption and income tax 
should be evaluated at a local level considering efficiency, equality and stability 
(Hernández M., 2010). 
 
According to Tello (2015), municipalities with natural resources are highly 
dependent on the resources derived from them, do not diversify and their effect 
on employment and manufacturing activities in other sectors is negligible.  
Although oil and mineral extraction promote other linked activities to flourish, 
they are all restrained to a single activity but at the moment it ceases, affects the 
whole economic chain.  In fact, income derived from this kind of resources 
provokes higher inequality, weak institutions, less human capital and investment, 
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as well as a lack of innovation and effort from municipalities (Alcalde, 2016).  
 
Property tax has been recognised to be the main source of income, particularly 
for local governments and it could be fully exploited in Latin American countries 
by improving tax administration, operational capacity, control, expanding 
coverage and updating cadastral values.  Besides, local governments have been 
the main agents of employment in less developed states, therefore, it has been 
problematic to restrain current spending.  For this reason, it is important that 
public policy promotes activity of the private sector, as a channel to increase 
local employment.  Diminish bureaucratic barriers to local enterprise creation, 
foster strategic alliances between the public and the private sector for the 
provision of public services, promote research and development and enhance 
entrepreneurship among graduate students.  Public programs could focus on 
strengthening aptitudes of participants conducive to incorporate them to the labor 
force (ECLAC, 2016). 
 
Public finances develop in this multifaceted context where economics alone is 
not the sole consideration when evaluating particular decisions regarding fiscal 
policy: an ethical and political judgement is inherent to this process (Rosen, 
2002, p.7).  In particular, diverse institutional frameworks in localities play a key 
role in the efficiency of public policies (North, 1993).  By acknowledging the 
perception of policy makers with respect to income and expenditure variables 
and their relationship to growth in Mexican states, while understanding local 
inhabitants’ opinions regarding the public services provided, this current work 
aims to link several fiscal policy outcomes with both sets of actors: local 
authorities and people affected by the local policies. 
 
In most Latin American countries public finance management, accountability and 
public policy has been centralised and paternalistic, however, it is necessary to 
promote better administration, accountability and control at a state and municipal 
level in order to diminish waste and inefficient use of resources.  Thus, the use of 
resources is limited, while information and data have poor quality and reliability 
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in the lower levels of government.  According to Cabrero Mendoza (2000) 
around 55 percent of the municipalities in Mexico do not have administrative 
laws and regulations, and when they do, they are not up to date.  Although, the 
existence of internal rulings does not guarantee an efficient administration, their 
inexistence generates disorder and impunity.  Besides, 74 percent of the localities 
do not have a proper planning regulation with clear objectives, actions and goals 
that will allow them an optimum use of resources.  Sixty percent of the 
municipalities do not have a responsible area for expenditure monitoring and 
planning; and only 46 percent carry out monitoring and supervision activities, 
mainly in medium and large urban localities. Furthermore, the fact that voters 
cannot re-elect their legislators, annihilates any possibility to reward or punish 
them for their performance.  The aim of accountability is to make effective the 
responsibility of the governors to the citizens. 
 
Recent reforms in the secondary legislation in Mexico (July 2016) were enacted 
to promote a new legal framework which aims to strengthen public governance 
and endorse accountability, integrity and transparency in the government.  In this 
respect, the National Auditing System is a fundamental platform for the 
coordination, information and improvement in governance.  Committed action 
among audit institutions, legislature, executive branch and citizens will be 
necessary to implement reforms and provide positive results to Mexican 
population.  Local audit institutions would have to fulfil their role with 
accountability and transparency in local governments, promoting evidence-based 
policies, audits in real time and more frequent reports to legislators for the 
benefit of local people.  In fact, legal, policy and implementation gaps inhibit the 
efficiency, capacity and quality of auditing at a local level.  Hence, the National 
Auditing System could address these gaps by harmonisation standards and 
professional improvement of the audit service in states and municipalities.  
Providing the Congress greater use of the audit reports and enhance their 
technical capacity would consolidate accountability (OECD, 2017, p.3-4).   
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Governments promote development usually through four main economic 
objectives: stabilisation of the economy, allocation of resources, redistribution of 
income, and economic growth (Tanzi, 2008, p.17).  As described earlier in this 
chapter, local governments raise property, payroll and some indirect taxes but 
their main source of income are central government transfers, which have a 
redistributive character since the less developed localities receive a higher 
amount of transfers.  Subsidies play an important role in low income localities 
because they are a mean to overcome regional disparities.  Nonetheless, local 
governments have to be cautious of subsidy design, purpose and framework in 
order to keep sound local public finances.  Furthermore, according to the results 
of this work, current government spending is preferable to public capital in less 
developed localities because operational and maintenance expenditure can enable 
full capacity and enhance growth.  In this context, the difference in 
productivities, government inefficiencies and corruption play an important role.  
Therefore, local governments can prioritise investment to complimentary goods 
and supplies that promote growth and an appropriate provision of public services.  
In order to stabilise local economies, an effort has to be made to strengthen local 
income so as not to be so dependent in central government transfers, update 
cadastral values, apply new technologies, achieve fiscal discipline and better 
accountability and transparency in the spending. 
 
In Latin America, various actors are involved in the budgetary process:  
ministers, legislators, civil servants and civil society, since it is one of the most 
important matters for a nation. Nonetheless, priorities and procedures vary 
between countries (Filc and Scartascini, 2010, p.2).  In Mexico, the ministers of 
finance do not design the government budget in isolation because public finances 
are circumscribed by a legal framework as follows. The President, through the 
Ministry of Finance, presents to the Chamber of Deputies the economic package. 
This package contains the General Criteria of Economic Policy, the initiatives for 
the Federal Revenue Law, several initiatives of amendments to income tax, 
federal fees, federal tax and excise tax and the Federal Spending Budget project.  
Subsequently, the Chamber of Deputies makes amendments to the original 
project and when it is ready, it is revised, modified and approved by the Senate.  
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At a local level, governors are obliged to present their income and spending 
budget projects, as well as the amendments to their tax codes and local fees to the 
Local Congress, which then makes further amendments until approval is reached 
(SHCP; 2012). 
 
Local governments are the closest providers of most public services to the 
community and they are required to align their objectives to the National 
Development Plan (Presidencia de la República, 2007).  National policies should 
be demarcated by acknowledging the distinct capabilities and resources found at 
the different layers of government. For instance, more developed localities can 
have some space for fiscal policy management while less developed localities, 
which might be highly dependent on central transfers, can scarcely have any 
opportunities for fiscal policy management.  According to this thesis, one of the 
main concerns of public finance government officials and other governmental 
bodies (Ministries of Finance, Congress, etc.) is how to increase revenue and 
optimize the use of resources (expenditure), which in turn can lead to higher 
levels of GDP per capita growth, investment and employment, in other words, 
better fiscal policy management and economic performance. The idea of 
effectiveness in the use of resources while analysing disaggregated revenue and 
expenditure trends at a national level has been developed by Gemmell and Au 
(2013, p.223-229) and Kneller et al. (1999, p.171-190).   
 
At the local level, which is the main focus of this study, I must consider that 
social, economic, political, administrative and institutional variables as well as 
powerful groups of interest, the level of development and degree of 
accountability pertaining to each locality play an important role in establishing 
the ways in which resources are distributed and applied.  Unfortunately, local 
finances in Mexico, particularly at a municipal level, are opaque with regards to 
administration and distribution of resources (IMCO, 2014).  As mentioned 
earlier, local governments most of the time have limited resources and 
capabilities, high dependency on central government transfers, diverse forms of 
local public service provision, different legislation, as well as different levels of 
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poverty, inequality, accompanied with fragile institutions, a lack of transparency 
and weak accountability.  Diversity and heterogeneity among localities give birth 
not only to an uneven distribution of wealth but also to distinct local public 
service delivery (Moscovich, 2015).  Therefore, in order to be able to provide 
public services efficiently, specific administrative, social, economic and 
institutional framework should be taken into account when data are available.  
Latin American localities in particular, present high levels of inequalities in 
terms of resources, capabilities, responsibilities and fiscal policy management, 
therefore, a uniform central policy that fails to acknowledge their differences 
would show different effects of fiscal policy on local economic growth. 
 
Fiscal policy can be considered a governmental mechanism which allows for the  
management of income and expenditure variables to achieve specific 
governmental economic and social objectives (Bunea-Bontas et al., 2009 p.2). 
Fiscal policy delineated at a central level can stimulate economic activity by 
adjusting the fiscal tax scheme and government trends in expenditure and debt. 
As discussed before, decisions concerning taxing different sources of income 
from households and/or businesses, consumption or property depend upon 
efficiency and distributional considerations, while enhancing the use of 
infrastructure and capital expenditure is important to stimulate a better provision 
of public services.  Nonetheless, the pressure of pension disbursements and 
resources committed to education, health, social welfare or insurance 
programmes, usually limits the room for governmental manoeuvring.  
Furthermore, at a local level, the possibility of fiscal policy management depends 
heavily on the role of central government transfers in supporting local public 
finances and frameworks. Consequently, government finance has a direct impact 
on the way people in localities develop their work, consume, pay taxes, invest or 
save in certain assets or activities.  Individuals’ willingness to contribute to 
public funds can be determined by their satisfaction with public services, the 
transparency and accountability of public resources, their perceptions with 
respect to whether or not the money they pay through taxes, fees and charges is 
being invested satisfactorily so as to their needs.  
 
 17 
Aims and objectives 
The first aim of this work is to understand the effect of fiscal variables on output 
per capita growth and employment/unemployment in 32 states and 2,247 
municipalities of Mexico, and in 20 Latin American economies from 1994-2010.  
Particularly, by using a full disaggregation of fiscal components, I will be able to 
analyse the impact of fiscal policy in different levels of government and 
development.  The second aim is to evaluate the impact on GDP per capita of the 
1998 Federal Reform to the Fiscal Coordination System in Mexico, because it 
was the most significant reform for a decade regarding transfers from central to 
local governments.  Finally, to complement the overall analysis, the third aim is 
to make a link between the perception of policy makers regarding fiscal policy 
variables, public finances and the opinions of people regarding taxes levied and 
spending efficiency. 
 
Specifically, the questions considering the distinct levels of government are:  
1) What is the combined impact of taxes and public expenditure on output per 
capita growth and employment?  
2) What is the impact on GDP per capita of the 1998 Federal Reform to the 
Fiscal Coordination System in Mexico? 
3) What is the linkage between the perception of policy makers with respect to 
fiscal variables, public finances and the local inhabitants’ opinion regarding 
public services provided? 
This thesis addresses the first and second questions using fixed-effects panel data 
econometric methodology of local fiscal variables and the third question is 
addressed with the analysis of a self-developed survey covering the 32 Mexican 
states and Latinobarómetro surveys for the period from 2008 to 2010. 
 
Main research methods 
This study will contribute to a better understanding of different tax and 
expenditure combinations and their effect on output per capita growth and 
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employment, using a fixed-effects panel data econometric approach to Mexico's 
32 states and 2,247 municipalities and 20 Latin American countries from 1994 to 
2010 by applying fixed-effects regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors to 
states and municipalities in Mexico. Additionally, simultaneous quantile 
regressions in Mexican municipalities are analysed in order to understand the 
diversity among localities.  The econometric model utilised is derived from 
Gemmell, Kneller & Sanz (2012 p.1-35) and Kneller, Bleaney & Gemmell’s 
(1999, p.171-190) approaches considering GDP per capita growth in terms of a 
set of fiscal and control variables.  Additionally, I analyse the impact of taxes and 
central government transfers on employment at a country, state and municipal 
level. 
 
Contribution to Knowledge 
The main contribution of this study is to estimate -within the limitations of the 
available data- the impact of the main income and expenditure components on 
GDP per capita growth and employment at a sub-national level in Mexico and in 
the 20 Latin American countries between 1994 and 2010, acknowledging their 
distinct framework of level of government and development of each.  
Accordingly, the innovative contribution of this study is to analyse the combined 
effects of different kinds of disaggregated expenditure and taxes on output per 
capita and employment at a sub-national level and acknowledging their 
differences.  For the case of Mexico in particular, the impact on output per capita 
of the 1998 Federal Reform to the Fiscal Coordination System is analysed.  The 
linkage between policy makers’ perception regarding fiscal variables, public 
finances and the local inhabitants’ opinion in relation to public services provided 
is crucial to understanding the way resources are utilised according to the 
priorities of the local authorities and the perceived benefit of governmental 
services among people within a certain locality. This in turn gives a broader 
picture of the use of public funds by involving both actors: local authorities and 




Structure of the study 
 
This study is organised as follows:  
 
1.  Introduction 
This chapter explains the importance of fiscal policy management for achieving 
specific economic and social objectives in Latin American economies and in 
Mexico in particular.  The purpose and the main contribution of the current study 
are the combined analysis of disaggregated income and expenditure key 
components and their effect on GDP per capita growth and employment at a sub-
national level whilst taking into consideration their differences, have been 
presented. 
 
2.  Mexico: State Performance and Analysis 
The first section of this chapter refers to the development of fiscal policy 
measures in the Mexican tax system and the evolution of public expenses in the 
last 30 years. Issues of fiscal federalism are raised in order to understand 
intergovernmental relationships in the country.  The second section indicates the 
evolution of macroeconomic growth theory with particular focus on the 
endogenous growth models.  It also describes the inclusion of government 
employment in a macroeconomic model and explains the approach of Gemmell 
(2012) and Kneller (1999) within the framework of Government Budget 
Constraint Models.  Previous empirical research on the topic is exemplified. The 
third section provides a general description of the main methodologies utilised in 
growth and employment models.  Finally, in the last section, a fixed effect panel 
data approach considering cross sectional dependence is applied to the 32 states 
with the aim of determining the combined effect of fiscal policy variables on 
GDP per capita growth and employment.  The impact on GDP per capita of the 
1998 Federal Reform to the Fiscal Coordination System is examined. 
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3.  Mexico: Municipal Fiscal Analysis 
Municipal heterogeneity has been a concern for public policy analysis, and it is 
necessary to understand their specific dynamics, capabilities, possibilities and 
sources of improvement in order to develop sound municipal finances.  The 
relevant literature and methodologies at a local level are addressed. A fixed 
effect panel data approach considering cross sectional dependence is applied to 
the 2,274 municipalities with the aim of determining the combined effect of 
fiscal policy variables on growth and employment.  Quantile regressions are later 
considered in order to understand the growth and employment disparities among 
different localities. 
 
4.  Latin America 
This chapter refers to the development of fiscal policy measures in 20 Latin 
American countries during the period covering 1994 to 2010.  The relevance of 
intergovernmental transfers, quality and transparency of public expenditure are 
discussed.  Some literature review and methodologies utilised are described.  A 
cross-country panel data approach is applied at a national level for two levels of 
government with the purpose of outlining different income and expenditure 
trends and their impact on growth and unemployment. 
 
5.  A Social Perspective of Public Finances 
The first section of the chapter refers to the challenges and limitations of surveys 
of public opinion, while the second describes some survey methodologies.  The 
third section relates to the Mexican framework, considering the perception of 
policy makers regarding different kinds of taxes levied and several types of 
expenditure utilised and their impact on output per capita.  The last part of the 
chapter refers to local inhabitants’ opinion regarding public services provided 





6.  Concluding Remarks, Recommendations and Future Research. 
The first part of this chapter gives an overall view of this study.  In the second 
part, the major findings and implications of the empirical research are briefly 
described.  Finally, the recommendations, limitations and potential areas of 
future research are recognised. 
  22 
2. Mexico: State Performance and Analysis 
 
This chapter refers to the development of fiscal policy measures in the Mexican 
tax system and the evolution of public expenses over the period from 1980 to 
2010. Issues of fiscal federalism are raised in order to understand 
intergovernmental relationships in the country.  The second section refers to the 
evolution of growth and employment theories and explains the approach of 
Gemmell (2012) and Kneller (1999) within the framework of Government 
Budget Constraint Models. Previous empirical research on the topic is 
exemplified. The third section describes the main methodologies utilised in 
growth and employment models.  Finally, in the last section, a fixed effect panel 
data approach considering cross sectional dependence is applied to the 32 states 
with the aim of determining the simultaneous effect of fiscal policy variables on 
growth.  Besides, the impact of taxes and central government transfers on 
employment will be evaluated.  The impact on GDP per capita of 1998 Federal 
Reform to the Fiscal Coordination System is examined. 
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2.1 Evolution of the Mexican Economy 
2.1.1 Mexican Income Policy 
At the beginning of the 1980’s there was a comprehensive revision of the 
Mexican tax system, modernising income and indirect taxation and at the same 
time, realise a complete transformation of the fiscal coordination system 
(Budebo, 1995).  The multiple schedular taxes imposed on personal income tax 
were substituted by the concept of global income applying unique progressive 
tax rates.  At a corporate level, the double taxation on dividends was eliminated 
through the inclusion of a special account which levied taxes only at a corporate 
level; however, if some earnings were not taxed, these would be recognised and 
taxed at an individual level.  Regarding indirect taxation, tax on mercantile 
revenues, one hundred state taxes and thirty-one federal taxes where substituted 
by the value added tax, the special tax on production and services and the tax on 
new cars. Moreover, by the end of the decade, a complete indexation of assets, 
liabilities and capital was fully recognised in the fiscal system and a minimum 
tax was introduced in order to increase the efficiency and control of the tax 
system (Amieva-Huerta, 2002). 
 
A significant reform during 1980 was the establishment of a fiscal coordination 
system which enabled the federal government to keep the most important taxes 
such as income and value added, while giving the states the faculty to have a 
share in their revenue and administration.  Between 1980-1985 there was a 
constant reduction of value added tax receipts and although the states kept thirty 
per cent for each peso collected, federal government decided to transfer the total 
administration of the value added tax to the states in 1990 (Budebo et al., 1995). 
However, in 1990 the federal government reassumes the administration of this 
tax attending efficiency considerations. In 1989 an asset tax of 2% was 
introduced as means of improving efficiency and control of the tax system.  The 
introduction of this tax increased the tax base and revenue while diminishing 
fiscal evasion. Budebo et al., 1995 highlight that for each peso collected through 
the asset tax, an additional 3.5 pesos were collected by the income tax. 
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According to 1983 General Public Finance Account, governmental income can 
be classified in: 1) taxable and non-taxable; 2) oil and not oil income; 3) 
proceeds derived from federal government and parastatal sector under direct 
budgetary control.  During the period 1983-1989 there was a considerable 
reduction in the oil proceeds due to the decline in prices, therefore, there was a 
lot of pressure on the government budget considering that that oil income 
accounted for 38% of the total income (Amieva-Huerta, 2010).   Under these 
circumstances, the only source of income that could be more reliable and long-
lasting is taxable income which depends upon the taxing scheme and economic 
activity.  In the present thesis, I consider the first classification of income in each 
of the 31 states and the Federal District (32 local entities in total) distinguishing 
between taxable and non-taxable income. 
 
During the 1990s, one of the most significant steps in achieving higher efficiency 
in tax collection was the introduction of the tax administration service in 1997 
with the purpose of strengthening tax receipts, realise an effective application of 
the tax legislation, promote voluntary compliance and improve service with the 
development of the professional fiscal career (Budebo 1999). 
 
In this century, fiscal policy in Mexico has played a fundamental role in order to 
attain macroeconomic stability while encouraging moderate spending.  The main 
orientation of the fiscal reforms has been the development of an efficient and 
internationally competitive tax code.  In this context, the current analysis and 
exclusively for the Mexican States and the Federal District, Income from 
Local Entities will be disaggregated as: 
➢ Taxes (own source) 
➢ Rights (own source) 
➢ Financial Products (own source) 
➢ Other Duties (own source) 
➢ Improvement Contributions (own source)  
➢ Income Federal participation (non-earmarked transfers) 
➢ Federal Government Contributions (earmarked transfers) 
➢ Other Income  
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Income Trend Development  
 
As it has been addressed, states are highly dependent on federal income 
resources, high income states receive between 49 and 82 percent of their total 
income from federal transfers, while generating between 11 and 13 percent of 
their own resources.  Distrito Federal would be the only exception to the rule, 
since it generates around 42 percent of its resources.  In the case of middle 
income localities, they receive between 71 and 91 percent of federal resources, 
while they generate about 7 and 10 percent of their own resources.  Lower 
income states present the highest dependency on federal transfers with a rate 
between 74 and 93 percent, while own source income represent around 4 or 7 
percent. 
 
In relation to resources derived from local taxes, high income states receive 
above 4 percent of their income from this source, except Distrito Federal which 
receive around 20 percent of its income from taxes.  Middle income states 
receive between 2 and 4 percent from taxes, while low income localities receive 
between 1 and 2 percent from this source. 
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Source: Own elaboration with data of INEGI (Mexico's National Institute of Statistics and Geography)
Mean by Group
Total Income
Own Source Income Federal Transfers Extraordinary Income Initial Funds Liability
HI - High income MI - Middle income LI - Low income
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Table 2.1 State Income by Group 1994-2010 
 
Group Variable 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Federal 
Transfers
49.44 63.40 68.21 67.30 72.26 72.00 77.38 82.05 80.09 81.78 79.82 81.74 82.01 77.81 80.74 80.00 75.68
Own Source 
Income
13.02 12.43 12.59 13.49 11.20 11.45 11.48 11.98 11.75 12.05 13.31 13.12 12.78 13.20 12.22 11.87 11.76
Extraordinary 
Income
36.22 22.95 18.86 17.67 14.08 13.16 7.98 3.55 4.39 3.92 4.69 1.75 1.89 5.82 4.93 5.83 11.76
Initial Funds 
Liability
1.31 1.22 0.34 1.55 2.47 3.39 3.16 2.41 3.78 2.25 2.19 3.38 3.32 3.17 2.11 2.29 0.80
Federal 
Transfers
71.31 78.06 82.91 87.67 90.12 90.16 90.71 90.08 89.94 89.09 89.06 87.98 87.34 83.68 86.60 83.89 86.27
Own Source 
Income
10.42 10.31 8.29 7.87 7.86 7.80 7.74 6.55 6.52 6.55 6.58 7.53 7.75 8.12 7.65 7.26 7.56
Extraordinary 
Income
17.99 11.36 7.80 3.98 1.85 1.89 1.38 2.62 3.44 3.99 4.17 4.09 3.46 5.49 4.05 6.14 4.73
Initial Funds 
Liability
0.28 0.27 1.00 0.48 0.17 0.14 0.17 0.75 0.10 0.38 0.19 0.39 1.45 2.71 1.70 2.71 1.45
Federal 
Transfers
74.40 83.04 85.52 91.08 91.98 92.66 92.97 92.13 91.46 90.04 91.35 92.52 90.14 86.28 90.26 87.31 83.52
Own Source 
Income
5.57 7.04 5.44 5.21 5.08 4.61 4.02 4.07 4.01 4.37 4.47 4.70 5.49 4.62 4.75 4.31 4.54
Extraordinary 
Income
18.21 8.22 6.69 2.88 1.78 1.16 2.18 1.85 3.03 4.07 3.08 2.05 2.49 7.43 2.76 4.82 9.33
Initial Funds 
Liability









With respect to other income derived from goods and services provided, 
resources received represent roughly half percent of the income for all groups, 
except of Distrito Federal who receives around 2 percent of its income from this 
source. 
 
When analysing the evolution of own source income in high income localities, 
taxes represent only a small amount of resources, however within this category, 
direct taxes represent around 80%, while indirect and other taxes represent 20%.  
In case of middle income states, taxes represent around 70% of this category, 
while the other categories represent around 30%.  In low income localities, direct 
taxes account for 90% of taxable income and the rest is distributed between 
indirect and other taxes. 
 
As mentioned earlier, federal transfers account for an average of 80 percent of 
the total income for high income states.  Distrito Federal would be the only 
exception to the rule, since it generates around 42 percent of its resources.  Of 
those resources, around 55 percent represent non-earmarked transfers and 45 
percent represent earmarked transfers.  In the case of middle income localities, 
they receive around half of their federal resources from non-earmarked transfers 
and the other half of earmarked transfers.  Lower income states present the 
highest dependency on federal transfers with an average rate of 86 percent, 
where non-earmarked transfers account for 42 percent and earmarked transfers 





2.1.2 Expenditure Economic Policy 
According to Amieva-Huerta (2010 p.252-256) current public spending is 
positively related to GDP per capita, which means that current public spending is 
not counter-cyclical and it is highly inelastic due to the institutional committed 
expenditures of the public sector.  Moreover, his analysis rejects Barro’s 
neutrality hypothesis where fiscal policy affects private savings.  His findings 
demonstrate that public current savings have a positive effect on private savings 
which means an interesting result: “public investment complements private 
investment”. 
 
During the 1980’s there were high levels of public expenditures which generated 
in turn high fiscal deficits and caused severe economic crises in 1976, 1982 and 
1986-1987.  While in the last two decades there was a prudent management of 
governmental expenses which enabled stability and economic growth.  The fiscal 
discipline conducted did not meant balanced budget since moderate deficits 
which do not cause major economic disturbances are desirable, when the 
additional resources are invested in productive projects.  Between 1991 and 
2008, fiscal policy was orientated to sound public finances with economic 
deficits not above 0.6% of GDP Amieva-Huerta (2010, p.172). 
 
In Mexico, the Public Sector includes the Federal Government and the Parastatal 
Sector.  In order to derive the economic balance, the Non-Financial Public Sector 
is utilised.  The expenditure policy according to its economic objectives has a 
fundamental role in terms of social security, health, education and investment. 
However, the role of the Parastatal sector is also important in areas such as: 
energy, communications and transport.  Programmable Spending can be 
classified in three ways:  Administrative (according to where the resources are 
allocated - who spends the resources); Economic (which determines the destiny 
of resources - in what are the funds spent) and Functional (refers to the purpose 





Regarding the Expenditure classification of States in Mexico, the publication of 
the Government Accounting Law was made the 31st of December of 2008 in the 
Federal Official Register, while the Functional Classification of Spending that 
applied to all government entities, states and municipalities regarding federal 
funds was published until the 10th of June of 2010.   Therefore, the economic 
classification is used in order to analyse the trends of disaggregated expenses.  In 
this context, the current analysis and exclusively for the Mexican States and 
Mexico City Spending from Local Entities will be disaggregated as: 
 
➢ Personal services 
➢ Materials and inputs 
➢ General services 
➢ Subsidies, transfers and aid 
➢ Acquisition of mobiliary and estates 
➢ Public building and social actions 
➢ Financial investment 
➢ Resources assigned to municipalities 
➢ Other spending 
 
 
Expenditure Trend Development  
The development of total spending clearly shows that about 32 percent of total 
spending for high income localities is current expenditure, subsidies, transfers 
and aid are about 31 percent and capital expenditure accounts for 8 percent.  
Resources assigned for municipalities represent 13 percent of total expenditure 
and extraordinary expenditure accounts for 12 percent of total spending.  In the 
case of middle income states about 25 percent of total spending refers to current 
expenditure, subsidies, transfers and aid are about 39 percent and capital 
expenditure accounts for 11 percent.  Resources assigned for municipalities 
represent 16 percent of total expenditure and extraordinary expenditure accounts 
for 9 percent of total spending.  In low income localities, current spending 
represents 28 percent of total expenditure, subsidies, transfers and aid account for 
32 percent while capital expenditure represents 13 percent of total disbursements.  
Resources assigned for municipalities represent 14 percent of total expenditure 
and extraordinary expenditure accounts for 6 percent of total spending. 
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Source: Own elaboration with data of INEGI (Mexico's National Institute of Statistics and Geography)
Mean by Group
Total Expenditure
Current Spending Capital Expenditure Extraordinary Expenditure
Subsidies, Transfers and Aid Resources Assigned for Municipalities Final Availability
HI - High income MI - Middle income LI - Low income
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Table 2.2 State Expenditure by Group 1994-2010 
 
Group Variable 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Subsidies, Transfers and Aid 32.64 22.94 20.70 22.53 28.63 30.07 32.77 35.55 37.96 37.08 35.43 35.78 38.47 37.68 38.56 40.81 41.53
Current Spending 27.63 34.81 38.05 35.53 32.71 31.09 31.41 34.35 34.61 34.88 33.50 30.34 27.81 27.97 26.15 26.90 27.02
Resources Assigned for Municipalities 9.46 9.00 12.17 13.49 11.21 11.85 11.61 12.72 11.68 11.81 11.91 17.14 16.64 16.72 16.90 16.19 15.59
Capital Expediture 5.95 10.20 6.89 6.83 7.04 7.86 10.01 8.49 9.50 9.20 9.16 8.53 9.42 9.88 9.91 10.62 9.40
Extraordinary Expenditure 23.15 21.73 20.27 18.95 15.11 13.65 8.83 3.32 2.70 3.83 4.75 3.66 3.41 3.57 4.37 2.95 5.64
Final Availability 1.18 1.31 1.91 2.68 5.31 5.48 5.35 5.56 3.56 3.21 5.25 4.55 4.25 4.17 4.10 2.53 0.83
Subsidies, Transfers and Aid 31.92 28.07 30.12 40.39 44.83 45.52 46.61 50.59 48.37 47.41 47.80 46.54 46.45 45.82 46.24 47.83 50.29
Current Spending 29.22 30.22 31.76 28.40 24.51 24.13 23.08 19.60 22.84 21.72 21.32 22.27 21.51 21.74 20.05 19.05 20.38
Resources Assigned for Municipalities 16.47 16.46 16.18 14.06 16.72 18.01 17.13 17.06 17.05 16.34 15.89 15.49 15.14 14.96 15.23 14.21 14.67
Capital Expediture 11.08 8.84 9.55 9.48 9.12 8.84 9.25 8.87 8.09 9.06 9.13 10.54 10.83 11.45 13.48 13.32 10.81
Extraordinary Expenditure 10.15 15.88 10.01 5.00 3.84 3.12 2.82 2.72 2.91 4.37 4.25 3.31 3.20 2.62 2.64 2.12 1.98
Final Availability 1.15 0.52 2.37 2.67 0.99 0.37 1.10 1.17 0.75 1.10 1.61 1.84 2.88 3.40 2.35 3.47 1.88
Subsidies, Transfers and Aid 29.33 16.97 26.93 32.65 42.58 39.25 40.97 45.62 46.33 45.16 46.95 45.31 43.64 47.37 44.54 43.09 43.25
Current Spending 32.88 33.15 36.12 36.04 28.73 28.53 28.18 24.45 24.43 23.72 24.08 23.34 24.01 20.46 24.03 24.02 23.11
Resources Assigned for Municipalities 16.81 17.75 9.08 15.33 15.76 19.44 18.27 18.13 18.07 17.44 16.66 17.10 16.79 15.43 16.33 15.43 14.74
Capital Expediture 9.32 18.00 8.27 10.05 8.46 8.21 9.07 8.68 8.24 9.30 8.33 10.40 10.30 10.70 9.99 11.30 9.55
Extraordinary Expenditure 8.69 11.30 9.55 2.23 2.01 1.34 0.98 1.21 1.27 2.37 2.82 1.94 3.36 3.07 1.20 1.59 4.13










With respect to the evolution of current expenditure in high income localities, 
personal services account for 80 percent, general services represent about 14 
percent while materials and inputs comprise 6 percent of total current spending.  
Regarding middle income states, personal services account for 82 percent, 
general services represent about 14 percent while materials and inputs involve 4 
percent of total current spending.  In the case of low income localities, personal 
services represent 85 percent, general services justify about 10 percent while 
materials and inputs occupy 5 percent of total current spending. 
 
The development of capital expenditure in high income localities reflect 95 
percent of resources applied to public building and social actions, while 
acquisition of mobiliary and estates and financial investment add up to the other 
5 percent of capital expenditure.  With respect to middle income states the 
resources applied to public building and social actions represent on average 90 
percent of capital expenditure, while acquisition of mobiliary and estates and 
financial investment add up to the other 10 percent.  Concerning low income 
localities, the resources applied to public building and social actions represent on 
average 95 percent of capital expenditure, while acquisition of mobiliary and 
estates and financial investment make the other 5 percent of capital expenditure. 
 
2.1.3 Fiscal Federalism 
Mexico is the fifth largest country in the American Continent (2 million m2) and 
according to the latest Census (Censo de Población y Vivienda 2010) it has a 
population of over 112 million. Mexico is a federation with thirty-one states and 
the Federal District (Mexico City) and 2,247 municipalities.  Each State has a 
Local Constitution and Congress, which enables each locality to manage 






Figure 2.1 Mexican States and the Federal District 
 
Source: Modified version of Map from Colmenares Paramo (2007). 
 
The Mexican Fiscal Coordination System has its origins in three National 
Conventions (1925, 1933 and 1947) in order to define new administration and 
distribution of tax faculties, eliminate multiple taxation and promote a better 
distribution of resources.  The normative base of 1980’s Mexican Fiscal 
Coordination System is in the Fiscal Coordination Law and the Accession 
Convention.  It has an Income Participation System where all Current Fiscal 
Federal Income conform the Federal Participable Revenue.  All the Local 
Entities have a share of the Federal Participable Revenue by means of multiple 
funds and consensual formulas. The strength of the System depends upon the 
Permanent Commission of Fiscal Servants, Technical &Working Groups and the 
Governors National Conventions which operate by consensus.  The formulas of 






According to Ahumada (2010), at the beginning of the 1980’s there were three 
funds which basically distributed the proceeds under a compensatory principle by 
incentivising states which showed higher collections of taxes, however, this 
situation generated an inertial component which beneficiated the most wealthy 
and oil-producer states.  During the nineties, the formula of distribution was 
modified by considering 3 components:  Compensatory (45.17%), Distributive 
(45.17%) and the inverse per capita of the other two (9.66%).  Additionally, in 
1998 the 33rd general branch provisions “earmarked transfers” is created as 
means of federal contributions to states which are conditional to the promotion of 
specific areas such as: Basic and teacher’s education; Health services; State 
social infrastructure; Technologic and senior education; Public security, among 
others.  In 2008, with the Reform, the Income participation distribution (non-
earmarked transfers) was made according the GDP of the local entities (60%), 
the collection effort from the local entity of property tax and water rights 
considering the mobile average during the last 3 years (30%) and each entity 
local revenue weight with respect to national (10%).  Besides, the earmarked 
transfers reform of Branch 33 had the aim of clarifying its compensatory 
purpose, therefore, the fund devoted to strengthening the states is distributed 
according to the inverse proportion of state GDP per capita and the fund for basic 
and teacher’s education incorporated on its distribution criteria taking into 
consideration educational lagging and quality. 
 
In the Mexican Federal System, the responsibilities of income and expenses are 
distributed in relation with the most suitable approaches regarding decision 
making process of the provision of public goods and services.  Therefore, in 
order to attain economies of scale, the local jurisdiction closer to the population 
where the service is provided should be the most efficient supplier.  However, 
the Central Government has a competitive advantage of collecting proceeds, such 
as income and consumption taxes, which have the most income potential in an 
economy.  Moreover, the Central Government has a national vision of growth 
and promotes a uniform development among States where there are severe 
regional disparities (state and municipal) in terms of income, capacity and 
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economic performance.  For further detail see Table 2.3 Tax Assignment in a 
Federation and Table 2.4 Local Taxes Levied by States 2010 
 
1998 Federal Reform to the Fiscal Coordination System in 
Mexico 
 
The legal figure of "federal contributions to federal entities and municipalities" 
was created in 1998 considering seven funds to transfer the resources associated 
with basic education, to health services to the open population, social 
infrastructure, technology education and to adults and public security. In all 
cases, the transfer of resources was designed in such a way as to make them with 
formulas auditable and transparent. 
 
One of the fundamental purposes of the federalization process in Mexico has 
been to give power and resources to each level of government, since they are in a 
better position to provide public goods and services needed by the population, 
considering local contexts. For instance, the Federal Government can share 
responsibilities in the development of infrastructure (trunk roads) and public 
health with States. In turn, it can coordinate with the state governments to 
provide services of preventive and curative medical care and local infrastructure 
(state highways), and even delegate completely the improvement and 
maintenance of basic infrastructure to state, and municipalities (Amieva Huerta, 
2002). 
 
The federalization of public spending in Mexico has been carried out by means 
of the federal holdings to states and municipalities, and through two main 
aspects: Federal contributions to federal entities and municipalities, Bouquet 033, 
and Decentralization conventions in the field of secondary and higher education, 




The federal contributions to federal entities and municipalities were incorporated 
in the budget of expenditures of the federation of 1998, in Bouquet 033. This 
includes the following funds: 
 
A. Fund of contributions for basic education and Normal (FAEB) 
B. Fund contributions for health services (FASSA) 
C. Fund of contributions for the Social Infrastructure (FAIS) 
a) Fund for State Social Infrastructure (FISE) 
b) Municipal Social Infrastructure Fund (FISM) 
D. Fund of contributions to the strengthening of municipalities (FORTAMUN) 
E. Multiple contributions fund (FAM) 
a) Social Assistance 
b) Educational Infrastructure 
F. Contributions to the fund and Technological Education of Adults (FAETA) 
a) Technology education 
b) Education for Adults 
G. Fund of contributions for Public Security of the States and the Federal District 
(FASP) 
 
The Bouquet 033, has the following characteristics: it embraces all the federal 
entities; is based on a legal framework that determines the amounts and their 
distribution; the destination of budget allocations and their accessories, is 
expressly established the legal framework; and the resources of each fund 
contributions may not be seized, or used as a guarantee of payment of any type of 
credit. The control and monitoring of the resources of the bouquet 033, once they 
are received by the federal entities and municipalities, and until its total outlay, 
corresponds to the control authorities and internal oversight of the government 
level that corresponds. The audit of the public accounts of the federal entities and 
municipalities, is carried out by the local congresses, in accordance with its own 
laws, ensuring that the units of the local executive and municipalities, 
respectively, have applied the resources of the funds for the purposes that are 
provided for in the law (LCF, 2000).  
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Table 2.3 Tax assignment in a federation 
. 
Tax Type  Government Level Justification
Personal income tax Central and State Government
Government must play a dominant role as the main 
social agent concerned in promoting income 
redistribution, even though some states can also 
perform it
Corporate tax Central Government
At the central level, administration and 
accomplishment problems related to these taxpayers 
are less than at a state level
Payroll tax Central and State Government
Can be imposed by both government levels and be 
tagged for financing social security systems or public 
works for the local government
Wealth tax Central government
At the central level, due to the role it plays in income 
distribution
Property tax
Central State and Local 
MunicipalityGovernment
Can be applied at all government levels since land is 
not mobile
Consumption tax Central and State Government
VAT at state level is very hard to administrate if the 
states set different rates
Specific Consumption tax Central and State Government
Alcohol, tobacco and petrol can be tagged for 
financing street and road construction
Source: Modified version of Table 1.1.  Tax Assignment Giugale and Steven B. Webb (2000) p.101.
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Table 2.4 Local taxes levied by states 2010 
  
Local Taxes States
Entertainment and public spectacles Aguascalientes, Baja California, Coahuila, Distrito Federal, Guerrero, Morelos, Nayarit, Oaxaca, Querétaro, Tlaxcala
Allowed, lotteries, raffles, contests, sweepstakes 
and games
Aguascalientes, Baja California, Baja California Sur, Campeche, Coahuila, Colima, Chiapas (2009), Chihuahua, Distrito Federal, Durango, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Jalisco, Estado de México, Michoacán, Morelos, Nayarit, 
Nuevo León, Oaxaca, Puebla, Querétaro, San Luis Potosí, Sinaloa, Sonora, Tabasco, Tamaulipas, Tlaxcala, Veracruz, Yucatán
Aquatic parks and spa services Morelos
Sales of lotteries and raffles tickets Jalisco
Payroll or Personal Labour Remuneration 
Expenses
Aguascalientes, Baja California, Baja California Sur, Campeche, Coahuila, Colima, Chiapas (2009), Chihuahua, Distrito Federal, Durango, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Jalisco, Estado de México, Michoacán, Morelos, Nayarit, 
Nuevo León, Oaxaca, Puebla, Querétaro, Quintana Roo, San Luis Potosí, Sinaloa, Sonora, Tabasco, Tamaulipas, Tlaxcala, Veracruz, Yucatán, Zacatecas
Professional practice and/or honoraries Colima, Chiapas (2009), Chihuahua, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Jalisco, Nayarit, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Tamaulipas, Tlaxcala, Yucatán
Used motor vehicles sell/buy Baja California, Coahuila, Colima, Durango, Michoacán, Nuevo León, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, Yucatán
Used motor vehicles acquisition Aguascalientes, Chiapas (2009), Chihuahua, Guanajuato, Hidalgo, Jalisco, Estado de México, Morelos, Querétaro, San Luis Potosí, Sinaloa, Tlaxcala, Veracruz
Sales of used mobiliary Baja California, Baja California Sur, Quintana Roo
Acquisition of mobiliary Chihuahua, Nayarit, Zacatecas
Used mobiliary domain transfer Jalisco, Sonora, Tabasco
Acquisition of estates Distrito Federal
Local on ownership or use of vehicles older than 
10 years
Aguascalientes, Coahuila, Chiapas (2009), Distrito Federal, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Estado de México, Morelos, Nayarit, Oaxaca, Puebla, Querétaro, San Luis Potosí, Tlaxcala, Zacatecas
Local on ownership or use of vehicles up to 9 
years old*
Aguascalientes, Campeche, Colima, Guerrero, Nayarit, Querétaro, Yucatán
Commercial and industry activities Baja California, Sonora
Books, newspapers and magazines commerce Campeche
Land and housing property Distrito Federal
Soil and subsoil exploitation  Baja California, Campeche, Quintana Roo
Public instruments and contract operations Chihuahua, Guerrero, Jalisco, San Luis Potosí, Tabasco, Tamaulipas, Tlaxcala
Accommodation services
Aguascalientes, Baja California, Baja California Sur, Campeche, Coahuila, Colima, Chiapas (2009), Chihuahua, Distrito Federal, Durango, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Jalisco, Michoacán, Morelos, Nayarit, Nuevo León, Oaxaca, 
Puebla, Querétaro, Quintana Roo, San Luis Potosí, Sinaloa, Tabasco, Tamaulipas, Tlaxcala, Veracruz, Yucatán, Zacatecas
Sales of goods with burden by the Special Tax 
on Production and Services Law 
Querétaro
Acquisition by disincorporation of Common 
Goods (Ejido)
San Luis Potosí
Registry of estates sales Chihuahua, Quintana Roo
Registry of income from use or temporal use of 
estates (leasing)
Chihuahua, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Nayarit, Oaxaca
Registry of personal income from professional 
services
Guanajuato
Registry of personal income from 
entrepreneurship
Guanajuato
Additions Baja California, Coahuila, Colima, Chihuahua, Durango, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Morelos, Nayarit, Oaxaca, Querétaro, Sonora, Veracruz, Yucatán, Zacatecas
Other State contribution  Guerrero
Source: Modified version of Table of INDETEC No.161 (2010) p.51.
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Table 2.5 Employment in Mexican States 1997-2010 
 
 
Group Variable 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Formal 
Employment 
1751.27 1822.81 1896.15 1963.77 1929.53 1861.85 1841.99 1874.20 1929.26 2009.75 2083.96 2091.51 1948.14 1966.62
Formal 
Employment Rate
1923.57 2006.58 2108.62 2225.28 2191.97 2145.44 2093.00 2101.10 2128.05 2194.36 2261.04 2274.17 2154.17 2249.65
Formal 
Employment Rate












Considering the data base of workers registered in the Mexican Institute of Social 
Security, the percentage of workers employed during the period 1997-2010 were 
between 17 and 23 percent in the high income and middle-income states while in 
the low income states the percentage was around 5 percent.  This is a clear 
picture of the disparity among regions of states with different levels of 
development.  The size of the informal sector in Latin American economies 
accounts for about 40 percent of GDP, but rather is perceived as a survival 
economy (CUTS International, 2009).  In Mexico, the informal economy 
represents 58.7 percent in 2010 (ILO 2012). 
 
2.2 Public Finance, Growth and Employment: a review of the 
literature  
2.2.1 Public Finance 
Governments pursue sound public finances by raising enough fiscal income in 
order to provide essential public expenditure for their inhabitants.  Public finance 
refers to the management of income and expenditure components which different 
levels of government utilise to provide goods and services for their population.  
Governments canalise resources to relevant areas such as education and health, 
for the development of their communities while promoting a better distribution 
of income (Rosen, 2002, p.16).  However, management of resources implies 
taking positive and normative elements into account during the decision-making 
process.  This process is not straight forward since there are trade-offs between 
taxing certain goods and services or spending resources on certain activities 
(Auerbach, 2010, p. 1-2). 
 
Fiscal policy can be viewed as the way in which governments promote economic 
development, by raising different types of taxes and/or incurring in specific 
expenses, bearing in mind equity, efficiency and distributional considerations.  
Adjustments in the level and composition of taxes and expenditure have an 
impact on the aggregate demand and the level of economic activity (Perotti, 2002 
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p.5-8).  According to Vito Tanzi (2008 p.17-18), there are two fiscal instruments 
which governments commonly use in order to manipulate economic 
performance: government spending and taxation.  In this respect, the level of 
public spending and its composition are crucial when making policy decisions in 
order to quantify the potential benefits for the population.  A number of questions 
such as: how should the government employ the available funds, where should it 
canalise resources and how much should be spent are central when a government 
seeks to maximise their use of resources.  Furthermore, taxes on income, 
consumption, property and payroll, all bearing a variety of rates and levels, as 
well as tax expenditures and incentives, offer a diverse range of fiscal 
possibilities. 
 
Researchers suggest that the role of local governments is crucial for the 
development of a community.  Thus, the involvement of the administrative and 
political local authorities in a country becomes a necessary condition for 
sustainable development (Nunes Silva, 2014).  Although fiscal policy is 
synchronised at a central level, local governments are responsible for the 
effective provision of public goods, where local financial and fiscal development 
matters for economic development. The unique role of local governments in 
providing daily services to inhabitants of a community requires the political, 
fiscal and financial ability to manage their budget wisely (Hou, Y., 2013). 
 
Central government outlines national fiscal policy in order to promote 
development and growth, but local governments must be involved in the 
planning and implementation of the policy process. In this respect, Keynesian 
theory denotes that government spending could impact upon output and 
employment with the aim of minimizing fluctuations of the business cycle 
(Bunea-Bontas et al., 2009 p.5).  However, the economic literature mainly 
focuses on the role of central government in stabilising the macroeconomic 
variables and little has been written about the actual participation of local 
governments.  For instance, there has been a renewed interest in rearranging sub-
national finances and economic development with the aim of coordinating city, 
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regional and national development with a practical focus on policy making (Pike, 
A., & Tomaney, 2008).  For example, with respect to climate change, there has 
been an increasing number of community initiatives and programmes linked to 
specific policies and infrastructure programmes in urban areas based on local 
capacity and resources (Bulkeley, & Castán Broto, 2013, p.1).  In this current 
work is appropriate to take into consideration the fact that central government 
transfers play a key role in local fiscal planning, since some localities are highly 
dependent on central government resources.  This current study distinguishes 
income and expenditure components that are local and those that are centrally 
determined.  Thus, I will understand to what extent local policy makers can 
manage and decide about their own resources or simply depend upon central 
government transfers. Mexico has witnessed the increasing role of sub-national 
governmental authorities in social policy agenda setting, which seems to be 
associated with local political, administrative and financial policies (Medrano 
and Smith, 2015, p.1).  For instance, in 2001 a pension for elderly was 
implemented in Mexico City and was later imitated by other local governments 
and the federal government (SDS, 2000).  Consequently, local governments 
should have a more active role in developing their own policy initiatives within 
the local, regional and national framework. 
 
Institutions, Accountability and Transparency 
The institutional framework is a significant element when analysing the 
effectiveness of any particular policy, since the way laws are enforced and 
implemented is fundamental to citizens’ rights.   Moreover, accountability and 
transparency of public funds are crucial for community satisfaction as I will 
explain in chapter five.  In particular, according to Becker (1983 p.394-396), 
there are interest groups that compete for political favours and exert pressure in 
order to maximise their income, by either increasing their subsidies or lowering 
their tax burden.  His finding applies not only to taxation and subsidies, but to 
public policies which promote efficiency in public services provision where there 
are market failures.  Levy and Walton (2009 p.13-15) stated that in the Mexican 
economy at federal and local levels, there are powerful groups of interest, such 
  
 45 
as:  political parties, business and labour groups that pursue as many benefits as 
possible, much to the detriment of Mexican society.  In line with Sorensen (1995, 
p.137-138), the demand function of local spending is multidimensional since 
parties’ influence politicians’ resource allocations, considering legislative 
committees and public-sector employment framework.  
 
Mexican institutions have developed in a context where there is a lack of 
transparency and accountability. Therefore, the results derived from this current 
work, should be contextualised under the scenario that institutions are very 
diverse among different states and localities in Mexico. This situation can 
produce diverse outcomes depending on the degree of transparency and 
accountability of these sub-national organisations.  In this context, institutions 
comprise the framework, including the constitution, laws, regulations and the 
formal and informal norms of behaviour and their enforcement (North,1993).  
Institutions are a result of the combination of social, political, structural and 
economic factors as well as the civil liberties acquired by voters in a particular 
locality (Crisp and Gwartney, 2012).  Moreover, the particular analysis 
conducted in this current research is applicable to the characteristics of Mexican 
localities and states. Some recommendations can be derived when conducting a 
similar study in other countries with different degrees of 
centralisation/decentralisation between several levels of government.  A 
limitation of the current study is that it is unable to measure the impact of the 
institutional framework in different localities in Mexico, although for the case of 
Latin American countries, the control variable “time to start a business” can be a 
proxy to measure the efficiency of the legal framework of a particular country. 
 
Ugalde (2015, p. 1-27) in his analysis of the Mexican democracy describes how 
pluralism can in fact increase corruption when institutions do not guarantee the 
rule of law. This scholar argues that there is no transparency and accountability 
for resources, for example, subsidies used for parliamentary groups. Moreover, 
he states that some state governors opted to give some of these resources to 
opposition parties in order to have good relationships with their local congress 
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and in return, have their budgets approved.  Therefore, instead of strengthening 
the role of local congress to counterbalance power and guarantee that 
government revenue is properly spent as well as ensure no corruption, local 
legislators and authorities have become part of the corruption process.  Although 
important steps have been developed in order to have better legislation in matters 
of transparency and anti-corruption programmes, the most relevant action is to 
guarantee the application of the law without exception. 
 
Government Revenue 
Government revenue which supports the provision of public goods and services 
can be derived from several sources: taxable income, non-taxable income and 
public utilities. Nevertheless, in this current work I focus on direct and indirect 
taxes.  For instance, it is much easier to promote fiscal packages during 
downturns which cut spending rather than packages that increase the tax burden, 
because not only they are quite unpopular but they are politically hard to endorse, 
although being at time, necessary (Shome, 1995).  Taxes can be classified 
according to the taxable base, income or consumption, and they are mandatory. 
Nonetheless, taxpayers usually want to avoid them, either legally (avoidance) or 
illegally (evasion).  Income taxes on corporations’ profit reduce investment, 
production and employment, while taxes on personal income distort the decision 
between work and leisure.  Consumption taxes increase the cost but do not distort 
the relative prices of goods and services, therefore, this type of tax encourages 
investment.   Direct taxes cannot be transferred between individuals and can 
become a disincentive to work, while indirect taxes refer to taxes on goods and 
services, which in turn, can be easier to levy and more effective in terms of 
obtaining higher levels of government income.  However, direct taxes can 
contribute to equity in the tax system, while indirect taxes are said to be 
regressive, since the relative burden for persons which have different levels of 
income becomes uneven.  Moreover, maximising the overall tax burden can 
imply imposing a greater burden on inelastic goods but, in fact, these types of 
goods are often basic goods.  Additionally, indirect taxes are more efficient and 
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easier to monitor and administrate than direct taxes. (Pérez Fuentes Alemán, 
1995). 
 
Although taxes generate distortions in the economy, indirect taxes do not change 
relative prices and are more efficient to apply than direct taxes.  Ormaechea 
(2012), Johansson et al. (2008), Angelopoulos et al. (2012) find that reducing 
direct taxes while increasing indirect taxes can have a positive impact on growth 
when analysing 64 countries from 1980 to 2000.  Nonetheless, the effect of taxes 
on growth is not conclusive since diverse authors find different results.  In the 
case of Mexico in particular, several studies find a negative relationship between 
taxes and growth at a national and state level from 1993 to 2011 (Srithongrung 
and Sánchez-Juárez, 2015; Caballero and López, 2012).  However, according to 
the study of Huang and Frentz (2014) there is no clear evidence that tax increases 
harm growth, particularly at a state level (p.8, 10), since every study refers to 
different entities with different socio-economic and political conditions, a diverse 
range of policies and time periods.  Studies from Samaniego (2014), Bania et al. 
(2007) and Tomljanovich (2004) indicate even a positive effect of taxes on 
growth in the case of the Mexican economy.  In this study, I expect a negative 
effect of direct taxes on GDP per capita growth and a positive or neutral effect of 
indirect taxes.  Although, my results show a positive overall effect of indirect 
taxes on growth in Mexico as a country, when considering high, middle and low-
income states, the positive effect of indirect taxes holds only in high income 
states.  In my study, I find a positive and significant effect of taxes on growth at a 
municipal level. 
 
Government Expenditure  
Devarajan et al. (1996 p.315-320) propose a model analysing different types of 
expenditure (productive and unproductive), where growth depends upon the 
elasticities of substitution between both, which means that not only the 
productivity of each type of capital is relevant, but also their share.  In this 
current work, the effect of current and government capital expenditure on growth 
depends upon the level of development of each locality, given by their respective 
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share according to their local disparities.  Although it is understood that certain 
expenditures could be theoretically more appropriate than others, this study 
considers the main expenditure components simultaneously and their effect on 
growth.  Gemmell et al. (2012 and 2009), Bassanini et al. (2001), Guillemette 
(2010), Angelopoulos et al. (2008), Milbourne et al. (2003), Nijkamp and Poot 
(2004), Bose et al. (2003), Aschauer (2000) and Kneller et al. (1999) find 
positive growth effects of productive expenditure for transport and 
communication, education and health, as well as research and development.  
 
Economic growth is positively influenced by the investment in physical and 
human capital (skills and experience), research and development (particularly 
oriented to business related activities), while strengthening macroeconomic and 
financial stability.  Even though spending on health, education and research 
promote growth in the long run, when social governmental transfers are focused 
on social objectives, their means of financing should be carefully analysed. 
Moreover, according to Bassanini´s results (2001, p.42-43), greater direct taxes 
and transfers provoke a decrease in growth, while capital investment promotes 
GDP per capita growth in 21 OECD economies during the period 1971-1998.  
Therefore, in this current work I expect a positive (negative) relationship 
between capital (current) and GDP per capita growth.  However, according to 
Amieva-Huerta (2010, p.252-256) in Mexico from 1970 to 2002, current public 
spending could be positively related to GDP per capita which means that current 
public spending is not counter-cyclical and it is highly inelastic due to the 
institutional committed expenditures of the public sector.  Moreover, Amieva-
Huerta’s analysis rejects Barro’s neutrality hypothesis where fiscal policy affects 
private savings.  His findings demonstrate that public current savings have a 
positive effect on private savings which yields an interesting result: “public 
investment complements private investment”. 
 
According to ECLAC (2010, p.146-165) Mexico increased education expense 
from 4.0 in 1990 to 5.8 in 2008 as percentage of GDP, a level that ranks third in 
Latin America.  In real terms, this change represented an increase from $197 to 
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$378 dollars per capita, the second highest after Argentina which spent $489 
dollars in 2008.  Nevertheless, according to Amieva Huerta (2015), Mexico’s 
payroll for teachers’ accounts for 93 percent of total expenditure and only 3 
percent is devoted to education infrastructure.  Mexican states have covered basic 
education for the vast majority of their population and coverage is increasing for 
middle and high schooling.  However, quality in education is still deficient, 
particularly in southern Mexican states.  
 
Regarding health expenditure in Mexico, the sector is fragmented because there 
are several bodies in charge: IMSS (Mexican Institute of Social Security), 
ISSSTE (State’s Employees´ Social Security and Social Services Institute) and 
decentralized   state   public   organisations.   Some of these bodies undertake 
similar   responsibilities, which generates a duplicity of functions and lack of 
coordination and low quality, particularly in poor municipalities.  The 
introduction of a popular health insurance scheme has promoted informality 
since beneficiaries have not transferred to the formal sector and they are not 
entitled to pension, disability or life insurance.  The popular health insurance 
programme is financed with federal and state resources Levy (2008, p.70-83).  
Additionally, the private sector which provides health care is not properly 
regulated and resources are directed to curative rather than to preventive 
medicine.  
 
Mexico devoted 2.8 per cent of GDP to health expenditure in 2008-2009.  This 
level is lower than the average for Latin America which was registered at 3.2 per 
cent of GDP and the levels of Argentina, Brazil and Chile which were 5.3, 5 and 
3 per cent of GDP, respectively.  With respect to social security and assistance, 
Mexico spending accounts for 3.7 per cent of GDP, while the average for Latin 
America is 8 percent of GDP and 11.1, 13.6 and 6.9 per cent of GDP for the 
abovementioned countries (ECLAC, 2010, p. 170).   In 2010, total health 
spending in Mexico is the second lowest among the OECD countries at 6.2 per 
cent of GDP, while the OECD average is 9.5 per cent of GDP (OECD, 2010, 
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p.1).  Moreover, the pressure for public finances is huge because of the 
demographic transition and the ratio of claimants to contributors is growing. 
 
It is important to acknowledge that the government budget includes entitlement 
programmes such as social security, welfare programmes, etc.  In 2000 about 75 
percent of the U.S. budget was uncontrollable (Rosen, 2002, p.14).  Furthermore, 
when breaking down expenditures by level of government federal government 
accounted for about 50 percent of direct expenditures, and approximately 21 and 
27 percent were related to state and local governments respectively.  In Mexico, 
in 2010 around 77 percent of government expenditure was non-programmable 
and 23 percent programmable.  Capital expenditure accounted for 24.1 percent of 
programmable expenditure while current expenditure constituted 75.9 percent, 
including wages and salaries (43.8), pensions (16.6) and social programmes (17) 
among others.  Transfer to local governments accounted for one third of total 
expenditure (SHCP, 2010). 
 
Gemmell, Kneller and Sanz (2009) report a positive relationship between 
transport and communication, as well as education and health expenditures with 
growth.  An increase of 1% in spending on each of the above-mentioned 
categories generates a rise in growth of 0.12%, 0.10% and 0.05% respectively.  
These results contrast with OECD calculations of ±0.1%.  The World Bank 2007 
report on fiscal policies in twelve emerging economies demonstrates that 
productive expenditure (on infrastructure, education and health) has a positive 
impact on growth (ibid).  Gemmell et al.’s (2009) results have shown that 
changing OECD expenditure towards productive spending could increase 
growth, however, they recognize that the government should spend on social 
items (Barrios, 2009 p.25, 26, 30, 31, 34). In this current study, I confirm the 
positive relationship of education with growth, and when considering total 
government investment in Mexico, I also find a positive relationship with GDP 
per capita.  However, in this work I find a positive relationship between growth 
and subsidies at a national and a sub-national level in Mexico, although, the 
distortions of these type of instruments are well known by modifying production, 
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overinvestment in subsidised activities and the inefficient use of resources. 
 
In the current analysis, the economic strength or weakness of each locality 
depends upon its reliance on federal transfers and its particular fiscal stance in 
economic development, because outcomes in terms of GDP per capita differs 
according to whether a state/province is in the low-income, middle income or 
high-income group.  In 22 OECD economies from 1970 to 1995 Kneller et 
al.(1999 p.171) find that productive government spending increases growth, 
while non-productive does not.  In the current study, the effect of government 
investment on growth in Mexico at a country level is not significant, however, 
some differences arise at sub-national level depending upon the level of income 
of each locality. 
 
Transfers 
For local governments, a significant source of revenue derives from transfers 
from the central government, therefore, the relevance of a separate analysis. 
Arvate and Rocha (2013), De Mello Jr. (2002), Kappeler et al. (2013), 
Binswanger-Mkhize et al. (2012) illustrate the positive effect of transfers on 
growth and local investment.  Sour (2013), Caldera (2013) and Abbot et al. 
(2015) refer to the relevant role of transfers in local governments.  According to 
the study of Garcia (2010 p.239, 248) non-earmarked transfers show a positive 
relationship with growth considering average data for the period between 1997 
and 2005 for Mexican states, however, a negative association was found between 
earmarked transfers and growth. 
 
The fact that there are vertical and horizontal imbalances between sub-national 
governments, which means that localities have different capacities for raising 
taxes and providing public services, makes it necessary for the central 
government to provide transfers as an equalisation mechanism.  Understanding 
the different types of transfers from central to local governments gives insight in 
this current work regarding their impact on growth and employment.  There are 
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two ways to transfer resources from one level to the other: revenue sharing or 
grants. With respect to the first, tax bases can be shared or several taxes can be 
pooled, while grants can be conditional (earmarked) or unconditional (non-
earmarked). These transfers can be flexible or subject to certain restrictions and 
can sometimes require matching elements from the local government (IMF 1997 
p.73). 
 
Graph 2.4 Effect of Unconditional Transfers 
 
Source: Cullis, J., Jones, P., & Jones, P. R. (2009 p.379). 
 
Shah (2006 p.1-9) stated that around 60% of local spending is financed by 
intergovernmental transfers in developing countries.  In particular, unconditional 
transfers have no restrictions and local governments can use them to increase 
their expenditure in any area that they consider suitable according to their local 
policy objectives.  As can be seen in Graph 2.4 with no transfers from the central 
government, locality provides Xo and Yo units of public services with a utility of 
Uo.  However, when it receives a fixed amount of transfers (comparable to a 
check from the central to the local government), the budget line shifts to the right 
and the locality is able to provide a higher level of the public goods Yo and Y1 
with a higher level of utility U1.  Thus, there is an increase in the level of public 
goods provided, and for a given expenditure level (Eo and E1), the utility is 
higher with the provision of non-conditional transfers.  Regarding conditional 
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transfers, these can be utilised to promote certain economic activities or 
programmes in order to pursue country specific policy objectives.  In the case of 
conditional non-matching transfers, resources are spent on a particular activity 
that the central government considers as a high-priority in order to attain a 
certain level of public services in education and health, for example, thus 
complying with national standards.  In this situation, the local authority should 
spend the amount provided by the central government on the provision of the 
particular good or service that is being promoted, which leads to a corner 
solution as can be seen in Graph 2.5.  The provision of public goods moves from 
Xo to X1 because the X1 is established by the central government and not by the 
local government and its local preferences, which otherwise would have been 
X2.  As it can be appreciated, the utility U1 is a corner solution with lower utility 
than U2 which would have been obtained if the locality had chosen X2 according 
to its own local preferences.  Nonetheless, if transfers include matching 
requirements, the transfer from the central government plays the role of a subsidy 
for local spending, and the local authority needs to spend an additional amount of 
resources on the specified activity, to a certain extent. 
 
Graph 2.5 Effect of Conditional Transfers 
 




In this current work, I expect non-earmarked transfers (unconditional) to have a 
positive relationship with output per capita growth because they can be freely 
utilised by local governments, according to their local needs, which would 
presumably be more efficient due to the fact that local authorities are closer to 
the place the public services are provided, although, an important issue is the 
accountability for those resources.  However, in the case of Mexico, the central 
government cannot impose penalties on local governments when the application 
of resources is unclear and responsibility lies in the local government itself. 
 
In the case of earmarked transfers, resources in Mexican states and municipalities 
are mainly canalised to education, health, social assistance and infrastructure, 
public security and pensions.  I expect that the relationship of earmarked 
transfers (conditional) and output per capita growth is positive, since these 
resources are given to states with equalisation purposes, in order to account for 
regional disparities.  Nevertheless, the rigidity on the application of earmarked 
transfers can result in an inefficient allocation of governmental resources, 
considering that local authorities have poor financial accountability.  In the case 
of earmarked transfers, central government and the Chief Audit Office in Mexico 
can audit these funds and make recommendations to the local government but no 
sanction is considered if the local authority does not comply with the law.  In 
Mexico, local governments rely heavily on transfers from the central 
government; however, transfers are not properly monitored and enforced which 
in turn leads to inefficient use of resources, corruption and lack of accountability.  
Moreover, when some local governments, particularly those from low income 
states, perceive their total income as exogenous, because a huge amount of it 
derives from transfers from the central government, there is a risk of higher 
levels of spending, indebtedness and lower fiscal effort to collect local taxes.  
Furthermore, the less developed localities have weaker institutions, budget 
controls and administrative procedures. 
 
Turning to matching requirements, these do not consider the different levels of 
capabilities of different local governments. High income localities might have 
  
 55 
the capacity for providing certain public services as expected by the central 
government, but low-income ones might not be able to match any requirement, 
although their needs can be much higher than those of high income localities.  
Therefore, in order to ensure central government’s desired outcomes, conditional 
non-matching output based transfers would appear to be recommendable, which 
in turn, includes localities’ performance on certain indicators. These can be 
established by linking the transfer with inputs and outputs, since outcomes and 
the impact of transfers are beyond government’s control (Chief Audit Office 
Report, 2010). 
 
Although this current study does not focus on pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy 
variables, I acknowledge that several authors have found either pro-cyclical or 
countercyclical pattern of transfers. Lee and Sung (2007 p.457, 458) analyse the 
effectiveness of fiscal policy during business cycles in 94 economies from 1972 
to 1998 and they find that government’s current expenditures, subsidies and 
transfers are counter-cyclical, while taxes and capital expenditures are pro-
cyclical.  A comparison between OECD and non-OECD countries reveals that 
government expenditure responds more counter-cyclical in OECD countries.   
According to Caldera Sanchez (2013 p.29) revenues at a local level during the 
period 1989-2010 in Mexico are highly volatile since most transfers represent a 
fixed percentage of federal income sharing pool (which includes oil revenues), 
therefore, revenue volatility can have a negative impact on public spending.  
Abbott, Cabral and Jones (2015, p.16-18) find that expenditure and 




The theory of recent macroeconomics began with Keynes in 1936, where 
governmental intervention could influence consumption and investment. By 
manipulating the marginal propensity to consume through taxation or interest 
rates an active fiscal policy could stimulate effective demand to increase output.  
Subsequently, the following year, John Hicks formalized the main aspects of 
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Keynesian theory and developed the IS-LM model which explains the interaction 
between the goods market and the financial market, where fiscal and monetary 
policy are represented through changes in the IS-LM curves.  
 
The pioneer growth model was developed by Robert Solow (1956, p. 66-94). In 
this he describes a model for long-run growth that considers the Harrod and 
Domar assumptions. The central assumption regarding the production function is 
that it has constant returns to scale.  Solow considers a production function that 
depends upon two factors of production: labour (L) and capital (K) with an index 
of productive efficiency (A). 
Y= F (K, AL) where  ?̇? = 𝑔𝐴                                                                          (2.1) 
Output is a flow variable produced at a given period but t is omitted to simplify 
notation and K and L are stock variables measured at a given point in time.  
Thus, A increases labour input while keeping capital unchanged and g is a 
proportional rate of change of technology.  Under the assumption that the 
economy is working at full potential and considering that capital (K) depreciates 
at a constant proportional rate δ.  The rate of accumulation of capital is given by 
the saving rate sY where s is a constant fraction of income.  Therefore, the 
equation of capital accumulation is given by: 
?̇? = 𝑠𝑌 − δK                                                                                                     (2.2) 
and 
?̇? =  nL where n is the population growth                                                        (2.3) 
Considering that the marginal product of each factor of production is positive but 
diminishing in its quantity and denoting output per effective worker, capital per 
effective worker and that the marginal products should be equal in equilibrium; 
therefore, the long-term solution would be a function of s, n, g, δ, Ko and Lo 
which represent the saving rate, population growth, technological change, 
depreciation rate and the initial level of capital and labour respectively.  In this 
model, the saving and the population rate do not influence the long term steady 
state of growth since they are considered exogenous. The only variable which 




The Keynesian contention was that fiscal policy could play a major role in 
stabilising the economy during recessions. However, Milton Friedman in 1963 
analysed the trend of monetary history in the United States and concluded that 
the role of monetary policy is fundamental to explain movements in output.  
Until now, the debate of the importance of fiscal or monetary policy still 
continues as both play a key role in the development of the economy.  On the one 
hand, taxation, spending, allocation and distribution of resources (fiscal policy) 
are mainly implemented by the Ministry of Finance.  On the other hand, the 
Central Bank is in charge of interest rate and inflation targets (monetary policy).  
Both are important for stability and growth.  Adam (2010) analysed optimal 
fiscal and monetary stabilisation policies arguing that the former establishes 
interest rates and the latter decides the amount of public spending, taxation levels 
and debt.  Effective fiscal policies along with monetary measures are 
determinants for economic recovery during recessions (Spilimbergo et al., 2008 
p.2-3). Likewise, Terzi (2010, p.10-11) acknowledged that government spending 
and taxation can become a powerful tool in aggregate demand adjustment.  Thus, 
it is imperative to quantify the impact on consumption and investment via tax 
reductions that encourage firms to invest and householders to consume, as well 
as the composition of public expenditure on: infrastructure, research and 
development, goods and services, housing, education or health sectors.  
Government spending can impact upon output and employment with the aim of 
minimizing the fluctuations in the business cycle (Bunea-Bontas et al., 2009 p.5). 
 
Endogenous Growth Theory  
Growth is an outcome of forces within the economy and, therefore, human 
capital, technology, innovation and, in general, knowledge have a huge impact 
on economic development patterns.  Romer (1986) considered a long-run growth 
model with endogenous technological change with increasing returns to scale of 
human capital.  Similarly, Lucas (1988) referred to physical and human capital 
accumulation, as mechanisms of growth development. Barro (1980 p.103-125) 
developed a growth model that incorporates the public sector as follows: 
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Household utility is represented by: 
𝑈 = ∫ 𝑢(𝑐)
∞
0
𝑒−𝜌𝑡𝑑𝑡                                                                                         (2.4) 
ρ > 0 
where c is consumption per person and ρ is time preference.  Population is 
constant.  The marginal utility of consumption u(c) has a constant elasticity of - 𝜎 
The production function is: 
𝑦 = 𝝓(𝑘, 𝑔) = 𝑘 ∗ 𝜙 (
𝑔
𝑘
)                                                                                  (2.5)  
where y is output per worker, k is the quantity of capital and g is government 
consumption 
Government expenditure is financed by flat rate income tax 𝜏 
𝑔 = 𝑇 = 𝜏𝑦 =  𝜏 ∗ 𝑘 ∗ 𝜙 (
𝑔
𝑘
)                                                                            (2.6) 
where T is government revenue and 𝜏 is the tax rate 






) ∗ (1 − 𝜙′ ∗
𝑔
𝑦
) =  𝜙 (
𝑔
𝑘
) ∗ (1 − 𝜂)                                                (2.7) 
0 < 𝜂 < 1 
where 𝜂 is the elasticity of y with respect to g  
 
In the case the Government also finances services which are in the consumer 
utility function, then the share of productive and non-productive expenditure 
would determine long run growth (For further detail in the maximisation process 
see Barro 1980).  In this sense, productive expenditure such as education, health, 
research and development and technology represent a considerable boost for 
opportunities for endogenous economic growth and affects the productivity of 
the private sector, while unproductive expenditure only raises individuals’ 
welfare and has a negative effect on economic growth (Aghion et al., 1998 p.26-
27).  Moreover, a taxation scheme applied in a locality could distort investment 





Devarajan et al. (1996 p.315-320) proposed a model analysing different types of 
expenditure (productive and unproductive) where the production function to be 
considered is: 
        
y =  f(k, g1, g2)  = [𝛼𝑘−𝜁 + 𝛽𝑔1−𝜁 + 𝛾𝛽𝑔2−𝜁]
−1/𝜁
                                (2.8) 
 
where  
k   = capital stock  
g1 = productive capital expenditure   
g2 = unproductive capital spending 
 
and government constraint is given by  
𝜏𝑦 = 𝑔1 + 𝑔2                                                                                                 (2.9) 
where 
𝜏 = flat rate income tax   
and 
𝑔1 = ∅𝜏𝑦            
𝑔2 = (1 − ∅)𝜏𝑦  
 
where  
∅ represent the proportion of productive government expenditure, and 
(1 − ∅) represent the proportion of unproductive government expenditure 
 
However, Devarajan does not analyse the financing of funds and different types 




In his model, the representative agent maximises its welfare considering the 
following utility function by selecting consumption c, capital k and 𝜌 the rate of 
time preference: 
𝑈 = ∫ 𝑢(𝑐)−𝜌𝑡
∞
0
                                                                                        (2.10) 
Subject to 




                                                                                          (2.12) 
 
After the maximisation process, the steady state growth rate of consumption (λ) 









−1/𝜁                       (2.13) 
Therefore, growth would depend upon the elasticities of subsitution, which 
means that not only the productivity of each type of capital is relevant, but also 
its share.  In this respect, the hypothesis of my work  contends that the effect of 
government capital expenditure on growth depends upon the level of 
development of each locality, given by their respective share, according to their 
local disparities.  In the current study, I focus on resources derived from direct 
and indirect taxes, transfers and social contributions, while simultaneously 
analysing subsidies, current and capital outlays in different levels of government.  
The impact of each fiscal variable will depend upon the level of government 
involved.  Moreover, there has been a large set of empirical applications 
characterised by relating long run average growth rates of real per capita GDP to 
a list of structural and policy-related variables.   
 
Government Budget Constraint Models 
In these types of models, the government plays an active role in economic 
growth by influencing GDP development through levying various types of taxes 
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and allocating resources to different types of expenditures.  In particular, 
Gemmell (2012 p.1-35) and Kneller, Bleaney & Gemmell (1999, p.171-190) 
consider government budget constraint models where the financing of the 
spending is crucial for growth development.  In this respect, the focus of the 
current analysis is precisely to find the most suitable income-expenditure 
combinations which would in turn generate higher growth outcomes. 
g𝑖𝑡  = α + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 Yit + ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝑋𝑗𝑡
𝑚
𝑗=1  +  u𝑖𝑡                                                     (2.14)                                    
where 
git = Growth in country i at time t 
Yit = Non-fiscal variables 
Xit = Fiscal variables 
 
According to my main hypothesis, the local government would maximise each 
type of revenue in order to be able to raise enough resources to provide local 
public services, taking into consideration population characteristics such as 
education and health, subject to revenue resources given by the budget constraint 
and considering there is a minimal amount of expenditure (irreducible 
expenditure) which needs to be completed.  Gemmell, Kneller and Sanzell 
(2009) find that there is a strong and positive association between health and 
education expenditure and growth. The main difference in their model with 
respect to the one presented in this thesis, is that they do not consider all the 
fiscal variables simultaneously but instead they alternate either income or 
expenditure variables.  Moreover, Pechar & Andres (2011) consider that 
education policies should be linked to desired goals and outcomes. Peter et al. 
(2010) demonstrate that the welfare state and educational policies pursue the 
reduction of social inequality.  Governments get involved in the health sector as 
well in order to protect vulnerable sectors of the population that otherwise could 
not be able to get access to health services. The aid provided can be through a 
payment or a subsidy for health care while regulating drugs and medical devices 
(Stiglitz 2000 p.304).  In Mexico, the information for states and municipalities 
was non-existent by function of government for the period of the current study, 
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however, for the Latin American analysis I do have as control variables 
expenditure per student, health expenditure per capita and R&D spending. 
 
The economics debate about the relationship among taxes and expenditure has 
been raised for decades, regarding whether or not taxes generate further spending 
or if expenditures promote higher taxes in the future.  In this respect, the tax-and-
spend hypothesis developed by Friedman (1978) sustains that modifications on 
revenue generate further modifications in expenditure.  In this current work the 
objective is to analyse the simultaneous effect of taxes and expenditures on GDP 
per capita and employment, which means that income and expenditure decisions 
are made during the same fiscal year for budget purposes, and therefore I do not 
seek a causality between them.  In my work, different combinations of 
income/expenditure show different GDP per capita and employment levels.  It is 
important to acknowledge that states and localities have fiscal pressures 
regarding health, education and pension programmes which will eventually 
increase demand for higher transfers from the federal government (Zycher, 
2013).  In Mexico for instance, around 90 per cent of total expenditure cannot be 
reduced or modified according to current expenditures and liabilities such as 
wages, social contributions and capital expenditures which are being executed in 
public infrastructure, therefore, the margin for manoeuvring expenditure is very 
limited.  
 
Furthermore, the spend-and-tax hypothesis supported by Peacock and Wiseman 
(1979) considers that changes in expenditures will provoke changes in revenues.   
Dada et al. (2013 p.50) report strong evidence that Peacock and Wiseman’s 
hypothesis works in Nigeria, utilising time series data on government revenue, 
government expenditure and GDP for the period 1961-2010.  As mentioned 
previously, the main hypothesis of my work essentially focuses on the 
importance of considering both, disaggregated components of revenue and 
expenditure when evaluating the impact on growth and employment.  The 
relationship between them cannot be undermined and the combination of several 
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taxes and expenditures applied at a local government can make a difference to 




In 1930, there was the emergence of labour economics focused on employment 
legislation, labour unions and collective bargaining.  This institutional 
perspective had an interdisciplinary approach embracing in its scope law, history 
and economics while the neoclassical framework referred mainly to the operation 
of markets based on the underpinning assumptions of a competitive and efficient 
market (Kaufman,1993, p.84-91).  A new generation of labour economists 
emerged by the end of the decade and since then, there has been three phases of 
labour economics.  The proponents of the first phase considered labour market 
transactions to have particular, complex and significant qualitative and 
quantitative aspects that simple microeconomic theory could not explain, 
therefore, labour market could not be treated simply as an extension of 
microeconomic theory.  In this phase, Kerr (1988 p.1-23), Dunlop (1988 p.29-34) 
and Kaufman (1988 p.145-203) focused on a simple neoclassical theoretical 
framework with rational expectations and competitive market of supply and 
demand.  A more in-depth approach and analytical study of the determinant 
factors of the labour market considering labour market imperfections, collective 
bargaining and protective labour legislation.   Case studies emerged as an 
empirical approach and became a key tool for understanding institutional 
frameworks in a pragmatic way. 
   
The second stage during the fifties, focused on labour market outcomes instead 
of the institutional framework and its empirical applications.  (Jacobsen and 
Skillman, 2004).  This approach dealt with adjusted principles of supply and 
demand focusing on human capital as a tool to explain market transactions within 
the context of an institutional framework and in-depth econometric analysis.  The 
last stage, occurring during the sixties and seventies, was characterized with 
  
 64 
thorough analysis of human capital, in addition to the study of contractual 
difficulties, organizational, transactional and structural failures.  Models of 
strategic interaction (game theory) with imperfect information and contracts, 
together with sophisticated econometric analysis and more extensive data sets 
(ibid). Utilising the conventional supply and demand model of the labour market, 
proponents of contemporary labour economics viewed employment as a complex 
exchange relationship, since contracts have costs of transaction. Moreover, the 
structural relationship in the workplace depends on the allocation of property 
rights and the compensation schemes are not straight forward.  There are five 
variables that affect the structure of the labour market: education, work 
experience, ability, work effort and workplace disadvantages. (Jacobsen and 
Skillman, 2004, p.9-19; 108). 
 
Employment in a Macroeconomic model 
Finn (1988) developed a real business cycle model which evaluates the effect of 
government expenditure.  In this context, Carvallo (2005 p.1-38) described a 
model that includes households, the private sector and government.  The former 
consumes final goods and supply labour to the private sector and to the 
government. 
The budget constraint for the households is: 
𝐶𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡 = (1 − 𝜏𝑡





− 𝑇𝑡                                 (2.15) 
where Ct is consumption It investment and 𝜏𝑡
𝑛and 𝜏𝑡
𝑘 are the personal and capital 
tax rates; Wt is the real wage is, 𝑛t the labour supply, 𝑘𝑡 and  𝑅𝑡
𝑘are the capital 
stock and return respectively, 𝛿 the depreciation rate and T the lump sum taxes 
paid. 
Private (𝑌𝑡
𝑃) and government (𝑌𝑡





  where 0 < α < 1                                                          (2.16) 
𝐴𝑡 is the level of technology, 𝑁𝑡
𝑃the number of hours supplied to the private 





  where 0 < γ < 1                                                           (2.17) 
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𝐴𝑡 is the level of technology, 𝑁𝑡
𝐺the number of hours supplied to the government 
𝑍𝑡 are the government purchases used in the production 









+ 𝑇𝑡 +  𝑌𝑡
𝐺                                     (2.18) 
 
Therefore, government consumption of goods plus the wages paid to government 
workers is equal to taxes received from capital (including depreciation) and 
labour, including lumps sum taxes and production. 
Consequently, the aggregate constraint for the economy would be: 
C𝑡  +  I𝑡 + G𝑡  +  𝑊𝑡𝑁𝑡
𝐺 = 𝑌𝑡                                                           (2.19) 
 
Additionally, if I consider the national account approach, I can derive that the 
production of the economy is the sum of all factors of production, therefore, Yt 
would be the sum of the rents from labour (R𝐿𝑡), capital or land  (R𝐾𝑡), interests 
(i𝑡), profits (𝐵𝑡) , amortization (𝐴𝑡) and taxes minus subsidies (𝑇𝑡 − 𝑆𝑡) 
[Blanchard & Wolfers, 2000, p.1-40] 
 
𝑌𝑡 = R𝐿𝑡  +  R𝐾𝑡 +  i𝑡  + 𝐵𝑡 + 𝐴𝑡 + (𝑇𝑡 − 𝑆𝑡)                                             (2.20) 
 
 
There is a lot of scope for research investigating the link between labour market 
and fiscal policy.  This current study only covers authors who have offered a 
general description of labour market imperfections and their implications for 
fiscal policy. Under a new Keynesian framework, where nominal rigidities are 
present and adjustments are imperfect, output is demand determined and an 
increase in government spending raises labour demand and output.  In this case, 
even though a negative wealth effect shifts the labour supply curve to the right 
(as agents feel poorer), the demand effect is stronger (there is price stickiness), 
and consequently, output, real wages and employment levels go up (Canova, 
2011b).  These models can have several market failures, such as wage and price 
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stickiness, which imply that the economy does not reach full employment. 
Therefore, the government needs to apply appropriate fiscal and monetary 
policies in order to attain economic stability and growth. 
 
Transfers and the Labour Market 
 
According to a study developed by the US Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations, and United States of America (1977 p.56) there are 
several factors that can affect public employment in terms of intergovernmental 
organisation and diverse types of grants.  This situation can result from higher 
employability in a particular sector that is being stimulated by use of a particular 
grant, or one that is indirectly affected by the complementarity of certain goods 
or services linked to the activity being promoted.  Higher employment could be 
attained deriving only from the income effect since the localities have more 
resources to spend on a particular activity.  In my model, I will analyse the 
relationship between fiscal variables, transfers from central governments in 
particular, and their relationship with employment.  I expect that taxes levied 
have a negative relationship with employment and that transfers have a positive 
relationship with the rate of occupation in a local economy. 
 
I find a positive association with transfers, which means that local governments 
could in fact employ those additional resources to pay wages and salaries of 
public employees.  
 
Fatás and Ilian (2001 p.5-8) argue that government spending has a positive effect 
on employment because when government increases expenditure, it boosts 
economic activity. They demonstrate that government spending is expansionary 
when the multiplier is larger than one.  In my model, I find no significant 
relationship with capital government expenditure in Mexico as a whole, but when 
considering different states according to their level of income, I find a negative 
relationship with governmental capital expenditure in low income states. This 
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can have a justification following Devarajan analysis due to misallocations of 
public spending. 
 
Furthermore, in Mexico, I find a positive relationship between non-earmarked 
transfers and employment at a state level in low income localities and in low-
income municipalities as well, which in turn could indicate that resources are 
devoted to current expenditure by hiring more governmental employees. 
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➢ Negative relationship between taxes and growth. 
 
➢ Public investment has a positive effect on growth. 
Bania et al. 
(2007) 
50 US states 
(1962-1997) 
Growth, Taxes and 
Expenditure 
FE and GMM 
➢ The effect on taxes utilised in productive inputs first is positive but later on 
turns to be negative. 
Tomljanovic 
(2004) 
50 US states 
(1972-1998) 
State Policy and State 
Economic Growth 











64 developed and 
developing 
4 5-year periods from 
1980 to 2000 
Government size and 
economic growth 
OLS 
➢ Efficiency of the public sector depends upon both factors: the size of the 
government and the combination of resources utilised considering input-
output efficiency indicators of the public sector    
➢ The allocation of resources and the efficiency of the public sector is 
fundamental in order to derive the “size-efficiency mix” which is optimal for 
a government to achieve  
➢ In their study, they explicitly link the GDP per capita with the efficiency 
measures (cost effectiveness of the public sector in 4 areas: administration, 
stabilization, infrastructure and education) 
Lee and Sung 
(2007) 
94 OECD and 
non-OECD 
(1972-1998) 
Fiscal Policy Business 
Cycles & Stabilisation 
OLS & 2 
Methods of 
Detrending. 
➢ Government’s current expenditures, subsidies and transfers move counter-
cyclically, while taxes and capital expenditures move pro-cyclically 
➢ Government expenditure responds more counter-cyclically in OECD 
countries 









➢ Economic growth is positively influenced by the investment in physical and 
human capital (skills and experience), research and development (particularly 
oriented to business related activities) 
➢ Spending on health, education and research promote growth in the long run 
➢ Greater direct taxes and transfers provoke a decrease in output per capita 

















➢ The method of financing any expenditure matters, whether taxes are raised, 
deficits are incurred, or reductions in specific expenditure is realised. 
➢  
➢ Positive growth effects for transport & communication, education and health 
expenditure and negative effects for social welfare spending. 








➢ There is a strong positive association between transport & communication, 






(1960 and 1985) 




➢ Positive relationship between public investment and economic growth in the 











➢ Evidence shows that successful fiscal consolidations rely on spending control 
rather than in tax increases.   
➢ Growth can be achieved if productive expenditure is utilized and proper fiscal 
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GDP per capita 
Growth 
PANEL 
➢ Distortionary taxation reduces growth, while non-distortionary taxes does not 
reduce it 
➢ Productive government spending increases growth, while non-productive 












➢ Evidence of the flypaper effect has been found in Mexico, however, 
asymmetric behaviour has been acknowledged at a local level. 
 
➢ Non-earmarked transfers have a greater effect on local government spending 





2.3 Several growth methodologies 
2.3.1 Pooled Mean Group 
Gemmell et al. (2012 p.1-23) analyse the effect of different types of expenditure 
on economic growth in 17 OECD countries during the period 1970-2008.  The 
estimated equation considers growth of GDP in country i at time t as function of 
total government expenditure as percentage of GDP, E, and the share of each 
expenditure category e1: 
 




















…                     (2.21) 
 
Considering the budget constraint, E, expenditures have to be financed by taxes 
where R represents total tax revenues and D represents budget surplus or deficits. 
Since D = Rit - Eit 
 















…                 (2.22) 
 
Therefore, this equation illustrates the effects of taxes and expenditures as 
percentages of GDP on economic growth.  Afterwards, they apply a “pooled 
mean group estimation” allowing short run heterogeneity and imposing long run 
homogeneity. 
 




𝑘=1   (2.23) 
 
Where F is a vector of fiscal and control variables and ∅, β, α and λ are 
parameters to be estimated.  They apply this approach in order to control for non-
stationary variables, however, they realise that in order to avoid a degrees of 
freedom problem they have to include each spending category separately, two 




Gemmell et al. (Barrios, 2009 p.24-27) empirical approach begins by regressing 
economic growth against budget surplus, distortionary and other taxes, non-
distortionary taxes, total expenditure, investment ratio and employment growth.  
However, when testing public expenditure composition and growth they assume 
that total expenditure remains constant while switching the 9 different categories 
of spending:  transport and communication; education; health; defence; economic 
services; housing; general public services; social welfare and recreation.  They 
also test alternative classifications of public expenditure with OECD and IMF 
data regarding consumption, net investment, current transfers and capital 
transfers.   Moreover, they distinguish between public, merit goods and transfers.  
The current approach to study expenditure at a state and municipal level is 
directed to the economic classification: current and capital disbursements. 
 
Overall, although Gemmell et al. considers income and expenditure variables 
simultaneously, due to the degrees of freedom problem, he is only able to regress 
budget surplus, distortionary and non-distortionary taxes, one or two at a time, 
with total expenditure (no disaggregation is made), however, in my analysis I 
regress simultaneously all relevant income and expenditure variables. 
 
Even though PMG tries to account for heterogeneity between groups in the 
sample for the short run, still adopts homogeneity in the long-run coefficients, 
which is not an accurate assumption in my point of view.   In fact, according to 
Sachs JD et al. (2002 p.32), who analyses growth in 14 states of India during 
1980 and 1998 finds that richer states experienced some degree of convergence 
but poorer states divergence was remarkable.  Moreover, Durlauf et al. (2005) 
find that GDP per capita growth diverge over time, situation that is addressed by 
Battisti et al. (2013 p.2) in his study “Global Divergence in Growth 
Regressions”.  According to the United Nations “Report on the World Social 
Situation 2013: Inequality Matters” income inequality among countries has risen.  
For the case of Mexico in particular, deep-rooted inequities are the source of 
weak growth (Levy and Walton, 2009, p.1) and during the period 1980-2000 
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there is no evidence of statistic convergence, in fact polarization between high-
income states and low-income states has augmented (Barriga and Vázquez, 2006, 
p.842).  Additionally, according to OECD Income Inequality Update (2014, p.7) 
during 2011 in Mexico, people with higher income obtained 30.5 times the 
income of the poorest, situation that reflects of course at a subnational level as 
well.  
 
Therefore, considering the restriction of instruments allowed in the model 
together with the constraint of testing each category separately, instead of testing 
them simultaneously as this study proposes to do it is a major drawback for the 
purpose of the current analysis.  Moreover, PMG technique can throw biased 
results when the regressors are correlated with the error term incurring, then, in 
spurious regressions.  Bergheim recognizes that this type of technique was an 
important estimation during the 1990’s but still more research has been 
addressed in order to consider complex and heterogeneous panels, such as unit 
root and panel co-integration tests (Bergheim, 2008). 
 
Consequently, the present study utilises fixed effects panel data modelling 
because of its particular treatment of heterogeneity between groups, which in fact 
is very ample and thus, averages of their estimates are simply not comparable. 
That is to say that, for example, the mean of two localities in Group 1 (high 
income localities) in Mexico for some parameter under research would not be 
strictly comparable to other two localities in Group 3 (low income localities).  
Furthermore, among the 2,274 Mexican municipalities which are clustered in 7 
groups according to their socio-economic conditions, the range of variability is 
considerable. 
 
The present study simultaneously analyses taxation and expenditure trends and 
its impact on GDP per capita growth.  This thesis considers fixed effects panel 




2.3.2 Panel Data Models 
Panel data is a useful tool in order to analyse a wide range of observations over 
time, increasing the degrees of freedom and reducing collinearity among 
explanatory variables and therefore, increasing efficiency of econometric 
estimates.  Consequently, data sets can be comprehensively examined on a more 
detailed basis compared with cross-section or time-series data methodologies 
(Hsiao, 2003 p.3).  Panel data enables more accurate predictions than cross 
sectional or time series models alone, since it combines and expands the 
information on both.  This type of models can be used to solve the omitted 
variables problem, since the information utilised considers inter-temporal and 
cross-sectional characteristics which naturally adjust the effect of missing 
variables, thus obtaining consistent estimators.  Moreover, there is an 
“unobserved effect” which refers to an unobserved characteristic of each 
individual, locality or country that does not change over time.  This effect 
improves the information of the model (Wooldridge, 2002 p.247, 248).  
However, some drawbacks of this methodology can be the lack of design and 
incomplete information in the data analysed; some selectivity issues which 
include short time series dimension or not taking into consideration cross 
sectional dependence which can lead to incorrect conclusions (Baltagi, 2005 p.4-
8). Therefore, the current analysis considers fixed effects and then account for 
cross sectional dependence, which in fact, make the results robust. 
 
A panel regression considers both, a cross section and a time component, which 
in turn can be described as: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  α +  𝑋′𝑖𝑡β + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                                    (2.24) 
Where i denote each individual, household, locality or country from i = 1...….N, 
and t indicates time from t = 1……..T.  𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the dependant variable which I 
want to explain.  α is a constant.  𝑋𝑖𝑡 refers to the ith observation of the K 
explanatory variables while β is the estimated parameter for each K. 
 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 =  𝜇𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡                                                                                                 (2.25) 
  
 76 
Where 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the error term.   𝜇𝑖 indicates the unobservable individual effect 
which is time invariant and 𝑣𝑖𝑡 indicates the remainder of the disturbance. 
 
Rewriting the panel regression in vector form, I would have: 
 
 𝑌 =  αl𝑁𝑇  +  𝑋β + 𝑢 =  𝑍𝛿 + 𝑢                                                                   (2.26) 
and 
𝑢 =  𝑍𝜇𝜇 + 𝑣                                                                                                  (2.27) 
 
Where Z=[lnt, X], δ=[α,β], l𝑁𝑇 is a vector of ones dimension and Zµ is a selector 
matrix of ones and zeros, considering that 𝜇𝑖are fixed parameters (Baltagi, 2005 
p.11). 
 
The basic unobserved effect model for a cross section observation i can be 
described as: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡b + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡                                                                                     (2.28)                                             
 
Where 𝑥 can contain variables that change across t but not across i, or 
components that change across i but not t, and variables that change across both 
dimensions. 
 
In traditional panel data models, 𝜇𝑖 is called random effect if it is treated as a 
random variable or fixed effect if it is considered a parameter to be estimated for 
each cross section observation i (Wooldridge, 2002 p.251). 
 
 
Consequently, according to the flexibility and the unit-specific structural 
heterogeneity of entities in fixed effects panel data models previously described, 
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the current study will utilise this particular approach because it makes economic 
sense to assume that there is an idiosyncratic fixed characteristic over time for 
each state or municipality, which is consistent with the idea that each locality has 
its own political, social, economic, technologic and institutional characteristics. 
 
2.3.3 Generalised Method of Moments 
When considering estimation for fixed effects models with a lagged dependent 
variable (Windmeijer 2014, p.30-31), the first difference model can be: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝛼(𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2) + (𝑣𝑖𝑡−𝑣𝑖𝑡−1)                                                (2.29) 
 
Valid instruments for (𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑦𝑖𝑡−1) would be the lagged levels 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2, 𝑦𝑖𝑡−3  and 
the moment condition are: 
𝐸(𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 (𝑣𝑖𝑡−𝑣𝑖𝑡−1)) = 0                                                                               (2.30) 
 
Considering Δ𝑣𝑖 is the vector of errors, the first differenced equation is: 
Δ𝑣𝑖 = [
𝑣𝑖3 −  𝑣𝑖2






]                                                     (2.31) 
 
And the matrix of instruments Z is:  
𝑍𝑖 =  [
𝑦𝑖1 0 0
0 𝑦𝑖1 𝑦𝑖2
0 … . .












]                                            (2.32)      
 
Therefore, there are (T-1)(T-2)/2 moment conditions: 
𝐸(𝑍′𝑖 Δ𝑣𝑖) = 0                                                                                               (2.33) 
 

















𝑖=1 Δ𝑣𝑖)                                                 (2.34)             
 
Where 𝑊𝑁 is a weight matrix that contains the efficiency characteristics of GMM 






𝑛=1 𝑍𝑖                                                                                      (2.35) 
This estimator is efficient where errors are homoskedastic and not correlated 
over time, this means   
𝐸(𝑣𝑖
2|𝑧𝑖) = 𝜎𝑣
2                                                                                            (2.36) 










−1 2    −1
−1 2
]                                                                        (2.38)                    
 
However, when there is conditional heteroskedasticity 
𝐸(𝑣𝑖
2|𝑧𝑖) = 𝜎𝑖
2(𝑧𝑖)                                                                                      (2.39) 







′𝑍𝑖                                                                  (2.40) 
Δ𝑣𝑖 =  Δ𝑦𝑖 − ?̂?1Δ𝑦𝑖,−1                                                                                 (2.41) 
Where  ?̂?1is the one step estimator. 
 
The method of moments based on the first difference estimation is proposed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991, p.278-293).  This estimator includes the linear 
moment restrictions but generates a large number of instruments (the lagged 
values of the regressors) in the differenced equation. The estimation can be done 
either in one or two steps.  They apply this estimation method to employment 
equations in an unbalanced panel of 140 UK companies during 1979-1984.  
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Their results suggest a long-run elasticity with wage and capital variables.  
However, Blundell and Bond (1998, p. 115-138) consider that when the 
autoregressive parameter is large and the time period is short, the first difference 
estimation has a large finite sample bias and poor precision because the lagged 
variables are weak instruments.  Hence, they propose a system that is an 
extended version of the linear differenced model which consider additional 
moment conditions; so, the model incudes not only the first difference equations 
but supplementary equations in levels with the lagged first-differences as 
instruments.  The results and extension of their previous work shows significant 
improvement and accuracy.  They confirm greater efficiency for the system 
GMM estimator compared to the difference estimation.  Hasan et. al. (2009, p.9), 
Soto (2009, p.10) and Liang, Z. (2006, p.15) confirm the greater efficiency of the 
system estimator. 
 
Another approach of the current work is to apply GMM system to my sets of 
panels in Mexico and Latin America, since N>T and I have a lagged dependent 
variable and not strictly exogenous independent variables.  However, the number 
of instruments is large with respect to the number of observations and the results 
are not robust.  In this respect, according to Bun & Windmeijer (2010, p.95-97) 
and Verdier, (2014 p.2-4) Generalized Method of Moments estimation presents a 
large variance and the presence of weak instruments persist.  My final estimation 
includes system GMM as a matter of comparison in my Mexican states and Latin 
American data set. 
 
2.3.4 Robust Standard Errors with Cross Sectional Dependence 
Hoechle, D. (2007 p.287-289) develops an estimator which extends original 
formulation of “Discroll-Kraay” and applies it to the use of balanced and 
unbalanced panels.  The equation to estimate would be: 
yi,t =  x′itθ + εit                                      i = 1, … . . , N          t = 1, … . , T           (2.42) 
where 




for individual i with a subset of ti1 … , T1  with   1 ≤ ti1 ≤ ⋯ Ti ≤ TThe 
regressors xit are uncorrelated with  εis for all s,t but εit can be autocorrelated. 
Therefore, θ can be estimated by OLS 
θ̂ = (X′X)−1X′y                                                                                              (2.44) 
The variance and covariance matrix would be  
V(θ̂) = (X′X)−1ŜT(X
′X)−1y                                                                           (2.45) 
and ŜT 
ŜT = Ω̂0 +  ∑ w(j, m)[Ω̂j + Ω̂j
′]m
(T)
j=1                                                                (2.46) 
where m(T) refers to the maximum lag where the residuals may be autocorrelated 
and the modified weights would be: 
  w(j, m) = 1 −
j
{m(T)+1}
                                                                                 (2.47) 
where high order lags receive less weight and  Ω̂j would be: 
Ω̂j = ∑ ht(θ̂)
T
t=j+1  hit(θ̂)(θ̂)′ with ht(θ̂) = ∑ hit(θ̂)
N(t)
t=1                               (2.48) 
That is the t moment conditions hit(θ̂) go from 1 to N(t) where N can vary with 
t, which makes the estimator valid with unbalanced panels, therefore, the 
moment conditions of a linear regression model would be: 
hit(θ̂) = xitε̂it = xit(yi,t −  x
′
itθ)                                                                 (2.49) 
Therefore, the fixed effects first step estimation would be zit  ∈ {yi,txit} 





t=ti1  and z̿it = (∑ Ti)
−1 ∑ ∑ zitti                                             (2.51) 
Which corresponds to the OLS estimator 




These types of models have the great advantage of dealing with autocorrelation, 
heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional dependence between the cross sections, 
which in fact is an issue with 32 states and 2,247 municipalities in Mexico, and 
20 countries in Latin America, since they are interconnected geographically, 
politically and economically. Moreover, allowing for unbalanced panels makes 
this estimator robust with these types of data.  In the case of Mexico in particular, 
my fixed effect growth regression results become robust after applying cross 
sectional dependence estimator.  Early panel data estimators assumed 
independent errors and homogeneous slopes; cross sectional dependence and 
heterogeneity were only considered in spatial models but not in standard panels. 
However, ignoring cross sectional dependence of errors has severe 
consequences, since the presence of some sort of cross sectional dependence 
among macroeconomic panel data seems to be the rule and not the exception 
(Chudik & Pesaran, 2013 p.2). 
 
Fuinhas and Couto (2015, p.148) analyse the relationship between oil 
consumption and economic growth in 15 oil producing countries during the 
period 1965-2012. They utilise a fixed effects Driscoll-Kraay estimator in order 
to account for heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and cross-sectional dependence 
present in their panel. Their results demonstrate that oil consumption promotes 
economic growth. 
 
2.4 Fiscal Policy Mix State Analysis 
2.4.1 Fiscal policy model, methodology and data 
My empirical analysis considers a range of disaggregated income and 
expenditure variables in Mexico in 32 states from 1994 to 2010.  Bearing in mind 
Gemmell et al.’s (2012) Budget Government Constraint Model, I know that 
growth can be determined by revenue and expenditure components; however, I 
additionally include control variables that have been widely used in growth 
models. Considering simultaneously the disaggregated sources of government 
revenue and expenditure withholding from an a priori categorisation, I look at the 
figures to understand their impact on growth.  My research is innovative because 
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it considers simultaneously income and expenditure available data on GDP per 
capita at different levels of government in Mexico.  This study intends to 
constitute a bridge between macroeconomic fiscal policy and the current budget 
that local governments utilise in their day to day finances. 
 
I apply a fixed effects panel data model as a matter of comparison (“xtreg” 
command), however, when allowing for cross sectional dependence in my 
dataset, my results present a higher efficiency.  System GMM is also considered 
by applying “xtabond2” command, although the estimation is not robust.  The 
Stata command “xtscc” is used as the baseline specification (Hoechle 2007).  The 
specification tests are included before my regressions tables.  I provide evidence 
demonstrating that the main income and expenditure components should be 
analysed simultaneously when evaluating changes in GDP per capita growth.  In 
order to test my hypothesis, I run regressions with income or expenditure 
components separately and then together (detailed in the appendix) and my 
findings show that there is a difference between the coefficients in all three 
regressions with slightly more significant coefficients in my broader model. 
 
 
Fiscal Policy Model 
 
As mentioned earlier, the empirical analysis considers a range of disaggregated 
income and expenditure variables in Mexico at a state level.  Ormaechea (2012), 
Johansson et al.  (2008), Angelopoulos et al. (2012) find that reducing direct 
taxes while increasing indirect taxes have a positive impact on growth.  Arvate et 
al. (2013), De Mello Jr. (2012), Kappeler et al. (2013), Binswanger-Mkhize et. 
al. (2012) illustrate the positive effect of transfers on growth and local 
investment.  Sour (2013), Caldera (2013) and Abbott, Cabral & Jones (2015) 
refer to the relevant role of transfers in local governments.  Gemmell, Kneller & 
Sanz (2012 and 2009), Bassanini et al. (2001), Guillemette (2010), Angelopoulos 
et al. (2008), Milbourne et al. (2003), Nijkamp and Poot (2004), Bose et al. 
(2003), Aschauer (2000), Kneller et al. (1999) find positive growth effects of 
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productive expenditure for transport & communication, education & health, 
research & development. 
 
Data and choice of variables 
The empirical analysis uses annual data of 32 states from 1994 to 2010.  As 
mentioned in the introduction, the NAFTA is signed in 1994, therefore it is 
important to contextualise this work under the new economic framework of the 
Mexican economy, when it begins a new episode of improved trade with its 
northern neighbours in order to facilitate the trilateral flow of goods and services.  
The period of study ends in 2010 because of the changes in local budget 
reporting of the Mexican states, according to the new regulations established in 
the General Law on Government Accounting.  The fiscal policy variables 
included are direct taxes, indirect taxes, non-earmarked transfers, earmarked 
transfers, subsidies, transfers and aid, personal services and capital expenditure 
(for definitions, descriptive statistics and sources of these variables, see Tables 
2.7-2.9). It is understood that regressors in a growth model should be carefully 
selected and robust in order to avoid ‘Model Uncertainty’ as specified by Temple 
(2000).  However, the particular variables specified by Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) 
refer mainly to cross country growth regressions and not to states.  According to 
Durlauf, S. N., Johnson, P. A., & Temple, J. R. (2005, p.646) there should be a 
closer interaction between theory and practice, considering particular features of 
the countries of study, in this thesis, the variables selected intend to reflect 
Mexican state reality. 
 
The regression equation links growth with the fiscal variables afore mentioned as 
a share of total revenue or expenditure.   The control variables employed have 
been broadly utilised in growth models by Afonso and Furceri (2010), Santiago 
Acosta-Ormaechea & Jiae Yoo (2012), Johansson, et al. (2008) such as level of 
GDP, average years of education and population growth; life expectancy has 
been considered by Bloom, Canning & Sevilla (2004), Hamoudi & Sachs (2000).  
The empirical analysis of the current study will test if the fiscal variables are 
related to higher growth.  The fact that regressors in growth models among 
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regions are interconnected geographically, politically and economically has to be 
accounted for in order to have robust estimators (Chudik & Pesaran, 2013). 
Consequently, the method of estimation applied will be robust standard errors for 
panel regressions with cross sectional dependence between 32 states. 
 
According to Gemmell et al. (2012 p.21) ‘the fact that the government budget is 
an accounting identity’ means that any change in the sources of funding has 
necessarily to be equal to the use of resources; therefore, in order to estimate the 
impact of fiscal policy variables on growth, this distinction has to be made.  
Benos (2009) and Arnold (2008), consider Government Budget Constraint 
models, however there are some limitations to the interpretations of results, since 
the specific changes on assets and liabilities should be accounted.  A problem in 
growth models is that fiscal policy variables are likely endogenous, however, 
lagged values of fiscal variables are weak instruments even when applying 
Instrumental Variables or GMM.  Consequently, this work will only able to 
establish conditional correlations among fiscal variables and growth.  This study 
controls for the impact of variables that are relevant for the development of a 
locality.  The robustness checks are added to the baseline specification. 
 
Regression equation 
In this thesis in order to properly analyse fiscal variables, the estimation equation 
is as follows: 
 




i  = state 
 t  = time 
 ∝𝑖  = Fixed effect for each locality i 
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Y             = GDP per capita level 
R = Direct and indirect taxes and earmarked/non-earmarked      
transfers as a share of total revenue 
E = Subsidies, transfers and aid, personal services and capital 
expenditure as a share of total expenditure  
X          = Control variables (Average School years of Education, 
                        Life Expectancy at birth, Average Population Growth) 
             lit                = Locality fixed effects component 
             yit                = Year fixed effects component 
 
The main hypothesis is: 
 
∆𝑋𝑖𝑡 =  f(R𝑖𝑡−1 , 𝐸𝑖𝑡−1,   X 𝑖𝑡−1)                                                                     (2.54) 
 
The main income and expenditure components, should be considered when 
analysing the development of GDP per capita. 
 
 
Additionally, this study will analyse employment and its correlation with 
transfers and taxes levied as follows: 
𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = ∝𝑖 + 𝜃1𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1(𝑅)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2(𝐸)𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝜃2𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡(2.55)  
Where 
 𝐿𝐸 = Rate of formal employment in locality i at time t 
 
These models provide a clear setting of the type of analysis this research will 
develop in the following chapters.  Specifically, the focus will be in identifying 
and comparing the particularities of states in Mexico. Understand the link 
between fiscal variables and their impact on GDP per capita and employment.  
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Sources and properties of the data 
In the case of Mexican States, they will be divided according to their average 
income between 1994 and 2010, since the income difference between the lowest 
and the highest is about 8 times.  Maintaining in the same group states with 
similar GDP per capita provides us with a better tool of analysis, therefore, 
dummy variables per group will be considered for our fiscal variables.  The 
analysis has been done with data of Mexico as a country without any group 
distinction and then considering state division by groups with my dummy 
variables.   
 
Graph 2.6 Mexican 32 Local States Average Income between 1994 and 2010 
(Thousands of pesos 2003 constant prices) 
 
Source: Own calculations considering GDP provided by the Mexican National Statistics Institute
High Income Middle Income Low Income 
 Table 2.7 Descriptive statistics States 
 
  
Definition Mean Std. Dev. CV SourceSource
Employment rate
Number of formally employed people as 
percentage of the population
16.11 17.47 108.46
Mexican Social Security Institute, IMSS (2012); 
author's calculations.
Growth
Annual real gross domestic product per 
capita growth in percentage
2.18 5.92 271.84
National Institute of Statics and Geography, 
INEGI (2012); author's calculations.
Capital expenditure
Capital investment as a percentage of total 
expenditure
0.10 0.06 59.53
National Institute of Statics and Geography, 
INEGI (2012); author's calculations.
Direct tax
Direct taxes as a percentage of total 
goverment income
0.02 0.03 145.01
National Institute of Statics and Geography, 
INEGI (2012); author's calculations.
Earmarked transfers
Earmarked (conditional) transfers as a 
percentage of total government income
0.46 0.16 35.48
National Institute of Statics and Geography, 
INEGI (2012); author's calculations.
Indirect tax
Indirect taxes as a percentage of total 
government income
0.00 0.01 118.02
National Institute of Statics and Geography, 
INEGI (2012); author's calculations.
Non-earmarked 
transfers
Non-earmarked (unconditional) transfers 
as a percentage of total government 
income
0.38 0.11 29.52
National Institute of Statics and Geography, 
INEGI (2012); author's calculations.
Personal services
Personal services as a percentage of total 
government expenditure
0.22 0.15 65.79
National Institute of Statics and Geography, 
INEGI (2012); author's calculations.
Subsidies, transfers 
and aid
Subsidies, transfers and aid as a 
percentage of total government 
expenditure
0.40 0.19 46.75
National Institute of Statics and Geography, 
INEGI (2012); author's calculations.
Average years of 
education
Average years of schooling, in years 7.62 1.05 13.78
National Population Council, CONAPO (2012); 
author's calculations.
Drainage and sewerage 
system
Systems utilised for drainage and sewage, 
in thousands
0.25 0.31 126.28
National Institute of Statics and Geography, 
INEGI (2014); author's calculations.
Electric energy users Users of electric energy, in millions 0.80 0.64 80.86
National Institute of Statics and Geography, 
INEGI (2014); author's calculations.
Length of road network
Real square meters constructed, in one 
hundred thousands
0.09 0.06 64.67
National Institute of Statics and Geography, 
INEGI (2014); author's calculations.
Life expectancy Life expectancy at birth, in years 73.88 1.25 1.69
National Population Council, CONAPO (2012); 
author's calculations.
New trucks sold
New trucks sold to the public, in ten 
thousands
0.88 1.16 131.75
National Institute of Statics and Geography, 
INEGI (2014); author's calculations.
Piped water systems
Systems utilised for piped water, in ten 
thousands
0.08 0.10 129.86
National Institute of Statics and Geography, 
INEGI (2014); author's calculations.
Population growth Annual percentage population growth rate 1.36 1.00 73.58
National Population Council, CONAPO (2012); 
author's calculations.
Real GDP per capita
Annual gross domestic product per capita 
level
0.66 0.51 76.39
National Institute of Statics and Geography, 
INEGI (2012); author's calculations.
Total area sown Acres sown, in millions 0.68 0.49 72.11
National Institute of Statics and Geography, 
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Table 2.8 Descriptive Statistics by Group of States 
 
 
Mean Std. Dev. CV Mean Std. Dev. CV Mean Std. Dev. CV
Employment rate 19.26 6.66 34.58 21.47 23.76 110.66 6.08 2.07 34.10
Growth 0.98 5.03 514.22 2.43 5.85 240.44 2.77 6.55 236.27
Capital expenditure 0.09 0.05 62.86 0.10 0.05 53.85 0.10 0.06 64.24
Direct tax 0.05 0.06 131.86 0.02 0.02 70.89 0.01 0.01 57.62
Earmarked transfers 0.37 0.16 44.19 0.46 0.14 29.94 0.53 0.16 30.30
Indirect tax 0.01 0.01 117.20 0.00 0.00 101.10 0.00 0.00 118.29
Non-earmarked 
transfers
0.38 0.10 25.28 0.40 0.10 26.01 0.36 0.13 36.53
Personal services 0.25 0.14 55.12 0.20 0.12 60.99 0.23 0.18 76.88
Subsidies, transfers and 
aid
0.33 0.17 52.68 0.43 0.16 37.46 0.40 0.21 52.60
Average years of 
education
8.42 0.93 11.06 7.80 0.75 9.63 6.73 0.84 12.52
Drainage and sewerage 
system
0.04 0.06 137.29 0.24 0.27 113.32 0.40 0.38 94.83
Electric energy users 0.78 0.77 99.53 0.82 0.66 80.55 0.78 0.49 63.24
Length of road network 0.06 0.03 47.04 0.10 0.07 67.86 0.11 0.06 53.78
Life expectancy 74.43 1.01 1.36 74.08 0.96 1.30 73.15 1.43 1.96
New trucks sold 1.26 1.84 145.96 0.89 0.90 100.59 0.55 0.49 88.49
Piped water systems 0.03 0.02 79.78 0.06 0.05 93.95 0.14 0.14 100.56
Population growth 2.09 1.38 66.22 1.35 0.58 43.18 0.78 0.65 84.14
Real GDP per capita 1.14 0.80 70.38 0.61 0.14 23.73 0.37 0.08 22.64
Total area sown 0.20 0.12 59.50 0.76 0.47 61.69 0.95 0.42 44.83
Control variables
Dependent variables
High Income Middle Income Low Income
Variable
Fiscal policy variables
 Table 2.9 Descriptive Statistics by State 
  
Mean Std. Dev. CV Mean Std. Dev. CV Mean Std. Dev. CV Mean Std. Dev. CV
Dependent  variables
Employment rate 0.13 5.43 4328.99 1.33 2.98 224.01 -1.89 4.26 -225.51 3.02 6.62 219.20
Growth 21.48 1.76 8.17 18.64 1.91 10.26 13.09 1.93 14.74 26.33 1.94 7.36
Fiscal policy variables
Capital expenditure 0.03 0.01 35.79 0.01 0.01 57.79 0.02 0.01 36.36 0.02 0.00 9.77
Direct tax 0.01 0.00 35.48 0.01 0.00 44.13 0.00 0.00 75.50 0.00 0.00 48.30
Earmarked transfers 0.32 0.08 24.64 0.35 0.03 9.17 0.34 0.02 6.19 0.36 0.04 11.74
Indirect tax 0.34 0.18 54.56 0.52 0.06 11.60 0.44 0.07 15.68 0.47 0.13 27.91
Non-earmarked transfers 0.33 0.16 48.99 0.58 0.05 8.97 0.23 0.06 25.93 0.20 0.13 66.37
Personal services 0.22 0.06 26.39 0.09 0.03 28.17 0.27 0.06 20.72 0.46 0.10 22.81
Subsidies, transfers and aid 0.06 0.03 45.71 0.06 0.04 66.84 0.09 0.05 48.01 0.12 0.05 38.66
Control variables
Average years of education 0.76 0.44 57.18 0.76 0.44 57.18 0.76 0.44 57.18 0.76 0.44 57.18
Drainage and sewerage system 0.18 0.39 222.67 0.18 0.39 222.67 0.18 0.39 222.67 0.18 0.39 222.67
Electric energy users 0.81 0.05 6.54 0.80 0.07 9.25 2.32 1.72 73.92 0.84 0.15 18.01
Length of road network 3.21 0.29 8.89 2.93 0.30 10.09 1.61 0.45 28.02 1.35 0.20 15.09
Life expectancy 75.09 0.64 0.86 74.73 0.88 1.18 73.55 1.14 1.55 74.16 0.48 0.65
New trucks sold 0.02 0.00 12.63 0.01 0.00 21.37 0.02 0.01 46.13 0.03 0.01 26.76
Piped water systems 0.79 0.17 21.43 0.15 0.05 30.91 0.17 0.04 26.37 0.65 0.15 22.74
Population growth 0.53 0.24 45.58 0.16 0.09 57.73 0.14 0.08 56.38 0.87 0.32 36.52
Real GDP per capita 0.02 0.01 38.12 0.01 0.00 13.45 0.03 0.01 19.72 0.00 0.00 27.89
Total area sown 0.23 0.01 4.96 0.04 0.01 16.75 0.21 0.02 8.30 0.29 0.03 8.79
Campeche Coahuila
Variable
Baja California Baja California Sur
High income High incomeHigh income High income
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Table 2.10 Descriptive Statistics by State (Cont.) 
Mean Std. Dev. CV Mean Std. Dev. CV Mean Std. Dev. CV Mean Std. Dev. CV
Dependent  variables
Employment rate 1.12 4.67 417.80 2.90 6.00 207.07 -0.75 4.86 -645.71 1.86 2.96 159.06
Growth 25.97 1.67 6.44 23.73 1.41 5.95 18.77 1.45 7.71 6.11 0.88 14.42
Fiscal policy variables
Capital expenditure 0.20 0.02 9.75 0.05 0.01 18.09 0.03 0.00 13.50 0.01 0.00 20.56
Direct tax 0.01 0.01 69.74 0.00 0.00 52.56 0.02 0.01 50.75 0.00 0.00 61.13
Earmarked transfers 0.41 0.02 5.67 0.33 0.09 26.70 0.34 0.04 12.17 0.57 0.08 14.12
Indirect tax 0.09 0.07 75.93 0.33 0.10 30.62 0.43 0.11 26.70 0.36 0.10 26.98
Non-earmarked transfers 0.22 0.10 44.42 0.30 0.16 52.13 0.49 0.09 18.53 0.29 0.14 49.12
Personal services 0.30 0.09 28.52 0.24 0.09 35.12 0.09 0.01 14.68 0.29 0.14 47.46
Subsidies, transfers and aid 0.10 0.05 51.04 0.07 0.04 57.26 0.10 0.03 26.35 0.10 0.10 99.47
Control variables
Average years of education 0.76 0.44 57.18 0.76 0.44 57.18 0.76 0.44 57.18 0.76 0.44 57.18
Drainage and sewerage system 0.18 0.39 222.67 0.18 0.39 222.67 0.18 0.39 222.67 0.18 0.39 222.67
Electric energy users 1.56 0.11 7.22 1.16 0.23 19.68 0.99 0.05 4.81 0.63 0.31 48.59
Length of road network 0.25 0.15 59.42 1.64 0.28 16.94 4.63 0.74 16.02 1.07 0.60 56.02
Life expectancy 75.11 0.63 0.84 74.66 0.53 0.71 74.73 1.13 1.51 73.44 0.90 1.22
New trucks sold 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.01 18.77 0.01 0.00 43.14 0.16 0.05 30.24
Piped water systems 2.60 0.23 8.93 1.12 0.21 18.71 0.27 0.10 34.80 0.45 0.10 21.49
Population growth 5.45 1.86 34.18 1.91 0.88 46.26 0.41 0.27 66.56 0.56 0.34 60.83
Real GDP per capita 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.01 37.62 0.02 0.01 57.16 0.06 0.02 26.18
Total area sown 0.03 0.00 6.26 0.37 0.02 6.13 0.12 0.01 5.44 0.28 0.03 10.23
High income High income High income High income
Distrito Federal Nuevo León Quintana Roo Tabasco
Variable
 Table 2.11 Descriptive Statistics by State (Cont.) 
  
Mean Std. Dev. CV Mean Std. Dev. CV Mean Std. Dev. CV Mean Std. Dev. CV
Dependent  variables
Employment rate 2.47 4.29 173.63 2.21 6.08 275.11 0.88 6.11 694.30 2.79 6.11 219.34
Growth 17.68 0.78 4.39 89.19 3.96 4.44 2.54 0.26 10.26 11.36 0.40 3.52
Fiscal policy variables
Capital expenditure 0.01 0.01 79.22 0.01 0.01 89.18 0.04 0.01 14.82 0.01 0.00 36.06
Direct tax 0.00 0.00 28.99 0.00 0.00 42.84 0.01 0.00 33.33 0.01 0.00 30.53
Earmarked transfers 0.42 0.05 12.50 0.39 0.03 7.66 0.34 0.03 9.85 0.37 0.14 37.25
Indirect tax 0.50 0.05 10.90 0.50 0.08 15.20 0.43 0.06 13.81 0.51 0.20 40.19
Non-earmarked transfers 0.56 0.05 9.53 0.54 0.07 13.57 0.39 0.19 47.56 0.49 0.13 25.67
Personal services 0.08 0.01 15.51 0.13 0.02 14.65 0.24 0.17 70.81 0.19 0.07 35.13
Subsidies, transfers and aid 0.13 0.06 45.00 0.07 0.03 41.68 0.13 0.05 42.04 0.07 0.04 58.56
Control variables
Average years of education 0.76 0.44 57.18 0.76 0.44 57.18 0.76 0.44 57.18 0.76 0.44 57.18
Drainage and sewerage system 0.18 0.39 222.67 0.18 0.39 222.67 0.18 0.39 222.67 0.18 0.39 222.67
Electric energy users 0.71 0.10 13.50 0.65 0.08 11.67 0.78 0.07 9.07 0.55 0.10 17.62
Length of road network 2.07 0.37 17.71 1.56 0.19 12.04 1.38 0.32 23.36 0.61 0.17 28.12
Life expectancy 74.49 0.61 0.81 74.32 0.87 1.17 74.61 0.82 1.10 73.55 0.77 1.05
New trucks sold 0.30 0.03 11.68 0.07 0.01 12.14 0.21 0.06 26.41 0.89 0.27 30.30
Piped water systems 0.29 0.06 21.65 0.18 0.04 21.16 0.89 0.16 17.75 0.38 0.06 15.04
Population growth 0.36 0.15 43.38 0.20 0.11 54.11 0.88 0.34 38.08 0.26 0.10 39.31
Real GDP per capita 0.03 0.00 16.03 0.02 0.00 8.07 0.12 0.03 25.52 0.01 0.01 54.23
Total area sown 0.16 0.01 3.54 0.16 0.01 3.57 1.01 0.04 3.94 0.69 0.02 3.41
Middle income Middle income Middle income Middle income
Aguascalientes Colima Chihuahua Durango
Variable
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Table 2.12 Descriptive Statistics by State (Cont.) 
  
Mean Std. Dev. CV Mean Std. Dev. CV Mean Std. Dev. CV Mean Std. Dev. CV
Dependent  variables
Employment rate 4.30 8.32 193.26 2.42 6.47 267.22 1.73 4.93 284.20 0.99 4.23 429.54
Growth 10.71 0.98 9.18 15.90 1.07 6.75 1.90 0.14 7.14 64.96 3.85 5.93
Fiscal policy variables
Capital expenditure 0.01 0.01 107.05 0.03 0.01 21.12 0.03 0.00 11.53 0.01 0.02 126.34
Direct tax 0.00 0.00 54.37 0.00 0.00 61.55 0.00 0.00 48.16 0.01 0.01 74.64
Earmarked transfers 0.41 0.06 13.48 0.40 0.10 23.82 0.41 0.05 13.32 0.41 0.10 23.70
Indirect tax 0.48 0.05 10.88 0.40 0.15 37.43 0.40 0.08 20.50 0.45 0.19 41.05
Non-earmarked transfers 0.29 0.17 59.00 0.22 0.13 61.13 0.30 0.15 50.86 0.49 0.16 32.08
Personal services 0.37 0.15 41.79 0.35 0.08 21.66 0.29 0.09 31.45 0.11 0.09 77.89
Subsidies, transfers and aid 0.08 0.03 43.30 0.05 0.02 40.94 0.09 0.03 36.39 0.11 0.04 31.75
Control variables
Average years of education 0.76 0.44 57.18 0.76 0.44 57.18 0.76 0.44 57.18 0.76 0.44 57.18
Drainage and sewerage system 0.18 0.39 222.67 0.18 0.39 222.67 0.18 0.39 222.67 0.18 0.39 222.67
Electric energy users 0.49 0.12 25.36 0.65 0.11 17.56 0.46 0.05 11.20 0.54 0.05 8.77
Length of road network 0.89 0.36 39.94 1.18 0.29 24.71 1.81 0.35 19.58 1.26 0.51 40.42
Life expectancy 73.96 1.09 1.47 74.25 0.80 1.08 74.33 1.03 1.38 74.44 1.10 1.48
New trucks sold 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.04 78.04 0.45 0.03 7.69 0.12 0.00 0.00
Piped water systems 1.24 0.25 19.75 1.73 0.39 22.34 2.60 0.27 10.57 0.46 0.09 19.74
Population growth 1.27 0.47 37.03 2.61 1.00 38.39 2.65 1.11 42.05 0.37 0.18 48.58
Real GDP per capita 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 36.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 82.88
Total area sown 1.06 0.05 4.62 1.47 0.09 5.95 0.89 0.03 3.57 0.14 0.01 4.80
Middle income Middle income Middle income Middle income
Guanajuato Jalisco México Morelos
Variable
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Table 2.13 Descriptive Statistics by State (Cont.) 
 
Mean Std. Dev. CV Mean Std. Dev. CV Mean Std. Dev. CV Mean Std. Dev. CV
Dependent  variables
Employment rate 2.99 5.04 168.56 3.31 7.47 225.61 2.67 6.20 232.35 2.07 4.19 202.00
Growth 16.95 1.32 7.82 10.15 1.02 10.02 12.24 1.12 9.12 16.63 0.90 5.42
Fiscal policy variables
Capital expenditure 0.01 0.02 116.68 0.01 0.01 69.26 0.01 0.00 15.88 0.03 0.01 26.93
Direct tax 0.01 0.00 50.43 0.00 0.00 95.18 0.00 0.00 30.89 0.01 0.00 45.69
Earmarked transfers 0.39 0.03 8.59 0.34 0.05 14.95 0.39 0.04 10.17 0.43 0.05 11.84
Indirect tax 0.49 0.08 15.87 0.58 0.04 6.46 0.46 0.13 28.52 0.41 0.04 9.09
Non-earmarked transfers 0.50 0.05 9.20 0.59 0.04 6.93 0.47 0.16 34.78 0.47 0.03 6.25
Personal services 0.12 0.02 14.64 0.13 0.03 24.44 0.16 0.03 17.50 0.20 0.03 16.78
Subsidies, transfers and aid 0.15 0.06 38.55 0.06 0.02 35.69 0.09 0.05 55.99 0.11 0.03 27.16
Control variables
Average years of education 0.76 0.44 57.18 0.76 0.44 57.18 0.76 0.44 57.18 0.76 0.44 57.18
Drainage and sewerage system 0.18 0.39 222.67 0.18 0.39 222.67 0.18 0.39 222.67 0.18 0.39 222.67
Electric energy users 0.73 0.13 17.75 0.47 0.10 21.24 0.51 0.10 18.82 0.71 0.09 12.03
Length of road network 2.24 0.36 15.92 0.84 0.30 35.95 0.58 0.41 72.12 1.36 0.33 23.91
Life expectancy 73.86 1.16 1.57 73.64 1.17 1.59 73.80 0.62 0.84 74.26 0.70 0.94
New trucks sold 0.15 0.09 59.96 0.27 0.12 46.43 0.25 0.08 32.55 0.22 0.11 49.85
Piped water systems 0.39 0.08 21.90 0.59 0.11 19.31 0.70 0.13 18.19 0.62 0.12 19.62
Population growth 0.39 0.27 68.50 0.48 0.23 47.04 0.84 0.46 55.00 0.68 0.29 43.39
Real GDP per capita 0.02 0.00 19.40 0.15 0.07 48.82 0.11 0.01 11.36 0.08 0.01 19.50
Total area sown 0.17 0.01 3.95 0.71 0.05 6.45 1.30 0.05 3.61 0.59 0.08 13.07
Middle income Middle income Middle income Middle income
Querétaro San Luis Potosí Sinaloa Sonora
Variable
 Table 2.14 Descriptive Statistics by State (Cont.) 
  
Mean Std. Dev. CV Mean Std. Dev. CV Mean Std. Dev. CV Mean Std. Dev. CV
Dependent  variables
Employment rate 2.86 7.67 267.86 2.38 4.15 174.80 2.75 8.47 308.51 1.51 3.75 247.86
Growth 16.93 0.93 5.48 13.43 0.81 6.01 3.44 0.45 12.96 4.09 0.35 8.62
Fiscal policy variables
Capital expenditure 0.04 0.00 13.26 0.03 0.01 36.06 0.01 0.00 43.96 0.01 0.00 39.79
Direct tax 0.00 0.00 48.56 0.00 0.00 40.24 0.00 0.00 105.28 0.01 0.00 41.42
Earmarked transfers 0.35 0.04 11.67 0.57 0.24 43.28 0.35 0.04 11.67 0.29 0.11 38.98
Indirect tax 0.52 0.04 7.21 0.32 0.28 85.77 0.54 0.09 17.22 0.64 0.14 21.13
Non-earmarked transfers 0.49 0.06 12.65 0.27 0.10 36.63 0.32 0.19 59.30 0.51 0.18 34.83
Personal services 0.12 0.02 16.65 0.35 0.06 17.22 0.28 0.16 57.84 0.11 0.04 35.44
Subsidies, transfers and aid 0.19 0.05 29.14 0.08 0.04 52.64 0.11 0.03 24.81 0.10 0.05 47.81
Control variables
Average years of education 0.76 0.44 57.18 0.76 0.44 57.18 0.76 0.44 57.18 0.76 0.44 57.18
Drainage and sewerage system 0.18 0.39 222.67 0.18 0.39 222.67 0.18 0.39 222.67 0.18 0.39 222.67
Electric energy users 0.71 0.15 20.55 0.52 0.08 15.74 0.28 0.05 17.96 0.36 0.04 10.26
Length of road network 1.58 0.26 16.46 1.55 0.25 15.84 1.47 0.31 21.24 0.41 0.55 132.95
Life expectancy 74.07 0.74 1.00 73.57 1.20 1.63 72.13 1.55 2.15 72.05 1.15 1.60
New trucks sold 0.06 0.01 25.42 0.01 0.00 35.05 0.36 0.06 17.38 0.17 0.10 58.21
Piped water systems 0.91 0.17 18.79 0.50 0.08 15.59 0.93 0.44 47.18 0.69 0.14 20.97
Population growth 1.21 0.51 42.02 0.47 0.32 67.84 0.61 0.33 54.92 0.43 0.23 52.91
Real GDP per capita 0.06 0.04 62.99 0.06 0.01 13.49 0.31 0.11 36.21 0.15 0.03 20.43
Total area sown 1.49 0.09 5.77 0.77 0.04 5.02 1.48 0.10 6.74 0.81 0.05 5.93
Middle income Middle income Low income Low income
Tamaulipas Yucatán Chiapas Guerrero
Variable
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Table 2.15 Descriptive Statistics by State (Cont.) 
  
Mean Std. Dev. CV Mean Std. Dev. CV Mean Std. Dev. CV Mean Std. Dev. CV
Dependent  variables
Employment rate 2.75 8.17 297.25 4.22 9.11 215.53 2.59 6.93 267.24 2.05 4.69 228.63
Growth 6.33 0.38 5.99 3.79 0.31 8.17 9.29 1.16 12.48 4.05 0.34 8.28
Fiscal policy variables
Capital expenditure 0.01 0.00 34.73 0.01 0.01 96.40 0.01 0.00 25.69 0.00 0.00 55.62
Direct tax 0.01 0.00 26.91 0.00 0.00 54.78 0.01 0.00 21.97 0.00 0.00 110.94
Earmarked transfers 0.42 0.23 55.45 0.33 0.05 15.24 0.31 0.02 7.04 0.26 0.06 24.90
Indirect tax 0.49 0.24 48.26 0.59 0.03 5.45 0.54 0.14 26.01 0.56 0.22 38.52
Non-earmarked transfers 0.61 0.05 7.61 0.15 0.05 35.40 0.51 0.15 30.06 0.49 0.16 32.99
Personal services 0.05 0.02 27.95 0.53 0.07 12.23 0.11 0.02 13.62 0.08 0.02 22.49
Subsidies, transfers and aid 0.10 0.04 43.12 0.10 0.02 19.92 0.08 0.05 58.06 0.08 0.05 60.63
Control variables
Average years of education 0.76 0.44 57.18 0.76 0.44 57.18 0.76 0.44 57.18 0.76 0.44 57.18
Drainage and sewerage system 0.18 0.39 222.67 0.18 0.39 222.67 0.18 0.39 222.67 0.18 0.39 222.67
Electric energy users 0.39 0.08 19.76 0.38 0.09 25.03 0.42 0.08 19.85 0.30 0.04 14.63
Length of road network 0.91 0.37 40.81 0.12 0.49 407.06 0.57 0.28 48.54 0.42 0.45 107.85
Life expectancy 73.25 1.26 1.71 73.55 0.93 1.26 73.96 0.80 1.09 72.39 1.51 2.08
New trucks sold 0.16 0.20 127.13 0.00 0.01 184.46 0.07 0.01 18.89 0.25 0.07 25.70
Piped water systems 0.44 0.18 39.65 1.12 0.22 19.43 0.29 0.05 18.42 0.86 0.15 18.02
Population growth 0.36 0.17 48.32 0.90 0.35 38.67 0.15 0.06 39.04 0.46 0.28 60.61
Real GDP per capita 0.03 0.02 83.47 0.00 0.00 218.75 0.00 0.00 16.67 0.18 0.01 6.42
Total area sown 0.59 0.01 1.52 1.07 0.05 4.91 0.36 0.02 5.93 1.22 0.10 7.87
Low income Low income Low income Low income
Hidalgo Michoacán Nayarit Oaxaca
Variable
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Table 2.16 Descriptive Statistics by State (End) 
 
Mean Std. Dev. CV Mean Std. Dev. CV Mean Std. Dev. CV Mean Std. Dev. CV
Dependent  variables
Employment rate 2.42 5.70 235.30 2.26 6.91 305.95 3.16 6.16 195.07 3.99 4.71 118.07
Growth 7.51 0.32 4.28 6.80 0.62 9.19 7.96 0.65 8.19 7.52 1.06 14.10
Fiscal policy variables
Capital expenditure 0.02 0.00 22.70 0.01 0.00 21.69 0.01 0.01 82.45 0.01 0.00 52.11
Direct tax 0.00 0.00 52.74 0.00 0.00 56.01 0.00 0.00 21.12 0.00 0.00 25.19
Earmarked transfers 0.38 0.06 15.88 0.45 0.20 44.20 0.39 0.09 21.86 0.38 0.13 35.34
Indirect tax 0.51 0.06 12.07 0.40 0.24 59.82 0.51 0.06 11.06 0.55 0.15 27.88
Non-earmarked transfers 0.19 0.08 44.08 0.46 0.13 27.25 0.18 0.09 49.89 0.56 0.16 28.06
Personal services 0.37 0.09 24.89 0.18 0.10 56.52 0.45 0.07 14.92 0.15 0.10 66.44
Subsidies, transfers and aid 0.12 0.11 84.76 0.07 0.03 43.81 0.10 0.03 32.93 0.12 0.13 110.43
Control variables
Average years of education 0.76 0.44 57.18 0.76 0.44 57.18 0.76 0.44 57.18 0.76 0.44 57.18
Drainage and sewerage system 0.18 0.39 222.67 0.18 0.39 222.67 0.18 0.39 222.67 0.18 0.39 222.67
Electric energy users 0.44 0.06 14.64 0.35 0.05 14.70 0.41 0.08 19.74 0.35 0.08 23.79
Length of road network 1.37 0.27 19.75 1.77 0.33 18.61 0.55 0.25 45.92 0.18 0.23 129.71
Life expectancy 73.23 1.51 2.06 74.34 1.19 1.60 72.73 0.89 1.23 73.83 1.44 1.95
New trucks sold 0.95 0.41 43.15 0.23 0.01 2.45 0.57 0.32 56.70 0.73 0.33 44.61
Piped water systems 1.09 0.29 26.11 0.25 0.05 21.45 1.72 0.35 20.34 0.41 0.07 15.96
Population growth 1.11 0.46 41.11 0.13 0.05 34.87 1.24 0.61 48.89 0.16 0.06 39.61
Real GDP per capita 0.21 0.07 35.15 0.03 0.00 1.71 0.29 0.21 70.67 0.12 0.03 23.43
Total area sown 0.95 0.04 3.94 0.24 0.00 0.77 1.48 0.09 6.27 1.27 0.03 2.63
Low income Low income Low income Low income
Puebla Tlaxcala Veracruz Zacatecas
Variable
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2.4.2 Growth 
 
In this section, the proposed panel data model is applied to the 32 localities (31 
states and the Federal District) in Mexico from 1994 to 2010, with the aim of 
determining the fiscal policy mix during the period of study and its impact on 
economic development.  This empirical estimation analyses GDP per capita 
growth as a function of fiscal variables: government revenue and expenditure 
variables, considering average population growth, life expectancy at birth, 
average school years of education, the lagged value of GDP per capita and fiscal 
reform and recession dummies as control variables.  
 
To begin my analysis, I regress growth per capita against income and 
expenditure variables considering Mexico as a whole (Table 2.20) and afterwards 
with group interactions of my fiscal variables of interest (Table 2.21).   In both 
tables, the first column reports the fixed effects estimation, followed by the 
GMM system, as a matter of comparison with my baseline specification, robust 
standard errors for panel regressions with cross sectional dependence.  I control 
for the impact of variables that are relevant for state development.  The 
robustness checks are added to the baseline specification.  My three methods of 
estimation present the same signs but my baseline specification has a higher F 
value, although the standard errors are similar among my three methods.  The 
specification tests are included in Tables 2.17-2.19 which account for cross 
sectional dependence in the dataset, and most of my variables are stationary, 
although few control variables are non-stationary.  My panel is unbalanced but 
none of the variables of my estimation present a problem of collinearity. 
 
The coefficient of direct tax is not significant in Mexico as a whole (Table 2.20) 
or when considering direct tax intercept per group (Table 2.21).  However, 
indirect tax coefficient shows a positive and significant relationship with growth 
in the case of Mexico as a country when controlling for infrastructure such as 
drainage and sewage systems, electric energy users, length of road network or 
total area sown. After considering group dummies (Table 2.21) indirect taxes 
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remain positive only in the case of the high-income group when controlling for 
drainage and sewage or piped water systems.  In the former literature on taxation, 
Gemmell (2011 p.44) when comparing the long-term impact of fiscal variables 
on growth on 17 OECD countries from 1970 to 2004, find that distortionary 
taxation presents a negative sign considering that each country can take a 
different lag length up to 2.  Dahlby et al. (2012 p.587) analyses the impact of tax 
changes on growth in Canadian provinces from 1997 to 2006 and finds out that 
there is a negative correlation with corporate taxation, however, personal income 
tax does not seem to affect growth.  In Acosta-Ormaechea and Jiae Yoo study 
(2012) overall tax burden has a clear negative effect on growth, however they 
consider that there is a positive association of VAT with growth.  In the case of 
Mexico in particular, several studies have found a negative relationship between 
taxes and growth [Srithongrung and Sánchez-Juárez (2015) and Caballero and 
López (2012)].  However, according to the study of Huang and Frentz (2014) 
there is no clear evidence that tax increases harm growth, particularly at a state 
level (p.8, 10), since every study refers to different entities with different socio-
economic and political conditions, a diverse range of policies and time periods.  
Studies from Samaniego (2014), Bania et al. (2007) and Tomljanovich (2004) 
show even a positive effect of taxes on growth.  
 
Mexican tax system contains structural weaknesses which limit its ability to 
generate revenue.  Tax legislation is complex and provides preferential 
treatments currently quantifiable, in about half of the tax revenue.  The use of the 
tax system to promote economic activities, or to subsidize the consumption or 
production of certain products or sectors, has shown its ineffectiveness at 
unsustainable fiscal cost.  As a result, undesirable inequalities arise in the 
distribution of the tax burden, difficulties in tax compliance and administration, 
multiplicity of opportunities for evasion and circumvention of the tax burden and 
distortions in the decisions of investment, savings and consumption of economic 
agents (Jiménez et al., 2010). 
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According to the report Paying Taxes 2016 of the World Bank, which includes 
the study of the tax systems of 189 economies between 2004 and 2014, Mexico 
has a complex administrative burden and major challenges with the informal 
economy and tax evasion.  INEGI reports that the informal economy accounted 
for around 26 percent of Mexico’s GDP between 2000 and 2009.  Therefore, in 
2014 Mexico introduced an ‘incorporation regime’ as an attempt of the 
government to convince informal workforce to pay taxes in return for social 
security.  Moreover, the main reason for the government to have implemented 
electronic invoicing in 2013 was to reduce tax evasion (World Bank, 2016). 
 
Therefore, after reviewing the Mexican tax framework is not surprising that 
direct taxes do not seem to affect GDP per capita and only indirect taxes show a 
partial correlation in high income localities, because these type of taxes does not 
change the relative prices and are easier to administrate, control and collect. 
 
The effect of non-earmarked transfers on growth, although expected to be 
positive, in the country as a whole have been found negative and significant 
(Table 2.20), nonetheless, when analysing them at a subnational level, they only 
remain negative and significant in the high-income localities but not significant 
in the other two groups (Table 2.21).  Perhaps, these results would imply that this 
kind of resources may be canalised to current spending instead of applying them 
on productive activities.  Non-earmarked transfers can be used for any purpose 
that the local governments consider as important according to their local 
priorities since they are unconditional transfers, in fact, according to the study of 
Garcia (2010 p.239, 248) non-earmarked transfers show a positive relationship 
with growth considering average data from 1997 to 2005 for Mexican States, 
however, a negative association is found between earmarked transfers and 
growth.  Considering earmarked transfers, their effect on growth in Mexico at a 
country level, turns to be negative and significant.  The negative effect could be 
result of the lack of capability of managing resources or a deficient institutional 
framework, as explained by Fatás and Mihov (2003) where political and 
institutional environment can moderate effects of fiscal policy.  According to 
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Transparency International (2014) Mexico is ranked 103 among 175 countries in 
the corruption index, and as I will discuss in chapter five, people do not trust 
their local authorities because they perceive high levels of corruption, lack of 
transparency and accountability of resources.  Unfortunately, I was unable to find 
indicators for corruption at a local level in Mexico. 
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Table 2.17 Cross Sectional Dependence and Heteroskesdasticity Tests 
  
 
Table 2.18 Fisher Unit Root Test 
 
 




Mod. Wald test 225.15 0.00
Unit Root Test t-statistics p-value
Growth 404.07 0.00
Direct tax 85.67 0.04
Indirect tax 217.36 0.00
Non-earmarked transfers 140.11 0.00
Earmarked transfers 549.77 0.00
Subsidies, transfers and aid 213.48 0.00
Personal services 263.34 0.00
Capital expenditure 171.22 0.00
Fiscal reform 67.81 0.35
Recession dummy 5.45 1.00
Real GDP per capita 86.43 0.03
Average years of education 83.41 0.05
Population growth 347.50 0.00
Life expectancy 81.19 0.07
Drainage and sewerage system in thousands 97.45 0.00
Electric energy users in millions 27.35 1.00
New trucks sold in ten thousands 30.41 1.00
Piped water systems in ten thousands 159.05 0.00
Length of road network in one hundred thousands 125.78 0.00
Total area sown in millions 147.94 0.00
Tolerance VIF
Direct tax 0.36 2.75
Indirect tax 0.52 1.93
Non-earmarked transfers 0.33 3.06
Earmarked transfers 0.22 4.53
Subsidies, transfers and aid 0.16 6.17
Personal services 0.18 5.69
Capital expenditure 0.67 1.50
Real GDP per capita 0.61 1.63
Average years of education 0.13 7.45
Population growth 0.41 2.45
Life expectancy 0.13 7.65
Drainage and sewerage system in thousands 0.60 1.66
Electric energy users in millions 0.16 6.28
New trucks sold in ten thousands 0.19 5.30
Piped water systems in ten thousands 0.37 2.72
Length of road network in one hundred thousands 0.38 2.66
Total area sown in millions 0.19 5.35
VARIABLES
Collinearity statistics
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
-23.35 -13.57 -23.35 22.85 24.41 16.72 14.80 46.81 42.71
(24.42) (9.94) (19.02) (42.33) (42.21) (44.84) (51.38) (39.74) (38.42)
49.43 -89.39* 49.43 82.76* 84.77* 81.59 84.46 104.07** 100.70*
(45.37) (45.79) (67.88) (45.33) (46.03) (47.39) (48.54) (44.47) (47.35)
-2.17 -5.83** -2.17 -5.83*** -5.76*** -5.53*** -5.58*** -3.65* -3.30*
(3.13) (2.79) (1.89) (1.79) (1.89) (1.83) (1.77) (1.97) (1.78)
-3.30 -6.55** -3.30 -4.07 -3.83 -3.71 -4.42 -1.55 -1.42
(2.30) (2.83) (2.89) (2.85) (2.92) (2.85) (2.73) (2.96) (3.07)
3.90 6.69*** 3.90 6.59*** 6.62*** 6.55*** 7.23*** 8.02*** 8.25***
(2.58) (2.50) (3.33) (2.10) (2.01) (2.01) (2.13) (2.46) (2.59)
0.99 7.01** 0.99 3.56 3.56 3.28 4.42 5.51 5.51
(3.49) (2.80) (5.24) (2.88) (2.93) (2.83) (2.78) (3.72) (3.85)
-3.88 -2.13 -3.88 -0.16 -0.20 -0.40 0.10 1.29 1.87
(3.46) (4.00) (5.36) (3.64) (3.52) (3.33) (3.22) (2.84) (2.75)
-8.07** -1.67 -1.28*** -9.38*** -20.52 -8.73** -22.58 -0.84** -0.82**
(3.59) (26.83) (0.27) (3.05) (57.86) (3.12) (60.02) (0.33) (0.34)
0.46 -1.46 -6.32** -1.72*** -9.26** -1.79*** -9.60** -6.94** -8.26***
(0.88) (0.94) (2.73) (0.30) (3.86) (0.33) (3.42) (3.09) (2.15)
-2.02*** -1.56*** -2.02*** -2.07*** -2.07*** -2.18*** -2.23*** -2.26*** -2.26***
(0.31) (0.40) (0.45) (0.42) (0.42) (0.43) (0.44) (0.46) (0.47)
4.30 0.12 4.30** 5.39** 5.54** 6.09** 5.94* 4.39 4.51*
(3.02) (0.39) (1.58) (2.27) (2.44) (2.74) (3.06) (2.56) (2.52)
-1.43** -0.53* -1.43 -1.97 -2.01 -2.17 -2.21 -2.20* -2.09*
(0.69) (0.27) (1.15) (1.20) (1.31) (1.26) (1.28) (1.20) (1.17)
0.24 0.09 0.24 -0.15 -0.13 -0.28 -0.14 -0.23 0.05
(0.41) (0.38) (0.47) (0.64) (0.65) (0.64) (0.69) (0.52) (0.55)
1.46* 1.49** 1.96** 1.44 1.04 0.74
(0.70) (0.65) (0.73) (1.00) (0.94) (1.00)
0.09 1.29 1.18 1.54 1.29
(1.52) (1.32) (1.87) (1.59) (1.73)
-2.22* -2.15 -2.46 -2.34







510 510 510 361 359 357 336 330 329
32 32 32 31 31 30 29 29 29
101.4*** 37.23*** 46748*** 41700*** 14313*** 141.5*** 3859*** 758.5*** 462.8***









New trucks sold in ten thousands




Real GDP per capita
Average years of education
Population growth






Length of road network in one hundred thousands





Drainage and sewerage system in thousands

















Notes: Dependent variable is real GDP per capita annual percentage growth rate. Independent variables have one period 
lagged values. Annual data for 1994-2010.  All regressions also contain year dummies and a constant term. SE are 
reported in parentheses.  The estimators used are fixed effects, system GMM and the Discroll and Kraay (1998) that 
accounts for autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and cross sectional dependence.  Fisher Unit Root Test was conducted 
to all regression variables and accepting in most of them the alternative hypothesis of at least one Panel being stationary 
at a 10% level.  ***(**/*) denotes statistically significant at the 1%(5%/10%) level. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
122.54 -79.04 122.54 183.39** 124.00 118.72 171.56** 162.28 122.25
(81.60) (63.85) (97.51) (72.24) (96.42) (100.11) (72.65) (102.77) (97.72)
-16.19 -99.59 -16.19 -39.16 -15.20 -0.08 -133.79 3.34 -11.87
(104.63) (84.35) (82.52) (173.14) (82.87) (81.66) (120.76) (77.14) (85.56)
125.32 -34.34 125.32 43.47 128.39 115.48 -9.73 96.43 131.25
(179.05) (94.67) (115.78) (96.31) (104.24) (116.42) (174.85) (123.99) (127.68)
-5.78* 2.49 -5.78 -7.70 -5.75 -5.41 -6.64* -5.35 -5.83
(3.47) (2.65) (5.09) (4.49) (4.79) (5.27) (3.36) (6.07) (5.10)
4.02 8.07*** 4.02** 4.42* 4.21** 4.26** 4.21* 3.52* 5.70***
(3.53) (2.34) (1.55) (2.43) (1.89) (1.68) (2.35) (1.68) (1.75)
6.29* 3.12 6.29*** 7.60*** 6.40*** 6.09*** 7.61*** 6.71*** 6.73***
(3.34) (1.93) (0.94) (1.25) (0.96) (0.84) (1.64) (1.07) (0.94)
-10.99** 8.19*** -10.99* -9.38 -10.88* -11.43* -9.23* -10.83 -11.15*
(5.07) (3.04) (5.66) (7.24) (5.56) (5.70) (4.38) (6.41) (5.60)
4.78 7.50** 4.78* 2.01 4.95* 5.35* 1.84 2.68 6.30**
(4.83) (3.39) (2.51) (3.72) (2.37) (2.76) (4.25) (3.68) (2.85)
5.23 3.71 5.23 5.91 5.35 5.23 6.66 5.69 5.44
(5.02) (2.51) (3.59) (4.13) (4.00) (3.60) (3.85) (3.75) (3.51)
-14.07* 15.73* -14.07** -16.18* -13.94** -15.04** -14.89** -15.81** -13.79**
(7.27) (9.01) (5.79) (8.70) (5.65) (5.42) (6.42) (6.97) (5.73)
-2.51 -4.42 -2.51 -2.24 -2.69 -2.88 -0.61 -0.09 -1.80
(7.27) (8.14) (5.51) (7.63) (5.72) (5.52) (6.30) (5.04) (5.83)
-1.18 17.45* -1.18 1.23 -1.21 -1.22 -0.36 -1.17 -0.25
(5.49) (9.79) (4.36) (3.99) (4.40) (4.37) (4.58) (4.46) (3.97)
20.19*** -0.03 5.22** 7.27*** 7.07** 7.17*** 5.38*** 6.73*** 11.99***
(1.19) (1.06) (1.79) (1.09) (2.96) (2.18) (1.24) (0.83) (3.00)
-14.51*** 2.06** 1.97*** -2.77*** -11.00*** -3.34*** -8.99*** -8.57*** -0.22
(1.07) (0.94) (0.06) (0.08) (0.46) (0.81) (0.12) (0.16) (0.62)
-1.76*** -1.75*** -1.76*** -1.67*** -1.75*** -1.78*** -1.74*** -1.70*** -1.75***
(0.62) (0.45) (0.48) (0.54) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50)
-2.42** -0.12 -2.42** -3.07*** -2.48** -2.31** -3.39*** -2.53** -2.62***













510 542 510 361 508 503 391 492 509
32 32 32 31 32 32 31 32 32
26.25*** 34.10***1.856e+06*** 54.72*** 121.2*** 6971*** 145.7*** 252.9*** 141.5***
0.629 --- 0.629 0.606 0.627 0.629 0.626 0.657 0.632
F - statistic
Indirect tax, Middle income
Personal services, High income





Real GDP per capita 
Population growth 
Total area sown
Drainage and sewerage system
Subsidies, transfers and aid, High income
Subsidies, transfers and aid, Middle income
Subsidies, transfers and aid, Low income
Fiscal reform 
Electric energy users
Personal services, Middle income
Personal services, Low income
Capital expenditure, High income
Capital expenditure, Middle income





Indirect tax, High income
Indirect tax, Low income
Fiscal policy variables
Notes: Dependent variable is real GDP per capita annual percentage growth rate. Independent variables have one period 
lagged values. Annual data for 1994-2010.  All regressions also contain year dummies and a constant term. SE are 
reported in parentheses.  The estimators used are fixed effects, system GMM and the Discroll and Kraay (1998) that 
accounts for autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and cross sectional dependence.  Fisher Unit Root Test was conducted 
to all regression variables and accepting in most of them the alternative hypothesis of at least one Panel being stationary 
at a 10% level.  ***(**/*) denotes statistically significant at the 1%(5%/10%) level. 
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Only resources that are properly monitored and have a specific destination might 
promote growth within a particular time period.   In this respect, it is important to 
consider the 2014 Report of the Chief Audit Office in Mexico, where the 
earmarked transfers can be subject to revision (63.2 per cent of total transfers on 
2012) which states that the use of those resources has not been transparent and 
responsible as it should be according to the federal law, where specific 
legislation needs to be promoted to guarantee the proper use of resources.  As an 
excuse, due to the fragility of local finances, local authorities use earmarked 
federal transfers for other purposes, instead of using them on what they should 
according to the law.  Regrettably, considering the autonomy of the local 
authorities, the Chief Audit Office can only recommend the appropriate use of 
federal resources but no sanction is imposed on the local authorities that do not 
comply with the law.  The major risk is derived from the fact that local audit 
institutions are not independent from the local governments.  Non-earmarked 
transfers cannot be audited by the federal government since those resources can 
be freely managed and applied by the local government, which also can 
constitute a risk for the proper use of resources.  Furthermore, Caldera Sanchez, 
A. (2013, p.29) indicates that for the period 1989-2010 the correlation coefficient 
between sub-central tax and transfer revenues in Mexican States is 0.38, 
indicating the destabilising effects of transfers.  Moreover, when including state 
and year effects, results suggests that the transfer system is highly pro-cyclical 
and GDP shocks are likely to affect own tax income. 
 
The coefficient of earmarked transfers is not significant which could be 
explained by a lack of transparency in the use of its funds.  For instance, the fund 
provided for education was distributed according to the number of schools and 
teachers, therefore it followed an inertial tendency without considering efficiency 
or inequality characteristics of each locality.  Similarly, the health fund was 
canalised according to medical infrastructure and doctors, which again failed to 
ponder State health needs (Aguilera and Barraza, 2009).  The infrastructure fund 
does benefit the localities which present lower development, however, security 
funds are assigned according to delinquency index, which is a clear disincentive 
to decrease the levels of criminality. 
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My results for country and state level in Mexico demonstrate a positive 
relationship between subsidies, transfers and aid, on the one hand, and GDP per 
capita growth, on the other. This is consistent with the redistribution argument 
among unequal entities, welfare state, collective goods, social peace and 
democracy (Lindert, 2004).  Social expenditure in Mexico increased about 2 
percent of GDP from 1985 to 2009, which represents about one third of OECD 
average.  Social transfers represent only about 8 percent of household disposable 
income and overall, this expenditure is not properly focused because half of cash 
transfers benefit the upper segment of the income ladder and just 10 percent of 
the funds is given to the poorest 20 percent (OCDE, 2012).   Moreover, 
subsidies, transfers and aid should be provided exclusively to beneficiaries and 
public-sector institutions involved.  These resources should be clearly identified, 
monitored and controlled according to fiscal regulations.  In OCDE report (2012) 
in order to significantly reduce poverty, it would be necessary to increase social 
transfers to the poor, which means reforming the social security system to 
provide more efficient support to lower-income families.  Subsidies, transfers 
and aid represent mechanisms through which governments foster economic 
growth and the redistribution of income by promoting investment or employment 
in certain vulnerable sectors (i.e. agriculture). 
 
Regarding, personal services coefficient, it has a positive relationship with 
growth in the middle and low-income group, result that is consistent with 
Devarajan (1996) who finds a surprising result; current expenditures in 
developing countries boost economic activity more than capital expenditures.  As 
discussed earlier in the chapter, personal services represent about 80 percent of 
current expenditure in states, so its role is significant in order to maintain 
employment demand in the local governments by providing families with income 
that can further be spent on goods and services in the local economies.  This 
could be explained by the crowding-in effect that occurs when the government 
injects spending into the economy by the payment of wages to the bureaucrats, 
creating consumption demand and positive multiplier effects through 
bureaucrats’ spending on goods and services (NEF, 2012).  Thus, the benefits 
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and costs of state development policies might be different among different 
regions and positive in areas of high unemployment and were programs are 
perceived to have an impact on businesses and economic activity (Bartik, 1991). 
 
The effect of government investment on growth in Mexico at a country level is 
not significant and negative for high income states (Table 2.20).  According to 
Lachler and Aschauer (1998, p.1) an increase in public investment can have a 
positive impact on growth if attention is focused on quality of public spending, 
rate of return of the investments and complementarity with private investment.  
Public infrastructure can promote economic development by increasing the 
productivity of priority sectors or by reducing factor costs.  In other words, 
enhancing the efficiency of private inputs employed by firms or by providing an 
attractive environment to families so they are able to accept lower wages (Eberts, 
1990).  Government investment can have a significant effect on GDP per capita 
for middle income regions but not for low income states; conversely, social 
capital has the opposite effect (Looney et al., 1981).  Overall the regional effect 
would depend on the locational advantages, production efficiency, costs and 
misallocations of public spending (Devarajan, 1996).  My results are consistent 
with Devarajan’s who states that capital expenditure effect on growth can be 
negative in developed economies.  Moreover, in my case, since regional 
inequalities are huge in Mexican localities, the effects of public investment in the 
country might be offsetting between different regions.  Unfortunately, another 
limitation for the current analysis is that no information of local private 
investment was available for my period of study.  In this respect, Ebert´s (1986) 
findings -when analysing 38 metropolitan areas in the US from 1958 until 1978 - 
show that the marginal product of public capital can be around seven times lower 
than the private capital. 
 
Gemmell et al. (2013, p.1928) analyses the development of fiscal 
decentralization in OECD countries from 1972 to 2005 finding a negative effect 
of expenditure decentralization, which could mean that federal government is 
more efficient in allocating expenditure to productive and national priority areas, 
and a positive revenue decentralization effect, perhaps because local authorities 
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collect less distortionary taxes than the federal government. However, it is 
important to consider that in their sample, all the countries have spending shares 
higher than those of revenue shares with the exception of Mexico.  Kappeler et 
al. (2012) analyse 20 European countries from 1990-2009, where local 
infrastructure increases with revenue decentralization, however, the effect is 
lower if earmarked grants are canalized to capital investment.  Besides, public 
investment of three levels of government provide infrastructure for roads, 
bridges, public services and priority areas and can in fact play an important role 
during downturns and promote productivity growth in the long run, where the 
estimated returns of public investment on private sector productivity ranges 
between 15 and 45 percent (Bivens, 2012, p.1-2).  According to Amieva-Huerta 
(2010, p.252-256) current public spending could be positively related to GDP per 
capita, which means that current public spending is not counter-cyclical and it is 
highly inelastic due to the institutional committed expenditures of the public 
sector.  Moreover, his analysis rejects Barro’s neutrality hypothesis where fiscal 
policy affects private savings.  His findings demonstrate that public current 
savings have a positive effect on private savings which means an interesting 
result: “public investment complements private investment”. 
 
In my study, I want to evaluate the impact on GDP per capita of 1998 Federal 
Reform to the Fiscal Coordination System, therefore I included in my estimation 
a fiscal reform dummy, due to the limitation of data on the legal institutional 
framework.  This reform refers to earmarked transfer funds to local governments, 
mainly for education, health and infrastructure as explained in section 2.1.3.  
Although I had expected a positive relationship with growth, considering the 
aforementioned analysis of transfers, the fiscal dummy variable turns out to be 
negative in the country as a whole, but positive when considering the different 
levels of development of states.  This result is consistent with Andrew’s (2013) 
findings regarding institutional reforms that have failed to take into account the 
context in which they are implemented.  Additionally, in order to control for the 
2008 financial crisis, I included a recession dummy that as expected, had a 
negative impact on growth. 
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Turning to other regressors, higher levels of education reflect higher growth, 
which is consistent with Bassanini et al.’s (2001, p.42-43) findings. Moreover, 
according to the work developed by Gemmell et al. (2009), there is a strong 
positive association between education and growth Barrios (2009).  Population 
and Life Expectancy did not present significant coefficients.  However, the effect 
of population growth on GDP per capita in developing economies is not clear 
and no consensus has been reached about it (Wong Hock and Fumitaka, 2006, 
p.314).  Acemoglu (2006, p.1) finds there is no clear evidence of a significant 
increase in growth due to higher life expectancy.  My main results hold when I 
add robustness checks to the baseline specification.   
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2.4.3 Employment 
 
In this section, my proposed panel data model is applied to the 32 localities (31 
states and the Federal District) in Mexico from 1994 to 2010, with the aim of 
determining the fiscal policy mix during the period of study and its impact on 
employment.  This empirical estimation analyses formal employment rate as a 
function of fiscal variables: direct taxes, indirect taxes, federal transfers and 
capital expenditure, considering average population growth, average school years 
of education, the lagged value of GDP per capita and fiscal reform and recession 
dummies as control variables. 
 
I apply a fixed effects panel data model and system GMM in order to compare 
them with my baseline specification model that allows for cross sectional 
dependence in my dataset.  The Stata command “xtscc” is used (Hoechle 2007).  
The specification tests are prior to the regression tables.  The procedure followed 
is similar to the developed in the previous section.  
 
To begin my analysis, I regress the equation proposed on my model which links 
formal employment rate with my fiscal variables considering Mexico as a whole 
(Table 2.25) and afterwards with group interactions (Table 2.26).  In both tables, 
the first column reports the fixed effects regression, afterwards the system GMM 
and finally the baseline specification estimation, robust standard errors for panel 
regressions with cross sectional dependence.  My three methods of estimation 
provide the same sign effect of fiscal variables on employment, however, GMM 
provides better results but is not robust according to Sargan’s test.  The 
specification tests for cross sectional dependence, heteroskedasticity and 
collinearity are reported in Tables 2.22-2.24. 
 
According to my study, direct taxes have a negative and significant effect on 
employment rate in Mexico as a country (Table 2.25) and the middle-income 
group (Table 2.26).  In fact, Mark et al. (2000, p.105), estimate determinants of 
employment in Washington D.C. metropolitan area over from 1969-1994 and 
their results demonstrate that taxes have a significant negative effect on 
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employment.  A high number of workers in a state is paid by the government, for 
instance teachers, public health and social security workers, among others, 
therefore, Freeman R. (1987, p.183-184) determines that at a local level, public 
sector employment increases during recessions and decreases during expansions, 
while public payroll moves in the opposite direction.  However, indirect taxes for 
the low-income states show a positive sign, perhaps because this type of taxes are 
regressive and the income effect is greater than the substitution effect and agents 
are poorer with an increase of the tax burden and have to work more in order to 
keep their level of consumption. 
 
Regarding non-earmarked transfers, I find a positive and significant association 
with employment when considering group intercepts in low income groups but 
no relationship in the other income groups (Table 2.26).  This outcome might be 
the result of fragile institutional accountability and transparency as described in 
the earlier section.  According to the study developed by the US Advisory 
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, and United States of America 
(1977, p.56) grants can influence public employment. This situation could be the 
result of higher employability on a particular sector that is being stimulated by a 
particular grant, or even indirectly affected by the complementarity of certain 
good or service linked to the activity promoted.  Furthermore, higher 
employment could be attained derived only by the income effect since the 
localities have more resources to spend on a particular activity.  Dahlberg et al. 
(2008, p.30-31) demonstrate that there is a large and positive effect of transfers 
on the number of employees in the central administration, but no effects in other 
sectors.  Additionally, Mitze (2010, p.1) finds that state to state transfers have a 
negative effect on growth while federal to state transfers show a positive 
relationship on public investment and growth. 
 
Fatás and Ilian (2001, p.5-8) suggest that government spending has a positive 
effect on employment because when government increases expenditure it boosts 
economic activity. They prove that government spending is expansionary with a 
multiplier larger than one.  Concerning capital expenditure, I find a negative 
relationship in low income and high-income groups (Table 2.26).  In this respect, 
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it might be, as mentioned in the previous section, that capital misallocations, 
informal economy and inefficiencies in public spending do not reflect in local 
employment.  Unfortunately, the lack of relevant data to estimate employment at 
a local level in Mexico has been a major drawback in this thesis. 
 
Turning to other regressors, the fiscal dummy variable was not significant and 
the recession dummy had a negative impact on employment as expected.  
Focusing on Education, there is a positive relationship between employment and 
human capital at a country and state level in Mexico.  Rothwell and Berube 
(2012, p.1) state that metropolitan areas with lower level of education have 
experienced higher unemployment than other areas which present higher 
qualified employees, due to the fact that educated workers can have more 
stability, competitiveness and entrepreneurial mindset.  Consequently, skilled 
workers will have higher wages, greater employment opportunities and the 
possibility of higher mobility in income.  Population growth has a negative and 
significant effect on employment when I consider state group intercepts.  Results 
differ according to demography and employment structure among other factors.  
Bloom and Freeman (1996 p.382) consider that the effect of population on 
employment depends upon its rate of growth compared with economic growth, 
which could in turn lead to positive, negative or neutral effects.  
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Mod. Wald test 5657.39 0.00
Unit Root Test t-statistics p-value
Employment rate 74.21 0.18
Direct tax 85.67 0.04
Indirect tax 217.36 0.00
Non-earmarked transfers 140.11 0.00
Capital expenditure 171.22 0.00
Fiscal reform 67.81 0.35
Recession dummy 5.45 1.00
Real GDP per capita 86.43 0.03
Average years of education 83.41 0.05
Population growth 347.50 0.00
New trucks sold 30.41 1.00
Tolerance VIF
Direct tax 0.27 3.65
Indirect tax 0.73 1.37
Non-earmarked transfers 0.85 1.18
Capital expenditure 0.95 1.05
Real GDP per capita 0.70 1.44
Average years of education 0.42 2.36
Population growth 0.64 1.56
New trucks sold 0.31 3.24
Collinearity statistics
VARIABLES
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-26.62*** -166.84*** -26.62* -24.56*
(9.05) (3.38) (12.80) (12.56)
-3.95 -234.05*** -3.95 9.21
(27.61) (20.97) (14.88) (18.78)
1.53 11.80*** 1.53 1.15
(1.01) (1.11) (1.03) (1.15)
-1.59 -40.48*** -1.59 -1.08
(1.69) (2.16) (1.00) (0.98)
--- 6.27 1.03
--- (7.38) (7.31)
0.12 -71.89*** -0.73*** -0.93***
(1.21) (0.99) (0.18) (0.17)
0.75*** 1.16*** 0.75** 0.77***
(0.20) (0.15) (0.25) (0.25)
1.55* 11.28*** 1.55* 2.16**
(0.92) (0.12) (0.72) (0.74)
-1.02* -0.41*** -1.02* -1.25*
(0.54) (0.11) (0.53) (0.65)
0.44*
(0.25)
448 448 448 442
32 32 32 32
10.60*** 3330*** 749175*** 448099***




















Notes: Dependent variable formal employment rate per capita annual percentage growth rate. Independent variables 
have one period lagged values. Annual data for 1994-2010.  All regressions also contain year dummies and a constant 
term. SE are reported in parentheses.  The estimators used are fixed effects, system GMM and the Discroll and Kraay 
(1998) that accounts for autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and cross sectional dependence.  Fisher Unit Root Test was 
conducted to all regression variables and accepting in most of them the alternative hypothesis of at least one Panel being 
stationary at a 10% level.  ***(**/*) denotes statistically significant at the 1%(5%/10%) level. 
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Table 2.26 Employment Regression with State Group Interactions 













-21.75 11.41** -21.75 -15.20
(17.56) (4.93) (12.70) (13.82)
-24.23* -712.46*** -24.23* -28.24**
(12.96) (10.70) (12.33) (12.35)
18.24 -395.79*** 18.24 21.42
(24.86) (32.34) (20.28) (22.54)
7.12 -441.58*** 7.12 13.32
(35.51) (43.64) (15.85) (16.47)
-31.54 196.23*** -31.54 -1.76
(49.78) (38.21) (60.88) (58.01)
126.17 -211.84*** 126.17*** 130.67***
(80.76) (45.67) (41.31) (37.78)
1.68 -28.67*** 1.68 0.57
(2.48) (1.58) (2.05) (2.53)
-0.29 29.99*** -0.29 -0.27
(1.38) (1.50) (0.76) (0.75)
3.21** -15.25*** 3.21*** 2.68**
(1.36) (2.11) (0.82) (0.93)
-3.90 10.32*** -3.90*** -1.41
(3.37) (3.97) (1.25) (1.43)
1.16 -12.07*** 1.16 0.45
(2.37) (2.77) (1.60) (1.58)
-4.46 -1.31 -4.46*** -3.90***
(3.22) (4.94) (1.33) (1.15)
0.00 1.92
(0.00) (7.26)
0.29 -36.74*** 8.13 -0.87***
(1.33) (1.75) (7.56) (0.23)
0.79*** -0.01 0.79** 0.78**
(0.21) (0.24) (0.29) (0.27)
1.13 7.30*** 1.13 1.88**
(1.01) (0.20) (0.85) (0.84)
-1.44** 2.70*** -1.44*** -1.54**
(0.57) (0.22) (0.45) (0.56)
0.45*
(0.25)
448 448 448 442
32 32 32 32
8.025*** 1375*** 2728*** 626.4***
0.367 --- 0.367 0.378
VARIABLES
Control variables
Indirect tax, High income
Indirect tax, Low income
Fiscal policy variables
Direct tax, High income
Direct tax, Middle income
Direct tax, Low income
Non-earmarked transfers, High income
Non-earmarked transfers, Middle income
Indirect tax, Middle income
Observations
Number of states
Non-earmarked transfers, Low income
New trucks sold
Fiscal reform 
Capital expenditure, High income
Capital expenditure, Middle income
Capital expenditure, Low income
R - squared
Recession dummy 
Real GDP per capita 
F - statistic
Average years of education 
Population growth 
Notes: Dependent variable formal employment rate per capita annual percentage growth rate. Independent 
variables have one period lagged values. Annual data for 1994-2010.  All regressions also contain year 
dummies and a constant term. SE are reported in parentheses.  The estimators used are fixed effects, system 
GMM and the Discroll and Kraay (1998) that accounts for autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and cross 
sectional dependence.  Fisher Unit Root Test was conducted to all regression variables and accepting in most of 
them the alternative hypothesis of at least one Panel being stationary at a 10% level.  ***(**/*) denotes 
statistically significant at the 1%(5%/10%) level. 
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2.4.4 Conclusion 
 
The institutional framework, the inequality and the high level of heterogeneity 
between states has to be considered in order to properly understand 
intergovernmental relationships in Mexico.  When evaluating trends of income 
and government expenditure components and their impact on growth and 
employment, no straight-forward approach can be used in order to maximise 
local revenue while at the same time be able to guarantee local service provision.  
Although Mexico has a large federation history, equilibrium responsibilities 
between the three levels of government have to be tackled to attain sound public 
finances, efficiency, transparency, accountability, adequate reporting, 




States generate less than 12 percent of their resources with local taxes, with the 
exception of Mexico City that generates almost half of its total income with local 
sources.  As it will be explained in the next chapter, Mexican localities are also 
highly unequal, therefore, within the same state it is possible to find very poor 
and very rich municipalities.  In the state of Mexico for instance, only 19 
municipalities generate 90 percent of the state industrial potential out of 125 
(Piña and Hernández, 2011), while 35 municipalities have high rates of 
marginalization and extreme poverty (Millán et al. 2008).  Therefore, the 
possible tax effect might be offsetting even when analysing group of states 
according to their level of income.  However, it is interesting to see that in the 
country as a whole and with state interactions the effect of indirect taxes is 
positive and significant only in the high-income localities.  According to the tax 
literature, indirect taxes are regressive although efficient and easy to 
administrate, therefore, the fiscal burden for the rich would be lower than the 
fiscal burden for the poor.  Moreover, local governments have major challenges 
with the informal economy and the cost of tax evasion, therefore, they should 
focus their available resources to strengthen their administrative capacity 
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together with implementing programs for effective tax collection. 
 
Considering federal transfers, they account for around 80 percent of total income, 
therefore, accountability and transparency of federal resources would be 
necessary for tax compliance.  Unfortunately, a deficient institutional framework, 
corruption, opacity and discretion in the use of resources is generalized among 
Mexican localities (Ugalde, 2015).  Thus, the negligible or negative effect of 
federal transfers could be explained, partially, by these circumstances or maybe 
because the effects offset between municipalities within the same state. 
 
Subsidies, transfers and aid play an important role in the development of middle 
and low-income localities, where local governments look forward to promote 
different areas which the state considers most vulnerable, however, government 
officials should be cautious with the fiscal cost involved.  My results for current 
and capital spending are consistent with Devarajan’s (1996) where current 
expenditure can boost economic growth in developing economies, while capital 
expenditure can have a negative effect in developed countries.  Besides, data for 
private investment was not available at a local level for my period of study, 
therefore, I had to work only with public investment. 
 
The dummy variable I included to evaluate 1998 Federal Reform is a very simple 
approach that cannot possibly capture the real effect. Unfortunately, without 
proper data to analyse it at a local level for my period of study, at least I do not 
want to leave it out because of the relevance of the reform to local finances. 
 
Within all the limitations of my work, considering the lack of data, the weak 
exogeneity, the short period of study, I did an exercise of computing the impact 
of several income and expenditure components simultaneously, and I was able to 
show that the coefficients do vary if taken in isolation or simultaneously.  In my 
understanding, the more variables which are available to analyse, the better, 
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According to my study, direct taxes have a negative and significant effect on 
employment rate in Mexico as a country and in the high and middle-income 
group.  However, indirect taxes for the low-income states show a positive sign, 
perhaps because this type of taxes are regressive and the income effect is greater 
than the substitution effect for poor localities. 
 
Regarding non-earmarked transfers, I find a positive and significant association 
with employment when considering group intercepts in low income groups.   
This result would indicate that perhaps the non-conditional resources are used to 
increase bureaucracy.  Concerning capital expenditure, I find a negative 
relationship in low income and high-income groups.  This result is particularly 
puzzling; however, misallocations of capital spending might be occurring, 
corruption in the public tendering processes involved and also informal 
employment - with millions of people operating outside government regulations.  
Therefore, Mexican government should encourage those in the informal 
economy into paying taxes gradually and incorporate them to the formal sector 
by providing them sources of employment, stable incomes and comprehensive 
social security. 
 
Consequently, a unique generalised formula for State development cannot be 
derived.  As I have seen, the Mexican Inter-governmental framework is highly 
centralised and a high amount of local resources derive from state and federal 
shares and contributions; however, a better institutional framework, a more 
accurate legislation to acknowledge local responsibilities on federal resources 
and formulas which properly recognise disparities among localities, must be 
considered to promote growth and employment and overcome regional 
inequalities.  
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3. Mexico: Municipal Fiscal Analysis 
 
3.1 An Overview of Local Government Finance 
 
Local government finances in Mexico become relevant in a framework where 
around 75 percent of their total resources are from transfers.  According to De la 
Torre (2012), regional disparities among regions are immense since some 
jurisdictions in Mexico City can have a similar development to cities in Europe 
(Italy), while less development localities can have similar development to 
countries in Africa (Malawi).  In an attempt to alleviate inequality in Mexico, 
during 2007 and onwards, the Federal Government has targeted special resources 
to the lowest Human Development Index Municipalities.  González (2003) state 
that the responsibilities of different levels of government should be revisited to 
harmonise public administration in the three levels of government.  
Accountability and transparency should be addressed to have sound local public 
finances.  In his study, he finds a contrast between urban and rural municipalities 
whose spending patterns follow distinct trends.  Urban municipalities 
expenditure follows a spending trend more related to their own source income, 
while rural municipalities expenditure relies heavily on central government 
transfers. 
 
Own source income of localities has evolved on average between 14.0 and 17.6 
percentage points from the late nineties until 2010.  According to INEGI (2012), 
10.4 percent of total income is from taxes, while utilities account for 4.4 percent 
of total revenue; however, only 74 municipalities collected 52 percent of total 
municipal property tax.  If I compare the collection in terms of GDP, property tax 
and utilities have evolved from levels in 2001 of 0.36 and 0.26, respectively, to 
levels of 0.30 and 0.22 percent.  Federal resources from unconditional and 
conditional transfers represent 32 and 33 percentual points. Turning to 
expenditure figures, personal services accounted for 59.1 percentage points of 
total spending in 1997 and decreased to 31.4 percent in 2010, while public 
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investment and social actions represented 21.3 and 27.7 percentage points during 
the same period. 
Graph 3.1 Municipal Production per capita (2003) 
 
           Source: González (2003, p.11) 
 
Mexican National Statistics Institute considering the Mexican Census of 
Population and Employment 2000, classifies municipalities into 7 groups; where 
Group 1 represents the municipalities where there is less relative advantage of 
socioeconomic development and Group 7 stands for localities with the higher 
relative advantage compared to the other groups. 
Figure 3.1 Socio-economic regions of Mexico 
 
             Source: Socioeconomic regions of Mexico (INEGI, 2015, p.1) 
US$16,244 
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The development of municipalities is quite unequal in Mexico, where resources, 
services, qualified human capital, investment, technology and 
telecommunications are mainly in the big urban cities, while the poorest 
communities not only lack of adequate human and material resources but have 
the worse institutional framework.  As a comparison, only 309 municipalities in 
Mexico out of 2,247 generate 74 percent of national GDP and concentrate 53 
percent of the population.  The valley of Mexico for instance, with about 1 
million inhabitants, produced about 25 percent of Mexico’s GDP.  Cities like 
Monterrey, Ciudad del Carmen and Guadalajara produced between 8 and 4 
percentage points of national GDP.  Among the most touristic cities are Los 
Cabos, Cancun and Puerto Vallarta; while Aguascalientes, Queretaro, Saltillo 
and Chihuahua are manufacturer centres; oil production cities are Ciudad del 
Carmen, Cardenas and Poza Rica; Saltillo and Aguascalientes are known for 
their automotive industry; while aerospace industry develops in Chihuahua and 
Queretaro (IMCO, 2014).  Formal employment is linked to more productive 
cities, however, in Mexico the informal sector is capable of generating faster 
employment to the population, however, according to Busso et al. (2012) a peso 
invested in a formal and legal enterprise accounts for additional 50 percentage 
points of wealth, compared to an informal and illegal corporation. 
 
In contrast to the rich and developed municipalities, seventy percent of the 
people in poverty live in 1,222 municipalities, and forty percent of municipalities 
account for more than eighty-seven percent of the poor population.  In Oaxaca, 
San Juan Tepeuxila, has 97.4 percent of its inhabitants living in poverty, by 
contrast, Benito Juárez neighbourhood in Mexico City, has the lowest portion of 
the poor with only 8.7 percent.  According to the Municipal Human 
Development Index in 2004, Benito Juárez neighbourhood had an index of 0.951, 
while Coachoapa in Guerrero, the index was only of 0.43.  In this sense, Mexico 
is indisputably a nation of inequality. (Robles Narro et al., 2013).  Regarding 
health and education indexes, the more disadvantaged states are: Guerrero, 
Oaxaca, Chiapas, Michoacán, Veracruz, Zacatecas, Yucatan, Puebla and 
Guanajuato, while the more advanced are Mexico City, Nuevo León, Baja 
California, Coahuila, Sonora, Aguascalientes and Guadalajara.
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Source: Own elaboration with data of INEGI (Mexico's National Institute of Statistics and Geography)
Mean by Group
Revenue collected by Taxes and Federal Income
Tax Non earmarked transfers Earmarked transfers
Group 1 is the least developed Group 7 is the most developed
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Table 3.1 Municipal Income by Group 1994-2010 
 
  
Group Variable 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Non-earmarked Transfers 69.62 71.69 81.83 84.46 81.93 83.84 75.52 12.29 31.28 34.13 41.98 44.18 39.22 29.75 31.39 28.45 29.07
Earmarked Transfers 1.13 0.31 1.05 2.64 3.19 6.58 15.11 58.54 59.21 53.95 47.85 50.57 50.86 56.62 58.74 56.92 61.87
Revenue collected by taxes 4.87 2.06 1.88 1.60 1.03 1.04 0.90 0.47 0.40 0.37 0.52 0.57 0.47 0.48 0.43 0.38 0.34
Non-earmarked Transfers 0.36 1.34 2.67 2.27 2.65 8.16 11.80 44.38 48.42 44.11 40.62 42.70 44.04 46.06 47.75 47.63 50.05
Earmarked Transfers 4.72 2.82 2.62 2.33 1.59 1.69 1.43 0.76 0.87 0.71 1.14 1.01 0.85 0.84 0.82 0.73 0.73
Revenue collected by taxes 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Non-earmarked Transfers 76.28 73.53 77.31 79.87 75.82 72.12 68.59 41.50 40.66 42.32 45.08 45.41 45.52 40.62 42.32 39.39 40.00
Earmarked Transfers 1.16 2.61 3.72 4.20 6.94 14.49 18.24 40.29 46.37 45.42 42.09 43.66 41.22 44.47 45.20 46.39 47.95
Revenue collected by taxes 5.41 4.93 3.91 3.62 2.57 2.45 2.20 1.57 1.68 1.49 1.64 1.75 1.56 1.68 1.55 1.47 1.57
Non-earmarked Transfers 64.63 66.70 67.11 68.78 63.82 54.34 51.95 51.91 46.89 49.07 51.06 51.03 51.39 49.51 50.69 47.60 48.43
Earmarked Transfers 2.42 3.34 7.26 5.73 12.28 25.75 30.36 29.44 31.81 30.82 29.74 29.90 27.49 29.49 30.22 31.47 33.73
Revenue collected by taxes 9.46 9.53 6.98 6.13 4.47 3.74 3.43 3.51 3.50 3.92 4.33 4.31 3.86 4.07 3.62 3.59 3.62
Non-earmarked Transfers 70.56 70.82 73.13 75.47 71.10 68.34 66.21 45.27 41.13 45.92 47.32 46.24 47.59 41.65 43.72 40.34 41.35
Earmarked Transfers 0.87 3.07 4.06 4.38 6.90 12.48 15.59 35.72 40.73 38.43 35.26 37.44 35.23 39.16 39.26 41.07 41.13
Revenue collected by taxes 8.64 7.57 6.60 5.60 4.37 4.26 4.13 3.20 3.47 3.07 4.02 3.77 3.58 4.07 3.73 3.72 3.61
Non-earmarked Transfers 58.59 60.44 63.30 66.12 60.36 57.19 53.40 47.19 40.90 46.26 46.58 45.88 46.04 42.87 42.98 40.66 41.65
Earmarked Transfers 2.04 3.31 4.82 2.89 10.05 18.42 22.71 28.43 32.06 26.92 25.89 26.03 24.92 26.51 30.09 30.40 30.93
Revenue collected by taxes 12.13 12.34 10.36 9.66 7.80 6.58 6.44 6.14 6.34 6.69 7.53 7.67 7.45 8.42 7.16 6.99 7.24
Non-earmarked Transfers 46.00 48.59 51.72 53.73 50.54 49.66 44.31 40.01 34.82 39.56 37.53 37.19 39.23 35.94 37.36 34.60 34.88
Earmarked Transfers 1.79 2.14 3.28 3.09 7.12 12.50 19.53 23.78 25.89 22.04 21.66 22.03 21.54 22.21 26.02 28.16 28.11
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Mean by Group
Composition of Capital Expenditure
Adquisition of movable an immovable goods Public infrastructure
Group 1 is the least developed Group 7 is the most developed
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Table 3.2 Municipal Expenditure by Group 1994-2010 
  
Group Variable 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Public Infrastructure 30.52 26.50 18.61 24.32 24.84 13.91 20.17 47.36 45.21 41.17 49.32 32.45 43.91 48.65 47.70 52.80 53.51
Aquisition of Movable and Immovable Goods 0.00 7.29 5.23 5.97 4.93 3.37 1.59 2.51 2.78 2.26 2.46 2.92 2.67 1.51 2.60 2.00 1.06
Public Infrastructure 30.15 25.60 20.93 24.83 25.00 16.02 21.14 39.17 40.59 35.06 41.98 28.74 37.81 41.73 38.72 44.72 44.68
Aquisition of Movable and Immovable Goods 0.00 6.45 5.17 5.67 4.88 3.79 2.17 3.22 2.60 2.00 2.65 3.29 3.09 2.18 2.62 2.10 1.56
Public Infrastructure 26.71 23.86 19.13 22.22 21.46 19.04 22.27 33.30 36.29 36.95 39.58 32.67 36.62 39.68 37.14 42.54 41.15
Aquisition of Movable and Immovable Goods 0.04 3.19 4.27 3.07 3.19 3.12 1.89 2.65 2.15 1.58 1.80 1.86 2.01 1.50 1.90 1.32 1.14
Public Infrastructure 19.41 16.40 12.68 14.89 15.59 15.65 22.72 22.59 22.62 26.67 26.17 24.85 27.29 25.16 26.99 33.05 29.80
Aquisition of Movable and Immovable Goods NA 1.95 3.34 2.48 3.75 4.29 2.42 3.71 3.29 2.05 2.44 2.40 1.97 2.23 2.80 1.27 1.53
Public Infrastructure 27.05 23.15 23.50 24.24 21.40 19.98 21.92 29.35 30.46 30.55 32.82 28.28 30.93 32.37 30.61 37.39 33.76
Aquisition of Movable and Immovable Goods NA 2.57 2.80 2.87 2.70 2.58 1.97 3.22 2.48 1.44 2.13 2.07 2.27 1.76 2.37 1.77 1.54
Public Infrastructure 20.56 16.24 15.63 15.96 16.12 17.90 19.60 19.82 21.41 22.64 22.99 21.88 22.59 20.21 23.82 28.57 24.40
Aquisition of Movable and Immovable Goods 0.00 1.90 2.26 2.50 3.57 2.73 2.48 3.33 2.20 1.88 2.19 2.21 2.24 2.24 2.37 1.65 2.31
Public Infrastructure 22.73 18.11 15.16 15.77 17.45 17.53 19.33 19.23 19.24 21.41 21.20 20.07 18.63 19.59 22.54 23.77 21.26








1) N.A. Value not available 
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Estimated rate of employment
Group 1 is the least developed Group 7 is the most developed
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Table 3.3 Entitled Population for Social Security in Municipalities by Group 1994-2010 
 
Group Variable 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Rate of employment -1.90 -1.76 -1.33 -0.96 -0.58 -0.19 0.16 0.45 0.75 1.09 1.35 1.86 2.06 2.33 2.44 4.78 7.04
Rate of employment 1.10 1.31 1.58 1.77 2.08 2.33 2.60 2.94 3.27 3.59 3.91 4.28 4.51 4.75 4.82 4.92 5.07
Rate of employment -10.62 -11.80 -10.03 -8.17 -6.54 -3.23 -2.73 -1.16 0.53 2.05 3.87 5.59 7.55 9.22 10.88 12.07 13.10
Rate of employment 16.51 16.36 18.08 16.33 15.81 27.81 15.90 16.18 16.62 16.68 17.30 17.62 17.22 17.89 16.09 15.26 15.63
Rate of employment 10.73 11.27 13.33 15.94 18.57 22.13 20.43 21.07 21.94 22.49 23.11 23.86 24.42 25.97 25.72 26.05 25.25
Rate of employment 18.74 20.13 23.01 25.18 28.18 35.87 30.53 31.38 32.73 32.81 33.33 34.19 34.92 36.29 33.94 34.41 35.28
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In this context, when evaluating a particular fiscal policy, the quality of the 
measures undertaken and the effectiveness of the public sector is fundamental at 
a local level.  Taking into consideration the importance of governmental 
efficiency, Afonso et al (2005 p.324) calculates “public sector performance”  and 
“public sector efficiency indicators” for 23 developed economies (Figure 3.2).  In 
this respect, it would be desirable to calculate the above-mentioned indicators at 
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Figure 3.2 Total Public-Sector Performance Indicator 
 
Source: Modified version of Figure 1 in Afonso et al (2005 p.324) 
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3.2 Local Public Finance: some literature insights 
 
A virtuous path between financial autonomy and local development could 
guarantee the success of economic performance at a local level (Dahl & Díaz-
Bay, 2014).  Consequently, local authorities should manage in the most effective 
way possible their resources and outlays: the composition of direct or indirect 
taxes, central government transfers and current and capital expenditures. 
 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003 p.522) have developed a cross-country analysis of 
average growth rate of GDP per capita in terms of explanatory variables, 
covering the level of educational attainment, life expectancy, investment (relative 
to GDP), and terms of trade, as well as fiscal indicators such as the ratio of 
government spending relative to each country’s GDP.  When dealing with local 
growth, it is necessary to consider the economy of a particular place and 
understand the process by which individuals respond to incentives and how they 
choose to live in areas where their needs are best satisfied.  Workers will move 
where they receive higher wages, while firms will seek lower hiring costs.  In 
this respect, spatial economics could provide insights to economic activity within 
a locality and shed light on the mechanisms which contribute to growth and 
development.  It has been argued that the policymaking process should take into 
consideration the complexity of local entities and priorities, while at the same 




The fact that there are vertical and horizontal imbalances between sub-national 
governments reflect different results for the effect of direct and indirect taxes on 
GDP per capita on Mexican states and municipalities.  As can be seen in Graph 
3.5, the effect of a particular tax (t) on wages (w) depends upon the level of 
wage.  If the labour supply in a particular locality is in the area of a positive 
slope, an increase of taxes, can in fact decrease labour and even revenue 
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collection. Though, if the labour supply at a given locality is in the negative slope 
end, an increase of taxes can lead to more hours being worked and even a   
higher tax revenue. 
When wages increase, there are two effects involved; the income effect, which 
makes the employee wealthier, work less hours and enjoy more time of leisure; 
and the substitution effect. which leads the employee to work more because the 
opportunity cost of leisure increases hours worked.  When wages increase and 
the hours worked decrease, the income effect is higher than the substitution 
effect (negative slope), however, hours worked increase in case the substitution 
effect is higher than the income effect (positive slope). Correspondingly, if the 
income effect is higher than the substitution effect and taxes increase, the wages 
decline and the hours worked rise and revenue collection expands as well (point 
A to B). The opposite happens in case the substitution effect is higher than the 
income effect and then when taxes rise, the wages decrease, hours worked 
decline (point C to D) and revenue might shrink as well. 
 
Graph 3.5 Effect of Tax on Labour Supply 
 
 
However, according to Felder (1988, p.10), leisure could be a luxury only after 
an individual has the minimum acceptable nourishment, cloth and housing levels, 
Source: Stiglitz (2000 p.537) 
*Subsistence level is not in the original graph 
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therefore, under the afore mentioned circumstances, the supply curve could be 
downward sloping (subsistence level). 
 
3.2.2 Spending 
Growth can be achieved if productive expenditure (i.e. highways, investment, 
machinery and equipment) is utilised and proper fiscal rules are implemented 
(Guillemette, 2010). Considering the overall picture of economic development, 
governments should take into account which financing method could be the most 
accurate at a particular point in time, because of the trade-offs of applying a 
particular tax.  For instance, if a locality requires additional resources to provide 
better public services, the local government can either raise direct or indirect 
taxation, increase the price paid by taxpayers for public goods and services or 
issue debt.  Local authorities have also to consider the best way to canalise 
resources, either to build a school or a hospital, improve the prevalent education 
and medical infrastructure, build a new road or improve an old one, increase 
transfers and subsidies to the population or invest in sewage and drainage. (Pérez 
Fuentes Alemán, 1995). 
 
In this respect, Chart 3.1 illustrates the effect of taxes, expenditure and debt on 
growth. 
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Chart 3.1 Growth effects according to financing and spending 
Financing method 























The effect depends upon initial conditions and a 
prudent level of debt to GDP ratio 
Budget deficits Ambiguous Negative 
 
            Source: Table 1* in Barrios et al (2009 p.19) 
            * In the original table debt is not included. 
 
Gemmell, Kneller and Sanz (2012 p.22-23) using 17 OECD countries from 1970 
to 2008 find that the nature of expenditure funding matters; whether taxes are 
raised, deficits are incurred, or there are reductions in specific expenditures. As 
mentioned earlier, they report positive growth effects for transport and 
communication, education and health expenditure but negative effects for social 
welfare spending. 
 
The dynamics of the small local governments can sometimes be different to the 
larger local governments and the central government, since during the execution 
stages of public works, they suffer from longer delays when their contracts are 
complex, long term and mainly financed with external resources, situation that 
inhibits their capability of delivering the planned benefits.  While citizens can be 
able to evaluate and monitor education services provided, the process of building 
a school cannot be properly supervised by them.  Additionally, other factors 
contribute to the quality of public works because the local fiscal planner can be 
captured by firm lobbying for the market and pressure from the local interest 
groups.  Moreover, there is a positive relationship between the local authority 
term and a worse outcome in the public works process, implying less 
participation, larger costs and a higher probability that the same company wins 
several times (Guccio et al., 2014, p.237-239). 
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3.2.3 Intergovernmental Transfers 
 
According to Breton (2002 p.31-45), intergovernmental competition can lead to 
inefficient outcomes. There are three main factors in governmental systems: 
concurrency, standards and administration. Concurrency refers to the power an 
authority is given to exercise policies in a particular territory. Standards pertain 
to levels of quality and service provided on regarding dimensions of the policy 
being applied.  Administration of a particular policy refers to how it is 
implemented by local authorities in their local conditions.  The failure of an 
efficient outcome derives from different information and coordination costs 
between each level of government, diminishing supply costs and dynamic 
instability. Furthermore, Breton and Scott (2007 p.22) analysed differences in 
environmental governance patterns in terms of signalling and mobility costs for 
the demand side, alongside coordination and administrative costs on the supply 
side. 
 
Local governments actively seek satisfactory provision of public goods to 
inhabitants because they are close to them. Recent developments in the new 
economic geography have shown that there are other factors and incentives that 
drive people’s behaviours, such as: proximity to other economic activity in 
places where wages and returns to investment seem to be higher, which at the 
same time are associated with higher living cost and pollution, however a higher 
propensity for innovation is also feasible and desirable at a local level.  (Bowley 
et al., 2010 p.18-33).  Therefore, the differences between income level, 
employment and social, economic and political performance need be taken into 
consideration when designing policy, because there will be different outcomes in 
different localities.  From this perspective, empowering and incentivising local 
governments and actors to actively enhance growth and development within a 
local framework with distinct characteristics should be viewed as a relevant 
challenge for new government policy (ibid).  A limitation of the current study is 
that it is unable to measure the above-mentioned incentives, although all the 
differences are captured in the fixed effect component.   
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Additionally, with respect to the role of government expenditures within the 
framework of fiscal federalism, Tiebout (1956) contended that the fiscal policy 
mix between income and expenditure responsibilities has high variability 
between different localities and residents will maximise their provision of public 
services given the tax burden of each locality.  Nonetheless, inter-jurisdictional 
externalities among localities provoke benefits or costs which spill over across 
different geographic jurisdictions (Hyman, 2008 p.696).  This phenomenon 
occurs when the local authority modifies tax and expenditure provision, affecting 
the benefit of a resident in another locality by changing the relative prices of 
public goods provided.  In this context, the relative prices do not reflect the 
public good provision.  In the case of Mexico, it is a common practice for 
taxpayers of neighbouring localities to pay some of their taxes (local ownership 
or use of vehicles taxes) in vicinities with lower rates.  In practice, fiscal 
authorities are aware of the tax burden prevailing in neighbouring communities 
for the decision-making process. 
 
Gemmell et al. (2013, p.1928) analyse the development of fiscal decentralization 
in OECD countries between 1972 and 2005. They showed a negative effect of 
expenditure decentralization, which could mean that federal government is more 
efficient in allocating expenditure to productive and national priority areas, and a 
positive revenue decentralization effect, perhaps because local authorities collect 
less distortionary taxes than the federal government. However, it is important to 
consider that in their sample, all the countries have spending shares higher than 
those of revenue shares with the exception of Mexico.  Kappeler et al. (2012, p.1) 
analyse 20 European countries from 1990 up to 2009, where local infrastructure 
increases with revenue decentralization. However, the effect is lower if 
earmarked grants are canalized to capital investment.  Public investment by the 
three levels of government provide infrastructure for roads, bridges, public 
services and priority areas and can play an important role during downturns and 
promote productivity growth in the long run. The estimated returns of public 
investment on private sector productivity ranges between 15 and 45 percent 
(Bivens, 2012, p.1-2).   
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Arvate Mattos and Rocha (2013 p.1-43) estimate the effect of intergovernmental 
transfers from 2001 to 2008 on local public expenditure for Brazilian 
municipalities with between 10,000 and 61,128 residents. They find that 
unconditional transfers promote higher spending that would otherwise cause an 
increase of income, supporting the flypaper effect which precisely supports the 
fact that a unit of a grant increases spending by more than it would if that money 
was given to a resident of a particular locality.  In Mexico, the effect of transfers 
on growth, although expected to be positive, in the country as a whole, and at a 
state level, has been found to be negative. However, when analysing them at a 
sub-national level, there is a positive effect of non-earmarked (unconditional) 
transfers on municipalities’ growth.  Considering earmarked transfers, their 
effect on growth in Mexico at the country level turns to be negative as well but is 
not significant.   
 
De Mello Jr. (2002 p.1871, 1881, 1882) estimates the impact on growth on 
Brazilian municipalities for the years 1985-1994 regarding three spending 
categories with their corresponding sources of financing: taxes, transfers and 
debt.  His study concludes that growth depends upon the provision of public 
goods and services from the local community, therefore, each expenditure 
category should not be analysed in isolation but with consideration of financing 
mechanisms.  In the current study, I find that diverse types of infrastructure have 
a different impact at a municipal level. 
 
Kappeler et al. (2013 p.15, 24, 25) analyse the effect of revenue decentralization 
on the provision of public infrastructure in 20 European countries from 1990 up 
to 2009 at a local level.  Their study concludes that tax shares increase public 
infrastructure at a sub-national level; additionally, investment grants increase 
investment at a local level.  In the case of Mexico in particular, the period of 
maturity of several types of investment at a local level determines its effect on 
growth for different time periods.  In this current study, when considering 
different lags (up to five), the outcomes and significance of each variable 
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changed within group and within the lag considered. 
 
Little has been written about fiscal positions in local governments.  During the 
period 1966-2003, Lan and Sylwester (2010 p.355) focus their work on 
synchronization in 27 Chinese provinces regarding which they state that 
provinces with similar budgetary positions have similar business cycle 
movements.  Rodden and Wibbels (2010 p.37) find that sub-national 
governments in seven federations from 1968 to 2001, have to work on their own 
when multiple shocks affect the development of their economies, since their own 
source taxes are pro-cyclical while revenue sharing and transfers behave either in 
a-cyclical or pro-cyclical manner. 
 
Blochliger et al. (2010 p.6-12) conclude that local governments in 25 OECD 
countries seemed to be less affected by recessions than central governments, but 
in fact, have to deal with higher spending and lower tax revenue, when making 
their own plan for recovery, and therefore appropriate coordination between 
intergovernmental entities becomes a key factor.  In this respect, during the last 
30 years, sub-central governments have had lower deficits (around 5 percent) 
than central governments (up to 25% in the mid 90s) and deficit levels were 
likely to be counter-cyclical.  When comparing net lending with the size of the 
output gap, the correlation was weaker at a sub-national level compared to the 
national level.  Patterns of revenues were similar, growing during the good times 
and diminishing in recessions. However, the ratio of sub-central and central 
government revenue fluctuation was very divergent between countries, reflecting 
the differences in their tax structures.  Spending at a local and a national level 
was found to be counter-cyclical.  Regarding investment, sub-central 
government’s volatility is huge since current spending is invariably politically 
sensitive and very difficult to modify.  Consequently, sub-central fiscal rules 
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Handley (2008, p.134) concludes that the task of achieving an adequate balance 
between federal and local governments is challenging.  Therefore, centralization 
is important to the extent that it promotes a national programme’s effectiveness 
at a sub-national level, however, local governments must strengthen their local 
capacity.  It is vital to harmonise national policies to local realities, since the 
results of the current work demonstrate a differentiated outcome for various 
localities in Mexico, according to their level of development. Therefore, the need 
to adjust national policies to local characteristics is essential in order to promote 
overall equity and efficiency of the fiscal system.   
 
Drawing on surveys from 1999 and 2006, Binswanger-Mkhize et al. (2012 p.26-
27) study 241 villages representing 17 major states of India. Their results 
demonstrate that villages spend their resources according to their own local 
priorities. However, when they compare the impacts of one Rupee of grant 
received with taxes raised, in terms of time fetching water and days lost to 
illness, they find that tax raised had less impact than grants received. Therefore, 
the efficiency of grants is higher than own taxes.  In Mexico, Sour Laura (2013) 
corroborates that non-earmarked transfers have a greater effect on local 
government spending than an equivalent increase in the income of the population 
at those localities. 
 
Externalities between Jurisdictions 
An externality exists when the provision of a particular good or service in a 
certain locality affects another locality, which is mostly the case for public goods 
delivered by neighbouring local governments (Barnett, and Topham, 1977 p.53).  
That is, a particular locality pays the full costs, but recuperates only part of the 
benefit. An example of this is when Mexico City’s public transport facilities and 
diverse health and education services benefit not only its residents but inhabitants 
from surrounding localities who work or visit to enjoy these services provided in 
the capital city.  Externalities have a significant role in shaping the products and 
services provided within localities and although these have been theoretically 
recognized, empirical studies have not focused on measuring them when 
  138 
analysing taxes and transfers.  This current study acknowledges the fact that in an 
ideal scenario, it is desirable to measure externalities in order to provide a more 
accurate fiscal policy impact, however, because of their nature, they are difficult 
to measure and thus are only mentioned in this section for explanatory purposes.  
According to Hepple & Rees Hedley (2009, p.2-3) there are three categories of 
externalities: benefit spillovers where local services benefit non-residents from 
other localities; crowding spillovers derived from congestion in the use of a local 
public service (health or education services in the case of Mexico City for 
instance); and spillovers from expenditure competition.  In Mexico, there are 
different local tax rates for certain goods, therefore localities compete for 
taxpayers from the neighbouring localities.  Solé-Ollé (2006 p.32) utilising data 
for 2,500 Spanish Municipalities for the year 1999 reported that spillovers are 
relevant to measuring expenditure policies. 
 
Employment 
The particular link between fiscal variables and the labour market has not been 
broadly studied and is an area in which to develop research.  By studying this 
relationship this current work can offer some insights regarding the management 
of fiscal policy variables and their influence on employment.  Dahlberg et al. 
(2008 p.30-31) study the impact of government transfers on different types of 
personnel employed by the sub-national governments in 279 Swedish 
municipalities from 1996 up until 2004.  Their results demonstrate that there is a 
large and positive effect of transfers on the number of employees in the central 
administration, but no effects in other sectors.  Lundqvist et al. (2014 p.190-191) 
by updating these results over 279 Swedish municipalities during 1996–2004 
confirm that transfers do not stimulate local public employment but results 
remain positive and significant for administrative personnel.  However, these 
authors opine that perhaps public funds targeted specifically at stimulating 
employment could have better results than those of unconditional transfers. 
 
Messing (2013 p.37-39) illustrate that large scale untargeted activation and 
public employment programmes have reached most Roman populations. Public 
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works can be the only available source of employment to families in extreme 
poverty.  In Slovakia and Bulgaria public employment is an active labour market 
measure, although welfare benefits are not tied to participation in it. 
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➢ Corporate income tax rate is related with lower investment and slower 
growth. 
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➢ Unconditional transfers promote higher spending that would otherwise 
cause an increase of income, supporting the flypaper effect. 
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➢ Growth depends upon the provision of public goods and services from the 
local community, therefore, each expenditure category should not be 
analysed in isolation but considering the financing mechanisms. 
Kappeler et al. 
(2013) 
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➢ Tax shares increase public infrastructure at a sub-national level; 
additionally, investment grants increase investment at a local level which 
can be interpreted through the vision of a major autonomy of sub-national 
governments that would lead to major levels of public investment. 
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➢ Sub-national governments have to work on their own when several shocks 
affect the development of their economies since own source taxes are pro-
cyclical while revenue sharing and transfers behave either a-cyclical or 
pro-cyclical too 
  
➢ Worldwide fiscal policies have a tendency towards applying 












➢ The way that sub-central governments are affected by the global crises 
and their capacity to cope with the fiscal policy undertaken by their 
central governments becomes relevant for a nation's economic recovery 
 
➢ Local governments seem to be less affected than central governments but 
in fact have to deal with higher spending and lower tax revenue, they can 
sometimes make their own plan for recovery but the appropriate 
coordination between intergovernmental entities becomes a key factor 
Binswanger-
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and unrestricted fiscal 
grants on tax 
3SLS 
➢ Villages spend their resources according to their own local priorities, 
however, the impact of one Rupee of grants received with taxes raised in 
terms of time fetching water and days lost to illness, tax raised has less 
impact than grants received, therefore, the efficiency of grants is higher 
than own taxes. 











and FE  
➢ Transfers are highly volatile and have a destabilising effect regarding 
GDP fluctuations.  
 
➢ In order to promote higher efficiency for intergovernmental transfer 
system in Mexican states and municipalities, a well-coordinated package 
of reforms needs to be implemented by improving transparency, spending 
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➢ Demonstrate that there is a large and positive effect of transfers on the 
number of employees in the central administration, but no effects in other 
sectors.  
➢ Transfers do not stimulate local public employment but results remain 
positive and significant for administrative personnel.  
➢ However, public funds targeted specifically at stimulating employment 
could have better results than the effect of unconditional transfers. 
Messing V. 
(2013) 
Five Countries of 
the EU 
Labour Market Policies 
with an Impact 






➢ Large scale untargeted activation and public employment programmes 
have reached most Roman population. Public work employment can be 
the only available source of employment to families in extreme poverty.  
In Slovakia and Bulgaria public employment is an active labour market 
measure, although welfare benefits are not tied to participation in public 
employment. 
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3.3 Growth Methodologies 
3.3.1 Cross Section  
It refers to an analysis of several variables of interest in a particular period of 
time, and for instance, it is very revealing that several of the studies done using 
local-level data, exploit this type of methodology.  Perhaps they have been 
confronted with the problem of different accounting and reporting methodologies 
within the localities.  
 
Benetrix and Lane (2010 p.6, 20) when analysing international differences in 
fiscal policy in 52 countries during the period between 2007 and 2009, 
considering country characteristics, develop a model as follows: 
∆FBALi*= α1 + µ1GROWi + β1Xi + ε1i                                                             (3.1) 
where 
∆FBALi*= Optimal Fiscal Balance of country i 
GROWi = Growth of GDP 
Xi = A set of other potential determinants of the optimal fiscal response which 
include: unemployment rate, GDP pc, debt as percentage of GDP, level of trade 
openness, country size, exchange rate and level of international financial 
integration. 
 
The cross-country configuration they apply seems to be useful in order to 
determine each country’s fiscal position, growth and other factors that could 
affect fiscal variables, which in turn is important in order to draw some general 
conclusions of the application of fiscal policies across countries.  Although the 
present study is interested in the particular characteristics of each locality, the 
development of income and expenditure variables may also vary across time, 
depending on regional and international economic conditions.  Most 
prominently, the current study will focus on the disaggregated governmental 
income and expenditure variables simultaneously and their impact on GDP per 
capita.  Furthermore, this study will concentrate on the relationship between 
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transfers and employment at a national, state and municipal level. 
 
Cross Section methodology is useful in order to analyse different countries or 
localities development, but in itself lacks of the time variation component, which 
is pertinent for a comprehensive analysis of economic development in a dynamic 
context.  Consequently, the current model will allow me to analyse each 
country’s development considering both its idiosyncratic differences and the time 
variation in its economic data.  A model which takes into consideration both 
component is the most suitable approach for the current analysis. 
 
However, this work develops a social perspective of public finances, which 
refers to the perception "policy makers" have regarding different kinds of taxes 
levied and several types of expenditure utilised and their impact on GDP, 
according to a self-developed survey for this purpose.  In addition, the current 
analysis will include the opinion people have of public services provided, 
considering the regional surveys provided by Latinobarómetro 2008-2010. The 
results of the above-mentioned questionnaires will surely enrich the overall 
development of this work by taking into account the opinion and expertise of 
public sector government officials in the 32 Mexican states and people’s 
perception of governmental development in matter of public finance. 
 
3.3.2 Quantile Regression 
According to Colin Cameron, A. et al. (2009 p.213) these types of models are 
robust because they allow a better representation of the data by studying not only 
the full distribution but parts of it, at any particular percentile.  Therefore, the 
function to be minimised is: 









′𝛽                          (3.2) 
 
Where 0<q<1 and 𝛽𝑞 refers to each percentile option. 
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Standard regressions utilise the relationship between the regressors and the 
dependent variable considering the conditional mean, however, the quantile 
regression employs the conditional median, where the median is the 50th 
percentile that splits the data into proportions q below and (1-q) above.  As 
mentioned in the precedent paragraph, the quantile regression minimises de 
absolute deviations, the sum that gives asymmetric penalties for over and under 
prediction and makes an approximation to the function of the conditional 
distribution of the dependent variable.  This type of regression is more robust to 
non-normal errors and outliers and it can give an insight of the tail distribution 
development (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). 
 
I apply this estimator at quantile 25 and 75 in our 2,247 municipalities in Mexico 
in order to demonstrate that inequality on income and expenditure is huge, even 
within the seven groups I have. 
 
Durlauf et al. (2001 p.555) present evidence for country specific heterogeneity, 
particularly for developing countries.  Therefore, when utilising quantile 
regression, it is possible to account for such heterogeneity in different segments 
of the conditional distribution.  Mello and Perrelli (2003 p.643, 665) apply 
quantile growth regressions to several samples of OECD (21 and 24) and Non-
OECD countries (30 and 80) during the period 1960-1998 and show that the 
effect of the control variables on growth varies significantly along the 
distribution.  Concavity is positive in the lower quantiles and negative in the 
upper quantiles.  Each quantile has a group response for GDP growth related to a 
change in a policy variable which captures the heterogeneity among countries.  
Coad and Rao (2006, p.6,7) develop a quantile regression to analyse the 
influence of innovation on the market value in 3,416,957 U.S. utility patents 
from 1963 to 2002 and find that the market value changes dramatically 
depending on the quantile of the distribution.  Coad and Rao acknowledge that 
this type of estimation is effective in accounting for heterogeneity. 
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For instance, Ram (2008 p.387) finds that growth development varies across 
quantiles and there is a huge contrast between high and low quantiles.  Lijuan 
Huo et al. (2015, p.3859) analyse economic growth convergence in 86 non-oil 
countries from 1960 to 2005 using quantile regression and find that the 
convergence speed depends on quantiles and it is higher either at the high or low 
quantiles. 
 
Uddin et al. (2017, p.610, 614) investigate the effect of political stability on 
economic growth in 120 developing countries during 1996–2014. Their findings 
show that political instability affects growth more harshly in the lower and 
middle-income countries, perhaps due to the lack of robust economic and 
political institutions. Besides, political instability is higher in oil producing 
countries.  When samples have countries with different levels of development 
and background (high heterogeneity), the assumption of normal distribution does 
not apply and quantile regression results are more robust. 
 
Several regression methods utilise the relationship between the conditional mean 
of the explanatory variables and the outcome variable, however, the quantile 
regression allows the possibility of analysing the relationship in different points 
of the distribution of the dependent variable, and is particularly effective when 
data is highly heterogenous.  In this respect, median regression is more robust 
than least squares regression and allows a more in-depth and detailed analysis of 
the data when it presents high variability (Koenker, 2017, p.20). 
 
3.4 Fiscal Policy Mix Municipality Analysis 
3.4.1 Fiscal policy model, methodology and data  
 
My empirical analysis considers a range of disaggregated income and 
expenditure variables in Mexico in 2,247 municipalities from 1994 to 2010.  My 
period of study begins in 1994 in order to be comparable with the interpretation 
made of Mexican states, although the same criteria applies regarding the 
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beginning of NAFTA to develop my research and it ends in 2010 as a 
consequence of the regulation change in the General Accounting Law.  My work 
suggests that income and expenditure components should be taken into account 
simultaneously, when evaluating changes in GDP per capita growth.  In order to 
test my hypothesis, I run regressions considering income or expenditure 
components separately and then together (detailed in the appendix) and my 
findings show that there is a difference between the coefficients in all three 
regressions with slightly more significant coefficients in my broader model.  
 
In light of Gemmell et al´s (2012) Budget Government Constraint Model, 
following the same procedure as I did in my previous chapter, with the limitation 
of the data available at the municipal level, which have a broader classification, I 
develop a more in-depth analysis considering 7 groups of municipalities 
according to their level of development as it will be explained later in this 
section.  The group classification is conducted by the Mexican National Institute 
of Statistics and Geography and I only utilise the same criteria to group the 
municipalities I have in my data set. The municipalities I have in my sample are 
the ones which have available income and expenditure data for my period of 
study.  
 
I apply a fixed effects panel data and afterwards I utilise my baseline 
specification model, allowing for cross sectional dependence in my dataset.  
Furthermore, in order to be able to analyse the differences within each group, I 
develop quantile 25 and 75 regressions.  The Stata commands I use are “xtreg”, 
“xtscc” and “sqreg”.  The specification tests are preceding each regression.  I 
provide evidence demonstrating that income and expenditure components should 
be analysed simultaneously when evaluating changes in GDP per capita growth, 
considering the main income and expenditure components.  In order to test my 
hypothesis, I run regressions with income or expenditure components separately 
and then together (detailed in the appendix) and my findings show that there is a 
difference between the coefficients in all three regressions with slightly more 
significant coefficients in my broader model. 
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Fiscal Policy Model 
 
The empirical analysis uses annual data of 2,274 Mexican municipalities from 
1994 to 2010.  The fiscal policy variables included are taxes, non-earmarked 
transfers, acquisition of movable and immovable goods, public infrastructure and 
other expenditure (for definitions, descriptive statistics and sources of these 
variables, see Tables 3.5-3.7).  The control variables in the case of provinces are 
piped water systems, drainage and sewerage systems, users of public institutions, 
length of road network, tourists, electric energy users and high school index. 
 
Regression equation 
In this thesis in order to properly analyse fiscal variables, the estimation equation 
is as follows: 
 




i  = province 
 t  = time 
 ∝𝑖  = Fixed effect for each locality i 
Y             = GDP per capita level 
R = Taxes and non-earmarked transfers as a share of total 
revenue 
E = Acquisition of movable and immovable goods, public 
infrastructure and other expenditure as a share of total 
expenditure  
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X          = Control variables (Piped water systems, Drainage and 
sewerage system, users of public institutions, length of 
road network, tourists, electric energy users and high 
school index) 
             lit                = Locality fixed effects component 
             yit                = Year fixed effects component 
 
The main hypothesis is: 
 
∆𝑋𝑖𝑡 =  f(R𝑖𝑡−1 , 𝐸𝑖𝑡−1,   X 𝑖𝑡−1)                                                                       (3.4) 
 
The main income and expenditure components should be considered when 
analysing the development of GDP per capita. 
 
 
Additionally, this study will analyse employment and its correlation with 
transfers and taxes levied as follows: 
𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = ∝𝑖 + 𝜃1𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1(𝑅)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2(𝐸)𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝜃2𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡  (3.5)  
Where 
 𝐿𝐸 = Rate of formal employment in locality i at time t 
 
Sources and properties of the data 
In the case of Mexican Municipalities, the classification is done according to 27 
indicators that describe their socioeconomic characteristics regarding education, 
health, employment and urbanisation.  I just followed the same classification that 
is commonly used by the Mexican Institute of Statistics and Geography in my 
dataset. 
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The indicators considered were: 
➢ Infrastructure: population with water services, electricity and sewage. 
➢ Quality of Housing: population with housing made of dissolved 
material, rock, brick, quarry, cement or others. 
➢ Overcrowding: occupants per room and population without 
overcrowding. 
➢ Housing equipment: population with sanitary service, electricity, gas, 
refrigerator, television, telephone and automobile. 
➢ Health: children alive from women between 20 and 34, population 
entitled to health services (total, women, younger than 18 and older than 
65). 
➢ Education: literate (15, between 15 and 65), children between 6 and 14 
who goes to school, population between 12 and 17 that goes to school, 
population over 15 with post-primary education, average education for 
population above 15. 
➢ Employment: working population between 20 and 49, female 
occupation, population which work without payment, population which 
works in tertiary activities. 
➢ Income: working population per 100 inhabitants, working population 
that earns more than two and a half minimum wages, population that 
earns more than five minimum salaries, population that earn more than 
10.42 pesos per household.  
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This methodology is applied by the Mexican National Statistics Institute 
considering the Mexican Census of Population and Employment 2000.  In this 
case, seven groups are constructed; Group 1 represents the municipalities where 
there is less relative advantage of socioeconomic development and Group 7 
stands for localities with the higher relative advantage compared to the other 
groups.  In my case, the database is original and is constructed by merging 32 
state databases, and afterwards applying the Mexican National Statistics Institute 
methodology of classification. 
 
 Table 3.5 Descriptive Statistics Municipalities 
  
Definition Mean Std. Dev. CV Sourcefuente
Employment rate
Annual growth of formally employed workers as 
percentage of total population
0.17 0.53 310.80
National Institute of Statics and Geography, 
INEGI (2014); author's calculations.
Gross revenue per capita 
growth
Annual real gross municipality revenue per capita growth 
in percentage
0.15 0.59 383.38
National Institute of Statics and Geography, 
INEGI (2014); author's calculations.
Aquisition of movable and 
immovable goods
Aquisition of movable&immovable goods as percentage of 
total municipality expenditure, multiplied by 100
2.56 4.55 178.10
National Institute of Statics and Geography, 
INEGI (2014); author's calculations.
Earmarked transfers
Earmarked (conditional) transfers as percentage of total 
municipality income, multipied by 10
2.48 2.30 93.01
National Institute of Statics and Geography, 
INEGI (2014); author's calculations.
Non-earmarked transfers
Non-earmarked (unconditional) transfers as percentage of 
total municipality income, multiplied by 10
5.47 2.40 43.89
National Institute of Statics and Geography, 
INEGI (2014); author's calculations.
Public infrastructure
Public infrastructure as percentage of total municipality 
expenditure, multiplied by 10
2.76 1.84 66.44
National Institute of Statics and Geography, 
INEGI (2014); author's calculations.
Taxes
Taxes as percentage of total municipality income, 
multiplied by 100
4.40 6.10 138.71
National Institute of Statics and Geography, 
INEGI (2014); author's calculations.
Death of infants < 1 year Death of infants under one year, divided by 100 0.32 2.13 672.33
National Institute of Statics and Geography, 
INEGI (2014); author's calculations.
Drainage and sewerage 
system
Systems utilised for drainage and sewage per capita 0.26 0.53 206.76
National Institute of Statics and Geography, 
INEGI (2014); author's calculations.
Electric energy users Tourists at lodging establishments, divided by 100,000 0.26 0.13 49.04
National Institute of Statics and Geography, 
INEGI (2014); author's calculations.
High school index High school achievment index , divided by 10 5.50 3.25 59.03
National Institute of Statics and Geography, 
INEGI (2014); author's calculations.
Length of road network Real square meters constructed, divided by 1,000 0.36 1.65 456.84
National Institute of Statics and Geography, 
INEGI (2014); author's calculations.
New trucks sold Users of electric energy as percentage of total population 0.40 2.29 565.89
National Institute of Statics and Geography, 
INEGI (2014); author's calculations.
Piped water systems Systems utilised for piped water per capita 0.91 1.17 128.60
National Institute of Statics and Geography, 
INEGI (2014); author's calculations.
Total area sown Acres sown, divided y 10,000 2.26 11.65 514.93
National Institute of Statics and Geography, 
INEGI (2014); author's calculations.
Tourists New trucks sold to the public, multiplied by 1,000 1.00 5.08 508.25
National Institute of Statics and Geography, 
INEGI (2014); author's calculations.
Users public institutions
Population entitled to social security  as percentage of 
total population
0.83 0.67 80.59
National Institute of Statics and Geography, 
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Table 3.6 Descriptive Statistics Municipalities by Group (cont.) 
  
Mean Std. Dev. CV Mean Std. Dev. CV Mean Std. Dev. CV Mean Std. Dev. CV
Employment rate 0.01 0.25 2038.21 0.03 0.21 635.37 0.02 0.53 3214.61 0.18 0.18 103.82
Gross revenue per capita growth 0.29 1.01 343.90 0.21 0.71 336.52 0.15 0.50 341.93 0.10 0.37 358.33
Aquisition of movable and immovable goods 3.10 6.11 196.96 3.22 6.38 198.47 2.21 4.00 180.83 2.54 3.51 138.13
Earmarked transfers 3.17 3.12 98.19 2.65 2.58 97.51 2.73 2.43 88.99 2.22 1.73 77.88
Non-earmarked transfers 5.32 3.18 59.64 5.80 2.74 47.17 5.72 2.47 43.25 5.55 1.81 32.59
Public infrastructure 3.53 2.32 65.72 3.20 1.97 61.65 3.03 1.79 58.98 2.20 1.44 65.31
Taxes 1.15 3.27 284.72 1.61 2.97 184.38 2.54 3.61 141.94 4.93 4.99 101.31
Death of infants < 1 year 0.20 1.44 728.52 0.26 2.26 855.98 0.19 1.31 686.86 0.42 4.39 1046.24
Drainage and sewerage system 0.10 0.24 239.42 0.19 0.42 219.02 0.22 0.39 180.10 0.92 1.07 115.77
Electric energy users 0.16 0.17 102.29 0.23 0.16 70.78 0.25 0.11 45.72 0.33 0.12 35.31
High school index 5.44 3.70 68.05 5.03 3.80 75.47 5.58 3.30 59.20 4.89 3.61 73.87
Length of road network 0.80 3.48 433.61 0.47 1.95 417.24 0.30 1.22 408.58 0.39 1.55 396.47
New trucks sold 0.02 0.17 994.46 0.03 0.29 889.59 0.02 0.24 967.60 0.09 0.55 640.18
Piped water systems 1.05 1.18 112.50 1.27 1.37 107.56 0.90 0.93 102.61 1.46 1.82 124.56
Total area sown 3.05 17.58 575.69 2.15 12.55 583.14 2.06 10.87 526.93 3.08 11.99 389.53
Tourists 0.43 3.95 920.76 0.42 4.65 1096.55 0.39 3.07 794.77 1.32 6.42 485.85
Users public institutions 0.78 0.48 62.36 0.82 0.56 68.10 0.83 0.49 58.33 0.86 0.40 47.21
Group 3
Control variables
a ) Group classification was done according to municipalities socioeconomic characteristics and considering the Mexican Census of Population and Employment 2000, where Group 1 is the least developed and Group 7 is the 
most developed.





Group 1 Group 2
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Table 3.7 Descriptive Statistics Municipalities by Group (End) 
 
Mean Std. Dev. CV Mean Std. Dev. CV Mean Std. Dev. CV Mean Std. Dev. CV
Employment rate 0.21 0.61 290.07 0.31 0.79 259.17 0.68 0.51 73.99 0.17 0.53 310.80
Gross revenue per capita growth 0.13 0.49 375.32 0.09 0.40 442.73 0.07 0.26 385.69 0.15 0.59 383.38
Aquisition of movable and immovable goods 2.16 3.37 155.87 2.24 3.03 135.14 2.62 3.63 138.54 2.56 4.55 178.10
Earmarked transfers 2.40 2.10 87.39 1.96 1.58 81.00 1.64 1.32 80.13 2.48 2.30 93.01
Non-earmarked transfers 5.62 2.19 39.01 5.12 1.81 35.32 4.24 1.53 36.24 5.47 2.40 43.89
Public infrastructure 2.76 1.64 59.57 2.03 1.41 69.39 1.94 1.30 67.14 2.76 1.84 66.44
Taxes 4.66 5.55 119.04 8.16 6.85 83.97 14.82 9.00 60.72 4.40 6.10 138.71
Death of infants < 1 year 0.26 1.05 411.39 0.33 1.47 451.08 1.11 1.51 135.83 0.32 2.13 672.33
Drainage and sewerage system 0.16 0.23 141.17 0.25 0.40 163.26 0.06 0.09 161.73 0.26 0.53 206.76
Electric energy users 0.25 0.10 41.09 0.28 0.10 36.39 0.29 0.07 25.11 0.26 0.13 49.04
High school index 5.92 2.65 44.76 5.63 2.91 51.67 6.26 1.58 25.20 5.50 3.25 59.03
Length of road network 0.34 1.77 521.59 0.27 1.26 469.81 0.30 0.58 194.09 0.36 1.65 456.84
New trucks sold 0.22 1.03 479.59 0.86 4.24 495.13 3.77 5.09 134.98 0.40 2.29 565.89
Piped water systems 0.54 0.58 106.93 0.40 0.59 147.97 0.11 0.14 121.97 0.91 1.17 128.60
Total area sown 2.14 11.45 534.41 1.95 9.61 493.25 1.52 3.22 210.92 2.26 11.65 514.93
Tourists 1.01 5.22 514.72 2.09 7.18 343.47 5.41 6.46 119.55 1.00 5.08 508.25
Users public institutions 0.83 0.63 76.25 0.83 1.16 139.35 0.90 0.46 50.84 0.83 0.67 80.59
a ) Group classification was done according to municipalities socioeconomic characteristics and considering the Mexican Census of Population and Employment 2000, where Group 1 is the least developed and 
Group 7 is the most developed.
b ) Non classified group belongs to the municipalities that did not have the 27 indicators that described their socioeconomic characteristics regarding education, health, employment and urbanization. 









In this section, the proposed panel data model is applied to the 2,247 
municipalities in Mexico from 1994 to 2010, with the aim of determining the 
fiscal policy mix during the period of study and its impact on economic 
development.  This empirical estimation analyses the development of Real Gross 
Revenue per capita as a function of taxes, transfers and capital expenditures and 
a set of control variables such as: drainage and sewage systems, piped water 
systems, users of public institutions of social security and assistance, length of 
the road network, tourists who stayed at lodging establishments, electric energy 
users and high school achievement index.  
 
My estimations for municipalities are done considering panel fixed effects and 
afterwards the cross-sectional dependence estimator which allows me to account 
for autocorrelation and cross-sectional dependence (Table 3.11).  Furthermore, 
Quantile regressions give me an insight to understand the disparities at a 
subnational level between the seven groups of localities (Table 3.12).  The 
specification tests are shown in Tables 3.8-3.10.  My panel is unbalanced and my 
relevant variables are stationary and don´t present problems of collinearity. 
 
De Mello (2002, p.1871, 1881, 1882, 1877) estimate the impact on growth on 
Brazilian municipalities from 1985-1994 of three spending categories with their 
corresponding sources of financing which include taxes, transfers and debt.  The 
study concludes that growth depends upon the provision of public goods and 
services from the local community, therefore, each expenditure category should 
not be analysed in isolation but considering the financing mechanisms.  In my 
study, I find that diverse types of infrastructure have a different impact at a 
municipal level.  Moreover, as a proxy for municipal output De Mello utilises tax 
revenue and state GDP per capita.  In my model, I use total gross revenue per 
capita as a proxy for GDP per capita.  I also estimated all my regressions 
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considering state GDP per capita as a dependent variable, however, results were 
not robust, perhaps because of the huge disparities among localities. 
 
The impact of taxes on real gross revenue per capita growth is positive and 
significant in groups 3, 4, 6 and 7.  This result could be explained through the 
mechanism of central government transfers, since the formula of distribution of 
transfers takes into account the effort local entities make to collect own source 
revenue, regardless of the tax effects per se.  However, it is interesting to observe 
that again, taxes in developed localities show a positive relationship with growth, 
which is consistent with my results in the previous chapter, where indirect taxes 
were positive and significant only in more developed states.  Unfortunately, I 
was unable to have access to a broader classification of income and expenditure 
variables at a municipal level.  Local finances in Mexico are opaque and 
although the General Government Accounting Law was last amended in 
December 2015 in order to promote accounting harmonization between the three 
levels of government, little has been done in this respect, therefore, 
accountability and transparency of public funds remains an issue.  Likewise, 
when I consider quantile regression I can see that the effect of taxes on more 
developed localities is positive and significant while in less developed is not.  By 
comparing the 25 with the 75-quantile regression within the same groups, I 
observe a positive and significant effect on groups 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 on quantile 25 
while in quantile 75 it is only positive and significant in groups 4, 6 and 7.  These 
results would indicate that inequality persists even among the same group. 
  
Carnavire-Bacarreza et al. (2013, p.28) study taxation and economic growth in 
Latin America at a country level between 1990 and 2010, finding that personal 
income tax does not seem to have any effect on growth, however, corporate 
income tax displays a positive and significant effect on growth in this region.  
Moreover, J. Alm and Rogers (2011, p.483) use local data of 48 states in USA 
from 1947 to 1997 to estimate the effects of taxes, among other factors, on 
economic growth and find that the effect of taxation policies depend upon the 
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regressors, the estimation method and the time period.  Besides, their results 
demonstrate that there is no convergence in state per capita income. 
 
In the case of central government transfers, my study finds that non-conditional 
transfers have a positive and significant effect on growth in all groups with the 
exception of group 5 (Table 3.11).  The impact of unconditional transfers on 
groups 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 is positive and significant on quantile 25 and only remains 
positive and significant in group 4 and 7 in quantile 75 (Table 3.12).  Again, the 
positive effect of transfers can be seen, mainly in the low-income segment, who 
receives a higher amount of transfers compared with the high-income segment. 
Mainly these results are consistent with Cullis et al. (2009) reflecting higher 
levels of growth when higher level of unconditional transfers is allocated to local 
governments.  The same pattern was observed in Mexican states. 
 
Arvate et al. (2013 p.1) when analysing Brazilian municipalities find that 
transfers have a higher impact on local spending than on income, but local 
expenditure is more elastic to non-conditional transfers than to conditional 
transfers.  Moreover, González (2010, p.19) finds that conditional transfers 
enhance public investment in 15 oldest members of EU from 1993-2005.  
Overall, in the case of Mexican municipalities, it seems that unconditional 
transfers reflect on higher levels on local growth in the less developed localities.  
 
According to Coneval (2011) no systematic evaluation and analysis of Branch 33 
(earmarked transfers) exists, information is heterogeneous and clear and specific 
objectives should be designed.  Many localities don’t have the financial capacity 
to undertake these type of tasks, however, simple controls should be 
implemented to be able to track the use of these resources.  The implementation 
of suitable indicators that allow the adequate evaluation of Branch 33 funds 
should be considered.  The aforementioned study recognizes that the resources 
canalised through Brach 33 do not reflect adequately the requirements of 
particular localities.  Abud and Rodriguez (2012) show that GDP per capita at a 
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state level is negatively correlated with the efficiency of earmarked transfers.  
Ramírez (2013) states the importance of controls in the three level of 
governments in order to adequately coordinate efforts to canalize Branch 33 
resources efficiently.  Therefore, the resources of Branch 33 should not follow 
inertial patterns from historic trends but Human Development Index, locality 
needs and measurable achievements in local tax collection.  Pöschl (2015) 
developed a case study for 6 Mexican municipalities finding that there was 
substantial scope for increasing property tax, however, Majors preferred to 
motivate people who evaded tax and encouraged them to pay with a discount on 
fines of past indebtedness.  Majors looked for all potential sources of financing, 
however, they highly relied on transfers from the federal government in order to 
operate.  She finds that accountable and transparent Municipalities have higher 
prospect of tax collection.  Moreover, since the Mexican Constitution does not 
allow re-election of Municipal Majors, local administrations are reluctant to raise 
their own source revenues. 
 
Public Infrastructure is negative and significant for groups 2, 4 and 5, while 
Acquisition of Movable and Immovable Goods is not significant in any group 
when I apply cross sectional dependence estimator (Table 3.11).  The effect of 
other expenditure is not significant in any group as well.  With respect to quantile 
regression (Table 3.12), the effect of Public Infrastructure is negative and 
significant for group 1 and 4, but positive and significant only in group 3 and in 
the case of Acquisition of Movable and Immovable Goods, the effect is not 
significant in any group.  The effect of other expenditure is negative and 
significant only in group 2 while positive and significant in group 5 and 7.  The 
impact on growth when taking into consideration different lags, can be quite 
different and particularly between heterogeneous Mexican municipalities.  
Unfortunately, the definition of public infrastructure and the acquisition of 
movable and immovable goods at a Municipal level is very general and different 
types of infrastructure are pooled within the same category, which could partially 
explain the lack of significance of these variables.  Regional studies on public 
investment lack of consistency and there is a wide variation on public capital 
stock, different capacity and quality of public infrastructure, as well as a complex 
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process of interdependency where capital is not perfectly mobile across regions, 
however, the importance of public infrastructure in stimulating economic 
development has been recognized among economists by enhancing the 
productivity of private inputs or increasing output (Eberts, 1990). When I did my 
analysis considering different lags, the significance of my fiscal variables of 
interest was different for each group at different time periods.  These results are 
consistent with Devarajan et al. (1996) that find that the relationship between 
government capital expenditure and growth is negative in developing countries 
due to misallocations of public spending. 
 
Turning to other regressors, I find that drainage and sewerage and users of public 
institutions is positive and significant only for group 7; length of road network is 
positive and significant for groups 4 and 6, high school achievement index is 
negative and significant for group 1 and positive and significant for group 3; 
tourism has a negative and significant coefficient for groups 2 and 3 but positive 
and significant for group 5; electric energy users are only positive and significant 
for group 5. 
 
In this respect, benefits from public investment would have to exceed its costs, 
but most likely highways and water distribution and treatment facilities would 
provide a net positive effect on productivity (Eberts, 1990).  García-Mila and 
McGuire (1987) find a positive and significant effect of education and highway 
expenditures to GDP at a local level in US from 1970 to 1983.  In my study, less 
developed localities present negative and significant coefficients for tourist and 
education components but when measuring those variables in more developed 
localities they turn to be positive and significant.  Consistent with my findings, 
Hansen (1965) finds that less developed localities are categorised by a low 
standard of living, small firms and industries, therefore public infrastructure 




Consequently, the task of properly canalising resources to a particular 
expenditure within different municipalities is not straightforward.  A unique 
generalised formula for municipality’s development cannot be derived.  As I 
have seen, the Mexican Inter-governmental framework is highly centralised and 
a high amount of local resources derive from state and federal shares and 
contributions; however, a more accurate legislation to acknowledge local 
responsibilities on federal resources and formulas which properly recognise 
disparities among localities, need to be considered to promote growth and 
overcome regional inequalities.  If the lack of transparency remains in the use of 





Table 3.8 Fisher Unit Root Test 
 
 
Table 3.9 Heteroskesdasticity Test by Groups 
 
 
Table 3.10 Collinearity Test 
 
Unit Root Test I  chi -squared p-value
Growth 10063.14 0.00
Tax  15352.48 0.00
Non-earmarked transfers  6207.94 0.00
Aquisition of movable and immovable goods  8739.25 0.00
Public infrastructure  5353.09 0.00
Other expenditure 8430.53 0.00
Piped water systems 10803.60 0.00
Drainage and sewerage system 280.08 1.00
Users public institutions 8613.76 0.00
Length of road network 7464.78 0.00
Tourists 4091.36 0.00
Electric energy users 5548.08 0.00
High school index 4128.16 0.00
Value p-value
Group 1 3.00E+31 0.00
Group 2 9.80E+32 0.00
Group 3 4.00E+05 0.00
Group 4 7.70E+04 0.00
Group 5 2.42E+04 0.00
Group 6 1.43E+04 0.00
Group 7 3.76E+03 0.00
Test
Tolerance VIF
Tax  0.65 1.54
Non-earmarked transfers  0.43 2.32
Aquisition of movable and immovable goods  0.96 1.04
Public infrastructure  0.54 1.86
Other expenditure 0.94 1.07
Piped water systems 0.77 1.30
Drainage and sewerage system 0.79 1.26
Users public institutions 0.92 1.09
Length of road network 0.56 1.78
Tourists 0.49 2.04
Electric energy users 0.84 1.19



































2.01 2.01 5.47*** 5.47 3.51*** 3.51** 5.35*** 5.35** 0.03 0.03 0.73** 0.03 1.70*** 1.70*
(1.31) (1.33) (0.95) (4.75) (0.85) (1.57) (1.51) (2.22) (0.27) (0.27) (0.32) (0.27) (0.46) (0.85)
9.34*** 9.34*** 4.72*** 4.72*** 6.57*** 6.57** 8.22*** 8.22*** 2.11 2.11 9.00*** 2.11 7.41*** 7.41***
(2.22) (2.98) (1.64) (1.38) (1.86) (2.92) (2.98) (1.51) (1.51) (2.72) (1.53) (2.72) (2.48) (1.63)
-0.60 -0.60 -0.40 -0.40 -0.23 -0.23 5.68*** 5.68 -0.13 -0.13 -0.43 -0.13 -0.54 -0.54
(0.74) (0.70) (0.66) (0.56) (0.72) (0.66) (0.76) (4.57) (0.53) (0.56) (0.39) (0.56) (0.40) (0.34)
-4.40** -4.40 -3.12* -3.12* -0.77 -0.77 -7.39** -7.39*** -2.00 -2.00* -3.09** -2.00* -1.74 -1.74
(2.00) (2.58) (1.64) (1.75) (1.77) (2.14) (2.92) (2.44) (1.31) (1.07) (1.25) (1.07) (2.11) (1.92)
5.63** 5.63 -0.18 -0.18 -1.85 -1.85 -4.21 -4.21 4.36*** 4.36 3.14 4.36 -4.24 -4.24
(2.59) (3.70) (2.01) (2.38) (2.24) (3.44) (5.28) (3.80) (1.51) (4.08) (1.99) (4.08) (3.63) (8.97)
28.60** 28.60*** 11.61 11.61 13.62 13.62*** 61.02*** 61.02*** 2.64 -52.89 34.58*** -52.89 37.53*** -11.53
(12.25) (4.42) (9.63) (6.83) (9.80) (4.40) (21.11) (8.43) (6.41) (42.80) (7.65) (42.80) (12.69) (90.28)
62.11*** 27.50 26.75* 26.75** 17.00 8.85 -34.00* -18.61 5.02 5.02 16.23* 5.02 6.89 6.89
(22.35) (20.08) (14.33) (12.30) (13.49) (15.68) (17.42) (12.00) (9.61) (8.95) (8.33) (8.95) (12.93) (6.68)
0.76 0.76 3.36 3.36 -1.44 -1.44 -4.69 -4.69 0.15 0.15 -14.09 0.15 27.60 27.60
(3.21) (1.18) (3.88) (2.76) (3.20) (1.57) (6.40) (3.74) (4.84) (3.39) (11.29) (3.39) (76.77) (50.78)
22.37 22.37 4.55 4.55 -18.50 -18.50 0.76 0.76 12.74 12.74 7.94 12.74 86.41 86.41*
(15.93) (15.63) (18.43) (10.50) (12.31) (10.73) (9.60) (4.78) (13.80) (10.22) (21.85) (10.22) (65.30) (44.71)
11.35 11.35 12.13** 12.13 8.75 8.75 5.83 5.83 2.37 2.37 9.12 2.37 13.39 13.39**
(10.78) (8.60) (5.85) (9.20) (8.29) (8.34) (8.29) (5.95) (4.26) (2.07) (6.65) (2.07) (9.81) (6.11)
-1.29 -1.29 -1.48 -1.48 -3.73 -3.73 4.53 4.53** -0.60 -0.60 0.91 -0.60 -22.95 -22.95
(4.78) (3.06) (2.23) (0.85) (4.03) (2.24) (6.93) (1.61) (1.84) (0.68) (1.10) (0.68) (19.39) (14.65)
0.22 0.22 -0.45 -0.45** -0.62 -0.62* -0.24 -0.24 -0.55 -0.55 1.04 -0.55 0.03 0.03
(1.02) (1.18) (0.61) (0.20) (1.74) (0.33) (0.74) (0.46) (0.69) (0.39) (0.76) (0.39) (0.61) (0.40)
1.60 1.60 -4.35 -4.35 0.20 0.20 -4.05 -4.05 38.18 38.18** -0.46 38.18** -39.28 -39.28
(12.20) (5.24) (13.42) (10.29) (23.56) (18.05) (51.36) (22.29) (25.05) (14.53) (29.34) (14.53) (92.73) (42.42)
-1.63* -1.63*** -0.66 -0.66 1.16 1.16** -0.20 -0.20 0.27 0.27 1.25 0.27 0.28 0.28
(0.94) (0.53) (0.83) (0.69) (0.95) (0.46) (1.22) (0.50) (0.79) (0.76) (1.04) (0.76) (2.19) (1.73)
542 542 766 766 816 816 654 654 552 552 390 390 308 308
78 78 99 99 123 123 100 100 83 83 71 71 48 48
0.526 0.526 0.418 0.418 0.331 0.331 0.204 0.204 0.397 0.397 0.423 0.423 0.216 0.216
17.94 19103 17.06 60540 12.23 11225 4.993 294.3 10.76 168999 7.944 1737 2.371 1201
Groups
Aquisition of movable and 





Non-earmarked transfers  














Drainage and sewerage 
system
Users public institutions
Length of road network
Tourists
 Expenditure
Notes: Dependent variable is real gross revenue per capita annual percentage growth rate. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Annual data for 1994-2010. Group 
classification was done according to municipalities socioeconomic characteristics where Group 1 is the least developed and Group 7 is the most developed. All regressions also 
contain year dummies. SE are reported in parentheses.  The estimators used are Fixed Effects and the Discroll and Kraay (1998) which accounts for fixed cross-sectional effects, 
autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and cross sectional dependence.  ***(**/*) denotes statistically significant at the 1%(5%/10%) level. 
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Table 3.12 Growth Regression considering Simultaneous Quantiles for Municipalities in Mexico 1994-2010 
 
Quantile Quantile
25th 75th 25th 75th 25th 75th 25th 75th 25th 75th 25th 75th 25th 75th
0.48 0.42 1.04*** 0.46 0.60** -0.03 1.21*** 0.98*** 0.13 0.07 0.48** 0.57* 0.45** 0.52**
(0.59) (1.36) (0.35) (0.47) (0.28) (0.29) (0.31) (0.31) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23) (0.31) (0.21) (0.26)
1.36 0.09 1.18 1.08 3.03*** 1.21 3.87*** 3.58*** 2.21** 0.32 3.69*** 2.71* 3.79** 2.07
(1.27) (1.43) (0.85) (1.20) (0.60) (0.92) (0.80) (0.91) (1.01) (0.85) (1.25) (1.45) (1.47) (2.04)
-0.41 -0.25 0.20 0.92 0.11 -0.47 -0.18 -0.08 0.30 -0.22 -0.17 -0.14 -0.46 -0.20
(0.25) (0.25) (0.27) (0.64) (0.29) (0.37) (0.29) (0.44) (0.37) (0.45) (0.47) (0.50) (0.62) (0.65)
-0.30 -2.35* 0.71 -1.06 1.33* -0.02 -1.38* -1.78 -0.09 -1.07 -1.17 -0.97 0.09 -0.90
(0.65) (1.29) (0.63) (0.79) (0.79) (0.66) (0.72) (1.43) (1.04) (0.99) (0.85) (1.06) (0.76) (1.28)
0.88 1.85 1.59 -2.54* 1.24 0.41 -2.68 -2.12 5.73*** -0.07 1.63 2.01 3.70 4.51
(1.21) (2.48) (1.13) (1.46) (1.45) (1.31) (2.14) (2.39) (1.47) (1.38) (2.10) (1.61) (2.42) (3.85)
3.68 8.78 4.32 6.01 1.73 5.76 24.33** 60.73*** 6.11** -0.39 15.48* 13.61* 7.67 12.21
(7.97) (9.49) (4.77) (4.92) (3.24) (8.00) (10.40) (9.69) (2.92) (6.74) (8.89) (8.01) (10.05) (9.09)
-17.83** -20.74* -13.15** -7.37 -19.68*** -21.36* -25.51**-54.05***-19.10***-22.85**-13.89***-17.03** -5.57 2.32
(8.00) (11.65) (5.23) (6.14) (6.20) (11.56) (11.46) (11.29) (6.31) (10.68) (4.95) (7.81) (10.56) (9.13)
-0.24 -0.66 -0.05 1.01 0.42 -1.08 -2.46*** -0.82 -0.12 -1.11 -2.45 -0.53 -10.83 -21.19
(0.68) (1.04) (1.07) (1.67) (0.73) (0.99) (0.81) (0.83) (1.48) (2.40) (2.62) (3.60) (12.31) (16.37)
1.47 4.75 -2.21 -1.03 0.40 -1.39 0.37 -0.67 2.18 1.81 2.46 -0.92 10.48 27.87*
(3.72) (5.29) (2.74) (5.11) (2.35) (3.79) (0.62) (0.68) (3.94) (5.76) (3.35) (5.88) (13.07) (15.76)
-0.09 -2.40 3.96** 7.24** 0.92 -0.96 1.62 0.73 -0.91 -0.23 2.03 -0.22 2.91 -1.27
(3.26) (4.63) (1.62) (3.17) (2.24) (1.86) (1.47) (2.84) (2.26) (2.18) (2.55) (2.33) (2.94) (4.77)
-0.37 0.38 -0.87 -0.21 0.43* -0.32 -0.15 -0.41 -0.68 0.47 0.64* -0.65 1.73 -1.18
(0.56) (0.90) (0.57) (0.39) (0.23) (0.37) (0.32) (0.27) (0.83) (0.59) (0.37) (0.57) (1.63) (1.53)
0.25 -0.26 0.13 -0.08 -0.04 0.23 -0.31** -0.06 0.38 -0.28 -0.10 0.01 -0.12 0.18
(0.45) (0.54) (0.08) (0.05) (0.22) (0.19) (0.15) (0.15) (0.32) (0.32) (0.13) (0.12) (0.20) (0.22)
0.69 1.29 -2.84 -4.00 4.37 -5.92 -3.04 1.70 9.62 9.72 2.07 -12.75 -1.79 -36.64
(3.76) (7.18) (10.52) (4.91) (5.55) (6.95) (5.55) (11.82) (11.66) (14.53) (8.20) (11.19) (35.57) (31.70)
0.32 0.36 0.20 -0.18 0.58* -0.16 0.29 -0.20 0.69** -0.34 1.01 0.13 1.13 0.11
(0.23) (0.44) (0.18) (0.48) (0.34) (0.30) (0.41) (0.61) (0.30) (0.45) (0.71) (0.87) (0.85) (0.99)
542 542 766 766 816 816 654 654 552 552 390 390 308 308
5581 5581 7541 7541 7635 7635 4179 4179 3675 3675 2142 2142 1542 1542
8568 8568 10701 10701 10338 10338 5123 5123 5158 5158 2831 2831 1866 1866
0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
4243 4243 5815 5815 5628 5628 3074 3074 3108 3108 1786 1786 1271 1271
5554 5554 6938 6938 6743 6743 3738 3738 4232 4232 2323 2323 1594 1594
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
514 514 738 738 788 788 626 626 524 524 362 362 280 280
Sum of absolute desviations
Sum of raw desviations
Quantile 25th
Observations
Sum of absolute desviations
Sum of raw desviations
Quantile 75th
Residual Degrees of Freedom
(Group 6)
QuantileQuantile Quantile







Aquisition of movable and 
immovable goods 















Length of road network
Electric energy users
Users public institutions
Notes: Dependent variable is real gross revenue per capita annual percentage growth rate. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Annual data for 1994-2010. 
Group classification was done according to municipalities socioeconomic characteristics where Group 1 is the least developed and Group 7 is the most developed. All 





In this section, the proposed panel data model is applied to the 2,247 
municipalities in Mexico from 1994 to 2010, with the aim of determining the 
fiscal policy mix during the period of study and its impact on formal 
employment.  This empirical estimation analyses the development of formal 
employment as a function of taxes, transfers and capital expenditure and a set of 
control variables such as: drainage and sewage systems, piped water systems, 
length of the road network, new trucks sold to the public and high school 
achievement index.  
 
My estimations for municipalities are done considering panel fixed effects and 
then using cross-sectional dependence computation which allowed me to account 
for autocorrelation and cross-sectional dependence (Table 3.16).  Furthermore, 
Quantile regressions give me the opportunity to understand the disparities at a 
subnational level between localities with different development (Table 3.17).  
The specification tests are shown in Tables 3.13-3.15. 
 
The impact of taxes on formal employment rate is positive and significant in 
groups 1, 2, 3 and 5 when considering cross sectional dependence estimator.  As 
discussed earlier, taxes collected by the local governments are taken into 
consideration when transfers from the central government are distributed, as a 
signal of reflecting local effort on revenue collection.  This circumstance might 
be the reason for the positive effect.  These results are also consistent with my 
state analysis and perhaps the income effect is higher than the substitution effect 
in less developed localities. Conversely, when I consider Quantile regressions, I 
find a negative and significant effect only in group 3.  The limitation of 
availability of data at a local level in Mexico, constitutes a major drawback for 




My cross sectional dependence estimations (Table 3.16) reflect that the effect of 
transfers on employment is positive and significant for groups 2 and 3.  
However, quantile regressions (Table 3.17) show a negative and significant 
effect in groups 1, 4 and 6, however, the effect is positive and significant in 
groups 5 and 7.  Overall, it seems that transfers have a negative influence on 
employment, which could be an indicator that grants are not being allocated 
efficiently and also do not seem to play a significant role in promoting 
employment at a local level.  Municipalities that have higher degree of poverty, 
receive more resources from earmarked transfers, since these types of transfers 
have a general purpose of equalising regional disparities, however the amount of 
resources canalised to these localities does not reflect in better local performance. 
 
When I analyse the development of Public Infrastructure results are positive and 
significant for groups 1 and 3 with cross sectional dependent estimator (Table 
3.16).  However, results are negative and significant for groups 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 
but other expenditure presents positive and significant coefficients for groups 2 
and 4 when analysing Quantile regressions (Table 3.17).  These results are 
puzzling; however, informal economy plays a significant role in the Mexican 
economy, therefore, the real effect on the economy cannot possibly be captured 
by formal employment figures. 
 
Turning to the control variables utilised, I find mixed effects among high and 
low-income localities for drainage, sewerage and piped water systems, however 
the effect of length of the road network is positive for all groups except for group 
6. new trucks sold to the public is positive and significant for groups 2, 4, 5, 6 
and 7, but negative and significant for group 3.  High school achievement index 
is negative for groups 1, 2 and 7 but positive and significant for groups 3, 4 and 
6.  As explained earlier in this chapter, regional studies on public investment lack 





Consequently, the task of properly canalising resources to a particular activity in 






Table 3.13 Fisher Unit Root Test 
 
 
Table 3.14 Heteroskesdasticity Test by Groups 
 
 
Table 3.15 Collinearity Test 
 
 
Unit Root Test I  chi -squared p-value
Employment rate 5141.71 0.00
Tax  15353.12 0.00
Non-earmarked transfers  6207.94 0.00
Aquisition of movable and immovable goods  8739.25 0.00
Public infrastructure  5353.09 0.00
Other expenditure 8430.53 0.00
Piped water systems 8846.43 0.00
Drainage and sewerage system 7758.20 0.00
Length of road network 5620.56 0.00
New trucks sold 808.02 1.00
High school index 9278.66 0.00
Value p-value
Group 1 2.40E+32 0.00
Group 2 9.40E+32 0.00
Group 3 8.70E+33 0.00
Group 4 6.40E+33 0.00
Group 5 1.00E+34 0.00
Group 6 2.90E+34 0.00
Group 7 2.80E+32 0.00
Test
Tolerance VIF
Tax  0.68 1.47
Non-earmarked transfers 0.51 1.98
Aquisition of movable and immovable goods 0.96 1.04
Public infrastructure 0.60 1.67
Other expenditure 0.92 1.09
Piped water systems 0.85 1.18
Drainage and sewerage system 0.88 1.13
Length of road network 0.95 1.05
New trucks sold 0.86 1.16



































9.23** 9.23*** 8.87 8.87* 8.58 8.58*** -21.90* -21.90 19.23 19.23* 7.97 19.23* 7.41 7.41
(4.05) (2.35) (5.70) (4.80) (6.08) (2.54) (12.41) (13.61) (13.97) (9.42) (25.48) (9.42) (30.43) (32.56)
1.69* 1.69 0.94 0.94** 7.67* 7.67*** -3.87 -3.87 -0.41 -0.41 -9.56 -0.41 -32.29** -32.29
(0.88) (1.10) (0.58) (0.37) (3.91) (2.20) (2.87) (3.74) (8.47) (5.36) (8.36) (5.36) (12.93) (20.91)
-3.53 -3.53 1.61 1.61 1.46 1.46 25.76** 25.76 15.83 15.83 -18.99 15.83 -14.13 -14.13
(2.46) (2.84) (1.85) (1.18) (13.15) (4.98) (10.75) (25.24) (18.75) (15.55) (25.60) (15.55) (32.34) (15.92)
1.25** 1.25* 0.13 0.13 8.54** 8.54** 9.18*** 9.18 -7.47 -7.47 -0.85 -7.47 -14.97 -14.97
(0.62) (0.63) (0.69) (0.38) (4.20) (3.98) (3.31) (12.34) (8.57) (8.58) (9.39) (8.58) (13.93) (8.58)
-0.89 -0.89 0.59 0.59 -7.26*** -7.26*** -7.35* -7.35 -15.90** -15.90 -12.75 -15.90 -6.00 -6.00
(0.69) (0.79) (0.41) (0.63) (2.67) (1.99) (4.29) (5.59) (7.92) (9.15) (10.68) (9.15) (16.20) (26.59)
0.01** 0.01*** 0.01** 0.01*** 0.10** 0.10*** 0.21*** 0.24*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.24*** 0.19*** 0.12* 0.12***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.06) (0.02)
0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.04*** -0.24*** -0.24*** -0.11** -0.11*** -0.31*** -0.11*** -0.28*** -0.28***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.05) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.06) (0.03)
1.91 1.91* 1.81 1.81** -2.47 -2.47 10.10** 10.10 29.20* 29.20** 59.63 29.20** 242.86 242.86**
(1.91) (0.96) (1.21) (0.83) (3.36) (2.92) (4.72) (7.54) (14.94) (13.68) (38.88) (13.68) (229.89) (112.60)
-23.67*** -23.67*** -4.70* -4.70* -2.81 -2.81 -11.59 -11.59 -216.62** -216.62** 32.18 -216.62** 213.72 213.72
(5.19) (7.34) (2.40) (2.26) (10.61) (12.17) (8.35) (14.71) (82.92) (88.72) (52.37) (88.72) (207.91) (183.56)
2.76 2.76 0.39 0.39 -1.26 -1.26 -3.33 -3.33 -0.50 -0.50 0.20 -0.50 -41.45 -41.45
(3.79) (1.83) (1.90) (2.13) (4.45) (2.62) (28.39) (13.53) (1.96) (2.66) (2.89) (2.66) (57.96) (24.05)
3.78 3.78 13.18 13.18*** -7.03 -7.03 16.70** 16.70*** -3.77 -3.77 28.45** -3.77 1.34 1.34
(10.23) (6.27) (10.84) (2.78) (12.93) (9.76) (7.55) (3.24) (8.22) (7.83) (14.32) (7.83) (5.93) (2.23)
-0.45** -0.45** -0.77** -0.77*** -2.73 -2.73* -1.10 -1.10 2.51 2.51 2.43 2.51 7.60 7.60
(0.22) (0.19) (0.34) (0.12) (2.23) (1.55) (1.48) (2.39) (3.84) (2.48) (5.76) (2.48) (13.76) (22.77)
659 659 787 787 849 849 1,975 1,975 619 619 1,346 1,346 537 537
56 56 94 94 128 128 208 208 100 100 207 207 78 78
0.163 0.163 0.0981 0.0981 0.104 0.104 0.193 0.193 0.129 0.129 0.139 0.139 0.120 0.120







Drainage and sewerage 
system
Length of road network
(Group 7)(Group 6)







(Group 5)(Group 4)(Group 3)(Group 2)(Group 1)
Aquisition of movable and 





Non-earmarked transfers  
Groups
Notes: Dependent variable is employment rate. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Annual data for 1994-2010. Group classification was done according to municipalities 
socioeconomic characteristics where Group 1 is the least developed and Group 7 is the most developed. All regressions also contain year dummies. SE are reported in parentheses.  The estimators 
used are Fixed Effects and the Discroll and Kraay (1998) which accounts for fixed cross-sectional effects, autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and cross sectional dependence.  ***(**/*) denotes 
statistically significant at the 1%(5%/10%) level. 
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Table 3.17 Employment Regression considering Simultaneous Quantiles for Municipalities in Mexico 1994-2010 
25th 75th 25th 75th 25th 75th 25th 75th 25th 75th 25th 75th 25th 75th
0.14 -3.52 0.12 -8.99 -5.84*** -51.92** 13.25 -18.20 8.41 -51.63 8.61 50.68*** -27.06 19.46
(0.10) (10.54) (0.13) (6.53) (1.71) (23.59) (13.09) (17.28) (14.24) (43.88) (12.43) (17.26) (19.85) (20.29)
-0.02 -3.46*** 0.01 -2.22* -0.73 -2.24 -10.12*** -14.01*** 13.13 35.44* -26.45*** 8.84 9.32 35.85***
(0.06) (0.88) (0.03) (1.20) (0.51) (6.80) (1.89) (3.88) (8.33) (18.84) (6.90) (6.70) (15.83) (12.98)
0.07 -1.47 -0.15 -1.93 -1.71 -31.16 -5.34 4.58 14.08 -70.87 -62.61* -27.02 -28.50 -7.42
(0.10) (1.92) (0.11) (2.43) (1.69) (36.15) (8.09) (14.41) (27.54) (86.61) (36.07) (43.79) (59.90) (21.40)
-0.09* -2.21** -0.09** -2.88** -1.54** 0.05 -9.62*** -17.49*** -12.59** -28.67** -16.85*** -7.64 -15.46* -6.33
(0.05) (1.12) (0.04) (1.38) (0.60) (6.26) (1.70) (4.73) (6.00) (12.13) (6.16) (7.10) (8.36) (15.21)
0.02 0.80 0.07 1.98* 1.21* 3.87 16.17*** 18.07** 14.86 -19.53 -0.19 19.87** 34.90 -14.48
(0.04) (0.72) (0.06) (1.03) (0.69) (8.54) (3.72) (7.60) (11.20) (47.47) (18.10) (8.12) (45.30) (17.39)
-0.00 -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 0.05 0.03** 0.79*** 0.06 0.06 0.13** 0.42*** 0.03 0.05
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.25) (0.04) (0.13) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09)
0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.12 -0.02 -0.75*** -0.05 -0.21*** -0.22*** -0.43*** -0.47*** -0.13**
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.02) (0.26) (0.04) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.14) (0.06)
0.10 2.53*** 0.10** 0.74 0.16 -14.42** -5.54*** -22.33*** -29.42* 110.80 4.84 30.60 -396.92** -104.25
(0.07) (0.90) (0.05) (1.52) (0.40) (7.02) (1.07) (1.77) (17.82) (77.62) (14.84) (28.41) (161.21) (81.27)
0.55 24.65*** 0.62** 10.84** -0.16 15.28 -11.34*** -12.68*** -247.20***-928.95*** -7.90 -62.83** 410.45 643.11***
(0.60) (8.58) (0.30) (4.59) (1.37) (16.13) (2.18) (4.39) (54.97) (223.94) (18.82) (31.57) (255.73) (63.15)
11.06*** 17.29*** 16.88*** 30.94*** 48.24*** 55.30*** 17.97*** 17.33*** 19.59*** 11.37** 8.36* -0.65 36.83** -23.19***
(1.48) (1.38) (5.32) (6.79) (4.18) (7.41) (3.54) (4.31) (6.14) (5.62) (4.46) (7.26) (16.59) (6.84)
-15.07 -14.76 78.67*** 102.44*** -63.41*** -63.93 60.79*** 73.62*** 71.30*** 81.67*** 27.47** 45.75*** 3.10 17.64**
(19.61) (31.75) (16.72) (25.72) (24.53) (49.89) (8.39) (14.34) (14.06) (30.00) (12.75) (5.58) (6.22) (6.90)
-0.01 -0.28 -0.05*** 0.16 0.24 3.36 2.98*** 4.69*** 4.70 -51.32*** 18.11*** 1.55 -9.91 -21.68***
(0.01) (0.18) (0.02) (0.28) (0.15) (4.25) (0.80) (1.29) (4.13) (16.94) (2.47) (5.60) (10.62) (7.99)
659 659 787 787 849 849 1,975 1,975 619 619 1,346 1,346 537 537
7.13 7.13 9.97 9.97 44.26 44.26 101.20 101.20 68.89 68.89 121.70 121.70 48.98 48.98
14.08 14.08 30.62 30.62 57.12 57.12 130.80 130.80 88.06 88.06 135.40 135.40 55.51 55.51
0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
3.22 3.22 5.38 5.38 22.79 22.79 74.48 74.48 45.16 45.16 111.90 111.90 46.48 46.48
4.81 4.81 10.21 10.21 28.23 28.23 86.73 86.73 55.54 55.54 128.40 128.40 53.82 53.82
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.250 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
633 633 761 761 823 823 1949 1949 593 593 1320 1320 511 511
Tax  
Non-earmarked transfers  
Aquisition of movable and 
immovable goods  
Other expenditure
Piped water systems
Drainage and sewerage 
system
Length of road network
New trucks sold
Sum of absolute desviations
Sum of raw desviations
Quantile 25th
Residual Degrees of Freedom
 VARIABLES
Fiscal policy variables
(Group 7)(Group 1) (Group 2) (Group 3) (Group 4) (Group 5) (Group 6)
Quantile
Control variables
QuantileQuantile Quantile Quantile Quantile Quantile






Sum of absolute desviations
Sum of raw desviations
Quantile 75th
Notes: Dependent variable is employment rate. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Annual data for 1994-2010. Group classification was done according to 
municipalities socioeconomic characteristics where Group 1 is the least developed and Group 7 is the most developed. All regressions also contain year dummies. Standard errors 





Intergovernmental relationships in Mexico are complex and heterogeneity and 
inequality is spread all over Mexican territory.  Localities could initiate changes 
to improve their tax system by taking advantage of their potential taxing power 
and focusing in the transparency and accountability of public funds.  Develop 
their competitive advantage and promote investment and employment in priority 




The impact of taxes on real gross revenue per capita growth is positive and 
significant in most of the groups.  This result could be explained through the 
mechanism of central government transfers, since the formula of distribution of 
transfers takes into account the effort local entities make to collect own source 
revenue, regardless of the tax effects per se.  According to the classification I 
have for municipalities, no distinction is made between direct and indirect taxes, 
but certainly at lower levels of income the positive effect could also be explained 
by the income effect. 
 
In the case of central government transfers, my study finds that non-conditional 
transfers have a positive and significant effect on Municipalities.  My results are 
consistent with Cullis et al. (2009) findings and with state development figures 
explained in my previous chapter when analysing state development by group. 
 
Unfortunately, the definition of public infrastructure and the acquisition of 
movable and immovable goods at a Municipal level is very general and different 
types of infrastructure are pooled within the same category, which could partially 




Turning to other regressors, public infrastructure has a modest impact on growth 
on less developed localities (Hansen, 1965).  However, public inputs enter to the 
production of a locality as elements that increase productivity of private inputs 
(Eberts, 1990).  Looney and Frederiksen (1981), in their study of Mexico, find 




The impact of taxes on formal employment rate is positive and significant in 
groups less developed localities.  As discussed earlier, taxes collected by the 
local governments are taken into consideration when transfers from the central 
government are distributed, as a signal of reflecting local effort on revenue 
collection.  Another explanation, as expressed in previous sections is that the 
income effect dominates the substitution effect in less developed localities. 
 
My cross-sectional dependence estimations reflect that the effect of transfers on 
employment is mixed but as it has been discussed in my work, corruption, the 
opaque administration of public funds and data availability is a great drawback 
for the development of this thesis. 
 
When I analyse capital expenditure, my results are mixed among localities but 
the informal economy and the bidding for the completion of public works is 
complex and sometimes lacks of transparency, situation that can lead to 
corruption and fraud, therefore, the real effect on the economy cannot possibly be 
captured by formal employment figures. 
 
Turning to the control variables utilised, I find modest effects for less developed 
localities but positive outcomes for more developed municipalities.  However, as 
discussed earlier in this chapter, regional studies on public investment lack of 
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consistency and there is a wide variation on capacity and quality of public 
infrastructure. 
 
Consequently, the task of properly canalising resources to a particular 
expenditure within different municipalities is not straightforward.  A unique 
generalised formula for municipality’s development cannot be derived. 
Furthermore, my results illustrate disparities among localities between groups but 
also within groups, therefore, policymakers when implementing a fiscal policy 
measure need to consider the particular regional context in order to promote 
growth, employment and overcome local inequalities.  If the lack of transparency 







4. Latin America 
 
4.1 Fiscal Panorama of Latin America 
 
Countries in the region with low debt have been able to use their fiscal space to 
boost investment. During the last decade, income derived from non-renewal 
natural resources was a key element of sound public finances in the region, 
however, the lower prices observed since mid-2014 makes it necessary to revisit 
and strengthen revenue from other sources of income (ECLAC, 2015).  Four 
priority areas should be enhanced to increase revenue in Latin America: combat 
tax evasion, increase direct taxes, green taxes and tax some financial activities in 
the global economy; however, efforts to simplify the tax regime and 
administration should continue to minimize evasion or avoidance.  The 
distributive impact of fiscal policy should be addressed considering that Latin 
America is among the most unequal regions in the world; consolidate the 
recovery of social spending, better targeting and stabilise the sources of 
financing; as well as recognize the effects of decentralization in terms of equity.   
Structural fragility of public finances in Latin America, reflects the weakness of 
fiscal policy management and administration. However, it is important to 
recognize that the attainment of the goal of equity, faces some friction with 
macroeconomic fiscal consolidation.  There is huge complexity and difficulty of 
performing deep fiscal reforms to realign the fiscal instruments available for the 
realization of social rights and reduce structural weakness of public finances.  
Over the last decade, there has been an effort in the region to improve the 
situation of public finances by implementing fiscal rules that affect spending, the 




Figure 4.1 Latin American countries analysed 
 
Source: http://data.worldbank.org/products/wdi-maps 
Especially when reviewing the structure and composition of tax revenue it is 
noteworthy that the countries of Central America and Mexico are characterized 
by a low proportion of these revenues to GDP, around 13% on average for the 
1995-2012 period, compared with the average recorded for Latin America 16%, 
which contrasts to OECD countries, where income tax accounts for over 40% of 





Table 4.1 Latin America: Corporate Income Tax 2012 
 
In Table 4.1 note that Argentina had the maximum 35% rate, while the lowest 
Chile had the minimum 17% (18.5% by 2012), in contrast to the rate of Mexico 
30%, which was slightly lower than the average of countries in the region. 
However, corporate taxes in Mexico are in line with those of several countries in 
the region such as Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.  
However, some of these countries used, in addition, a minimum tax or control.   
  
Rate Minimum tax (2010)
% of tax  income




33.00% 3% over net wealth
30.00% No
25.00% No
30.00% 1% over gross income
31.00%
1% over 25% of net assets or 25% 
over gross assets 
30.00% 17.5% over cash income 1/ 
27.00%
25% of net taxable income or 
4.67% of gross taxable income
30.00% 0.4% over net assets 








Source: Modif ied version of Amieva Huerta (2015, p.24).




















Table 4.2 Latin America: Top Personal Income Tax Rates 
 
 
Table 4.2 presents the maximum rates for the personal income tax for a sample 
of Latin American countries.  Chile applied the maximum 40% rate, while 
Uruguay had the lowest rate with 25%.  During the period 2008 to 2011 only 
Mexico and Jamaica made modifications to their tax rates.  The average income 
tax for the Latin American countries was 31%, much less than that for the OECD 
countries of 41.5%.  The standard deviations were 0.05 and 0.11, respectively in 
both samples. 
 
As shown in table 4.3, Brazil was the first country in the Western hemisphere to 
introduce VAT in January 1967, while Uruguay was the second incorporation to 
its tax structure in 1968.  During the seventies Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panamá and Peru 
implemented it.  Mexico introduces it until January 1980, with a rate of 
introduction of 10%.  
2008 2009 2010 2011
35.00% 35.00% 35.00% 35.00%
27.50% 27.50% 27.50% 27.50%
40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00%
33.00% 33.00% 33.00% 33.00%
35.00% 35.00% 35.00% 35.00%
25.00% 25.00% 35.00% 25.00%
28.00% 28.00% 30.00% 30.00%
27.00% 27.00% 25.00% 25.00%
25.00% 25.00% 25.00% 25.00%
34.00% 34.00% 34.00% 34.00%
31.00% 31.00% 32.00% 31.00%
40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00%
25.00% 25.00% 25.00% 25.00%
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Source: Modified version of Amieva Huerta (2015, p.31).
Country

















Table 4.3 Latin America: VAT taxes 
 
 
In the region of Latin America and the Caribbean, the average VAT rate rose 
from 11.4% (time of its introduction) to 14.3%, which represents an increase of 
25%.  However, Latin America average rates are 25% lower than those of the 
OECD countries.  Furthermore, the standard deviation decreased from 4.6 to 3.7, 
due to fundraising reasons and to a lesser extent to tax harmonisation.  Note also, 
that the standard deviation for the case of the countries of the region of 3.7 is 








Jan. 1975 16.00% 21.00% 10.50%, 27.00%
Jul. 2006 10.00% 12.50%
Oct. 1973 10.00% 13.00%
Jan. 1967 17.60% 17.00% 7.00%, 12.00%, 18.00%
Mar. 1975 20.00% 19.00%
Jan. 1975 10.00% 16.00% 5.00%
Jan. 1975 10.00% 13.00% 5.00%, 10.00%
Mar. 2006 15.00% 15.00% 10.00%
Jul. 1970 4.00% 12.00%
Sep. 1992 10.00% 13.00%
Ago. 1983 7.00% 12.00%
Nov. 1982 7.00% 10.00%
Jan. 1976 3.00% 12.00% 15.00%, 18.00%
Oct. 1991 10.00% 16.50% 10.00%, 20.00%, 22.50%
Jan. 1980 10.00% 16.00% 11.00%
Jan. 1975 6.00% 15.00% 7.00%
Mar. 1977 5.00% 7.00% 10.00% 15.00%
Jul. 1993 12.00% 10.00% 5.00%
Jan. 1973 20.00% 18.00%
Jan. 1968 14.00% 22.00%
Oct. 1993 10.00% 12.00% 10.00%
11.40% 14.30%
Chile 20.00% 22.00% Uruguay








* Jamaica is a Carribbean country























In June 2013, 12 countries in the region had a general rate of VAT greater than 
or equal to the Mexico.  All of them with a greater tax burden than Mexico, like 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru.  According to the statistics of 
ECLAC (2012) tax burdens of these countries for 2011 were 7.9% for Argentina, 
7.5% for Brazil, 7.6% for Chile, 5.3% for Colombia and 6.6% for Peru.  The tax 
burden of the Latin America VAT, averaged 5.9%, compared to 3.9% in Mexico.   
 
Revenue composition of subnational governments 
 
Decentralisation process in Latin America in federalist countries like Argentina, 
Brazil and Mexico has focused in transferring certain governmental functions to 
the local governments; in unitary countries with several levels of government, 
functions where as well transferred to local governments; however, the process 
has been quite heterogeneous and diverse, result of very different and dynamic 
institutional, social, political, economic and democratic framework.  Likewise, 
there are some common characteristics: great vertical asymmetry between 
revenue and expenditure due to the misalignment of management and 
responsibilities.  During the 80’s the decentralization process began as a way to 
delegate power to lower levels of government and promote public sector 
efficiency, while during the 90’s focus was given to earmarked transfers in health 
and education categories.  The focus was mainly on expenditure.  The revenue 
local governments have raised to provide services to the general public has been 
funded by own source revenue, transfers from the central government or debt.  
According to ECLAC (2014, p.23) total transfers increased 2.4% of GDP from 
1997 to 2012, while local taxes increased only one percentage point during the 
same period.  During 2012, transfers to local governments in Mexico accounted 
for 7.9% of GDP and almost 85% of local government’s total revenue.  Tax 
authorities at a local level have been particularly weak, with limited resources 
and capabilities.  However, in the case of Brazil, local governments raise around 
29% of total tax revenues, while Argentina and Colombia raise about 15% of 
total revenues.  Property taxes, specific service and municipal taxes are mainly 
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collected by local governments, nonetheless general consumption taxes have 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Own elaboration with data of Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC (2014)
Mean by Group
Total Income
Direct tax Indirect tax Social contributions
UM-I - Upper-middle income LM-I - Lower-middle income  L-I - Low income
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Table 4.4 Total income Central Government Latin America 1994-2010 
  
Group Variable 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Indirect Tax Income 34.89 28.42 28.26 29.68 36.12 33.54 30.37 28.73 29.65 32.46 31.86 30.90 29.86 31.13 31.35 30.29 32.88
Direct Tax Income 27.96 30.98 29.75 31.53 25.52 29.63 29.14 30.01 29.81 28.70 28.86 31.41 37.34 34.63 33.71 36.07 32.49
Social Contributions 
Income
37.15 40.59 41.99 38.79 38.36 36.83 40.49 41.26 40.54 38.84 39.28 37.69 32.80 34.24 34.94 33.64 34.63
Indirect Tax Income 70.67 68.35 66.81 67.87 69.41 69.86 69.09 69.04 67.20 66.09 65.27 64.49 63.47 62.72 61.17 57.99 60.98
Direct Tax Income 18.09 21.02 21.79 21.01 20.06 20.03 20.32 19.71 20.55 21.11 22.61 23.94 24.51 25.32 27.34 29.72 26.84
Social Contributions 
Income
11.24 10.63 11.40 11.12 10.53 10.11 10.59 11.25 12.24 12.80 12.12 11.58 12.03 11.96 11.49 12.29 12.19
Indirect Tax Income 64.79 83.83 76.50 81.37 83.44 79.45 73.47 77.47 79.94 80.08 78.43 75.47 79.81 78.10 77.30 78.67 78.15
Direct Tax Income 35.21 16.17 23.50 18.63 16.56 20.55 26.53 22.53 20.06 19.92 21.57 24.53 20.19 21.90 22.70 21.33 21.85
Social Contributions 
Income









1) N.A. Value not available 
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Source: Own elaboration with data of Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC (2014)
Mean by Group
Total Expenditure
Current expenditure Capital expenditure
UM-I - Upper-middle income LM-I - Lower-middle income  L-I - Low income
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Table 4.5 Total expenditure Central Government Latin America 1994-2010  
  
Group Variable 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Current 
Expenditure
86.25 84.16 84.13 83.88 84.23 85.00 86.60 86.05 85.83 86.42 86.45 86.05 85.02 83.88 82.52 83.08 82.51
Gov Cap 
Expenditure
13.75 15.84 15.87 16.12 15.77 15.00 13.40 13.95 14.17 13.58 13.55 13.95 14.98 16.12 17.48 16.92 17.49
Current 
Expenditure
77.01 73.95 75.43 73.28 72.69 69.76 73.35 72.09 73.48 72.61 72.66 73.13 75.24 74.56 74.00 75.04 75.45
Gov Cap 
Expenditure
22.99 26.05 24.57 26.72 27.31 30.24 26.65 27.91 26.52 27.39 27.34 26.87 24.76 25.44 26.00 24.96 24.55
Current 
Expenditure
95.92 93.27 96.60 87.77 81.75 81.18 77.51 81.63 81.61 72.71 76.68 89.47 91.34 78.78 80.08 83.27 74.43
Gov Cap 
Expenditure











































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Own elaboration with data of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Developmen, OECD (2015)
Mean by Group
Total Income
Taxes on income Social security contributions Taxes on payroll Other taxes
UM-I - Upper-middle income LM-I - Lower-middle income  L-I - Low income
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Table 4.6 Total income General Government Latin America 1994-2010 
  
Group Variable 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Taxes on income, profits 
and capital gains
46.93 46.98 48.45 50.05 46.40 47.71 48.04 48.88 48.10 50.76 52.33 55.38 57.70 58.76 57.57 53.45 52.99
Social security 
contributions
46.06 46.25 45.03 43.42 47.18 45.69 44.14 43.30 44.04 41.72 40.60 38.11 35.71 35.18 36.55 40.26 40.56
Taxes on payroll and 
workforce
3.93 3.51 4.08 3.57 3.51 3.47 4.87 4.51 4.53 4.30 3.71 3.22 3.28 3.02 3.14 3.26 3.36
Other taxes 3.08 3.27 2.44 2.97 2.92 3.13 2.95 3.31 3.33 3.22 3.36 3.28 3.31 3.04 2.73 3.03 3.09
Taxes on income, profits 
and capital gains
52.21 55.11 57.98 59.17 59.80 54.45 51.04 51.14 49.17 51.70 51.76 55.10 56.21 57.87 63.64 56.39 57.13
Social security 
contributions
39.57 35.26 36.15 37.10 38.24 43.21 47.77 49.35 48.60 47.86 43.92 41.85 41.85 41.51 42.50 38.90 42.58
Taxes on payroll and 
workforce
N.A.1 N.A.1 N.A.1 N.A.1 N.A.1 N.A.1 N.A.1 N.A.1 N.A.1 N.A.1 N.A.1 N.A.1 N.A.1 N.A.1 N.A.1 N.A.1 N.A.1







1) N.A. Value not available 
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Source: Own elaboration with data of ^^^ ^CAMBIAME^^ ^^  (^^ ^^CAMBIAME^^ ^^ )
Mean by Group
Government consumption
UM-I - Upper-middle income LM-I - Lower-middle income  L-I - Low income
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Table 4.7 Total expenditure General Government Latin America 1994-2010 
Group Variable 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Government 
consumption
11.72 12.03 11.93 12.72 13.00 13.47 12.92 13.49 13.36 12.79 12.25 12.25 12.19 12.23 12.42 13.69 13.41
Government 
consumption
9.38 9.39 9.47 9.49 9.99 10.61 10.84 11.64 11.56 11.62 11.36 11.51 11.24 11.15 11.12 12.49 11.93
Government 
consumption









1) N.A. Value not available 
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Source: Own elaboration with data of Organization, ILOSTAT Database (2015)
Mean by Group
Employment and Unemployment Rate
Employment Unemployment
UM-I - Upper-middle income LM-I - Lower-middle income
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Table 4.6 Employment and Unemployment Latin America1994-2010 
  
Group Variable 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Employment rate 52.54 53.26 51.60 53.65 51.18 50.12 50.32 53.29 52.33 50.41 50.30 54.05 53.98 54.57 55.12 55.83 56.10
Unemployment rate 8.91 9.12 10.19 9.74 9.72 10.57 10.78 10.62 11.23 10.95 9.76 9.68 8.62 7.77 7.34 8.25 7.92
Employment rate N.A.1 N.A.1 50.47 51.41 N.A.1 N.A.1 N.A.1 36.10 N.A.1 N.A.1 N.A.1 47.25 N.A.1 N.A.1 N.A.1 53.16 53.42







1) N.A. Value not available 
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Quality and Transparency of Public Expenditure 
 
Social expenditure in Latin America increased from 50% during 1992-1993 to 
66% in 2010-2011, which means that social expenditure increased from 12.5% to 
19.2 % of GDP during this period (ECLAC, 2014, p.61).  In this respect health 
expenditure raised from 2.65% during the 90’s to 3.9% of GDP in 2010-2011.  
However, not necessarily a higher expenditure reflects higher health quality for 
the population.  In 2011, Latin American health expenditure was about 872 
dollars per capita, while North American, OECD and European countries spent 
around 8,200, 4,400 and 2.300 dollars per capita, respectively.  Moreover, 
regarding education expenditure in Latin America, it also increased to levels of 
5% of GDP in 2009-2010, but also there is great heterogeneity and strong 
differences of GDP per capita expenditure between countries.  Education 
expenditure per capita in the region increased from 121 dollars in the 90’s to 279 
dollars in 2009-2010.  IN 2010, primary education expenditure per capita was of 
14.7 % in Latin America in contrast to 22.9%, 22.3% and 22.4% in North 





According to Schwellnus (2009) if health expenditure was spent more efficiently, 
life expectancy could increase by 4 years in Mexico, 3 years in Argentina and 2 
years in Chile, Brazil and Uruguay. Mexico and Argentina could increase their 
PISA evaluation results in 74 and 90 points respectively if education resources 
where spent efficiently; in Chile, Brazil and Uruguay PISA results could increase 
44, 32 and 35 points, respectively. 
 
Afonso et al. (2013) determine efficiency indicators for the public sector in 23 
Latin American economies from 2001 to 2010.  Guatemala, Chile and Peru are 
the most efficient countries; followed by Dominican Republic, Ecuador and El 
Salvador.  Best results in education are for Ecuador, Uruguay and Dominican 
Republic, while Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Guatemala have the better 
results in health expenditure.  According to their study, Latin American countries 
could use 40% less resources to obtain the same result, or increase their 
productivity in 19% if they employed their resources efficiently.  
 
There are five channels through with public finance can impact long-term 
growth: government size; fiscal position and sustainability; composition and 
efficiency of public expenditure; efficient tax structure and administration and 
adequate fiscal policy management.  Recent developments have focused on 
management by results considering prioritising public policy and government 
planning, strategic objectives, adequate human resources, transparency and 
accountability in public transactions, controls, comprehensive spending reviews, 
audits, impact assessments and integrated financial management systems (Armijo 
and Espada, 2014). 
 
4.2 Latin America: research topics in public finance 
The government is a provider of public goods (i.e. clean air and national defence) 
that contributes to diminish externalities (i.e. impose a green tax in order to avoid 
pollution), and it aims to redistribute income and wealth and promotes growth 
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through the negotiation of interest groups’ demands (Cowen, T., 2002). 
According to Buchanan and Tullok (1962, p.21-30), the government is supposed 
to carry out the peoples’ will and policies should reflect the best interest of 
voters.  However, Niskanen (1971, p.227-230) argued that population 
preferences are only slightly reflected in political institutions as political leaders 
can often pursue their own interests and extract tax income from citizens.  The 
distributive role of the state can be summarized as an insurance against risk to 
income for living in interdependent economies, or countries dependent on 
international trade, can function through involuntary redistribution from high 
income to low income groups as well as involuntary redistribution from some 
groups with fragile political power to those with higher power.  Lybeck (1986, 
p.58-106) developed an integrated supply and demand model for twelve OECD 
developed economies where the interest group variable and the degree of 
unionization were significant for government growth.  Persson and Tabellini 
(2000, p.1121-1127) emphasise that not only can democracy affect the size of the 
government but that the structure of the institutions is also relevant.  They found 
that a presidential system leads to competition among different actors and that 




Taxes generate two main effects on the decision to work.  On the one hand, the 
income effect makes agents become poorer and they have to work more in order 
to keep the same level of consumption.  On the other hand, agents could choose 
more leisure and less work since the opportunity cost of leisure drops.  
Therefore, the final effect depends upon the magnitude of the income and 
substitution effect; whether they rather have more leisure instead of work or keep 
their level of consumption.  At a country level, several studies have found a 
negative effect on growth, however, when analysing sub national governments, 
the result is not straightforward.  Some literature suggests that taxation has a 
negative impact on growth.  For instance, Gemmell (2011 p.44) when comparing 
the long-term impact of fiscal variables on growth for 17 OECD countries from 
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1970 to 2004, finds that distortionary taxation presents a negative sign 
considering that each country can take a different lag length up to 2.  Using a 
sample of 22 OECD countries from 1970-1995, Kneller et al.(1999 p.171) 
endorse that distortionary taxation reduces growth, while non-distortionary taxes 
does not affect it.  Dahlby et al. (2012 p.587) analyse the impact of tax changes 
on growth in Canadian provinces from 1997 to 2006 and identified that there is a 
negative correlation with corporate taxation, however, personal income tax does 
not seem to affect growth.  However, some authors find no evidence of such 
relationship.  Carnavire-Bacarreza et al. (2013, p.28) study taxation and 
economic growth in Latin America at a country level between 1990 and 2010, 
reporting that personal income tax does not seem to have any effect on growth, 
however, corporate income tax displays a positive and significant effect on 
growth in this region.  Moreover, Alm and Rogers (2011, p.483) use local data 
pertaining to 48 states in the USA from 1947 to 1997 to estimate the effects of 
taxes, among other factors, on economic growth and discovered that the effect of 
taxation policies depends upon the regressors, the estimation method and the 
time period.  Their results have demonstrated that there is no convergence in 
state per capita income. 
 
Taxation literature explains that consumption taxes (indirect) promote savings, 
but the empirical evidence of this assumption remains questionable.    High taxes 
on social security affects employment, since it would be a disincentive to work 
for employees, which in turn would provide a low base to finance social security, 
however, if the income effect is higher than the substitution effect, employees 
would be poorer and thus, would work more, regardless of the higher taxes.  
With respect to Latin American studies, Fricke and Süssmuth (2014) find a 
positive long run revenue elasticity of income tax (personal and corporate), VAT 
(internal and external) and social security contributions for eleven Latin 
American countries from 1993 to 2009.  Nevertheless, by using a sample of 19 
economies between 1990 and 2009, Canavire-Bacarreza et al. (2013) report that 
personal income tax has a positive effect in Latin American growth, and small 
negative effects in the case of corporate income tax, while a mixed effect on 
VAT.  In this work, I expect that direct taxes have a negative relationship with 
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growth and employment, while indirect taxes have a positive relationship with 
both of them since the later does not modify relative prices. 
Nonetheless, in this study I am pooling countries which have different levels of 
development and the effects might be offsetting.  However, when I further re-
calculated my regression by splitting the sample in two groups, so I could 
differentiate among them (low and middle income) the regressions did not work. 
 
Martin-Mayoral and Uribe’s (2010) results show that the main factors to increase 
revenue in 18 Latin American economies during the period 1975-2007 are: the 
level of development, investment specialisation and trade, however, institutions, 
democracy and inequity play a fundamental role on government revenue.  
Becerra’s (2013) study focus on several social factors which affect tax collection 
in 18 Latin American economies during 2010 such as: perception of evasion by 
peers, as well as government trust and approval, which are significant 
determinants of tax morale. 
 
The design of tax structures can stimulate growth according to the composition 
of the tax mix.  In this current work, the focus is to take into account 
simultaneously the most significant revenue components and their impact on 
growth and not to analyse the appropriateness of each component.  Nonetheless, 
Johansson´s empirical estimates of tax structure modifications and their impact 
on growth show that a change of 1 percent from direct to indirect taxes could 
have a positive impact on growth between 0.25 and one percentage points.  Most 
OECD countries receive their revenue from three main sources: income taxes, 
excises on goods and services and social security contributions. However,  a 
pragmatic tax reform would need to take into consideration efficiency, equity and 
simplicity issues, while maximizing tax revenue (Johansson et al., 2008 p.1, 7, 
33, 43).  
 
In this respect, it is important to acknowledge that the effects of taxes on 
developed countries can differ from those in developing countries, since their 
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initial position and levels of taxation are quite different.  In the current study, 
there is a distinction among states and municipalities in Mexico according to the 
level of development of each locality, however, making a division for Latin 
America was not possible due to the availability of data. 
 
Angelopoulos et al. (2012 p.237-239) analyse tax composition and its 
relationship with growth in the UK from 1970 to 2005 using a theoretical 
dynamic general equilibrium model.  Their results suggest that reducing direct 
taxes while increasing indirect taxes can promote growth.  Their findings 
demonstrate the importance of tax composition in policy design.  However, if the 
objective is to promote welfare, policy makers should reduce capital taxation 
while increasing labour or consumption taxes. According to these authors’ 
estimations, welfare gains are about two percentage points. 
 
4.2.2 Expenditure 
Capital expenditure categorised as productive could be expected to generate a 
positive impact on growth, while current expenditure can normally be linked to a 
negative effect on it.  However, Devarajan (1996 p.313) when analysing a 
sample of 46 developing countries for the period 1970-1990, finds a surprising 
result; current expenditures in developing countries boost economic activity 
more than capital expenditures. This current study confirms his result.  One 
explanation for this controversial finding is that productive expenditure may 
become unproductive if there is too much of it (Ono, 2011).  Additionally, Daude 
et al. (2010 p.36) when analysing fiscal policy in Latin America report that 
discretionary fiscal policy has been pro-cyclical in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico 
but neutral in Chile. Nonetheless, although there are contrasts between Latin 
America and developed countries, in recent years, fiscal policy carried out in 
Latin American economies has played a stabilising role (Klemm, 2014, p.1). 
 
The results of the current study in Latin America reveal that capital spending has 
a negative effect on growth at a central level, while government consumption has 
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also a negative coefficient at a general government level.  These results are 
consistent with Devarajan et al.’s (1996) work that find that the relationship 
between government capital expenditure and growth is negative in 46 developing 
countries from 1970 to 1990 due to misallocations of public spending.  Clements 
et al. (2007) in 17 economies from 1989 to 2006 and Lora (2009) in 50 countries 
between 1985 and 2003, indicate that although primary expenditures in Latin 
America have increased for a decade, particularly, their social expenditures, there 
is still substantial opportunity to increase government efficiency.  Fernández‐
Arias and Montiel (2011) results suggest that productive public spending has 
been utilised during fiscal expansions in seven Latin American nations during the 
period 2007-2009. 
 
Various empirical studies confirm the Keynesian positive reaction of private 
consumption to government spending (Tagkalakis, 2008). However, questions 
can be raised concerning how governments should spend taxpayers’ money and 
how that spending should follow different paths under diverse economic 
conditions.  Fiscal planners should then promote public goods which are 
complementary with private goods (roads and automobiles) in order to boost 
economic activity (Graves, 2010 p.9). 
 
Afonso and Furceri (2010 p.517-521) develop a model which explains GDP per 
capita in terms of a set of revenue and expenditure components and their 
respective size and volatility. The countries included in their sample were 15 
European Union members and 13 additional OECD countries, and covered seven 
five-year periods from 1970 to 2004.  They use a set of control variables (initial 
level of GDP per capita, output volatility, investment share, human capital, 
average growth rate of population and openness) as well as the squared term for 
income and expenditure components in order to determine the existence of an 
“optimal government size”.  Their results show that both variables (income and 
expenditures) are significant for growth. In particular, they emphasised that 
indirect taxes (size and volatility), social contributions (size and volatility), 
government consumption (size and volatility), subsidies (size) and government 
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investment (volatility) have a considerable and detrimental effect on growth. 
 
Helmi Hamdi et al. (2013 p.737) examine inter-temporal relationship between 
government revenues-expenditures-GDP with a sample of six countries from 
1990 to 2010 utilising Granger causality. They elicited that government 
expenditures cause government revenues for Qatar and United Arab Emirates, 
while government revenues cause government expenditures for Saudi Arabia. 
Government expenditure links to GDP in Bahrain.  GDP causes government 
revenue in Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia and GDP causes government 
expenditure in Oman and Qatar.  Furthermore, in their study of five European 
countries using the same procedure for annual time series data from 1995 to 
2009, Helmi Hamdi et al. (2013 p.1350) reported that government expenditure 
causes government revenue in Greece and Portugal.  Government revenue links 
to GDP in Italy.  Government revenue causes government expenditure in Ireland.  
Spain shows a bidirectional causality between revenue and expenditure to GDP 
and government revenue causes government expenditure.  
 
4.2.3 Fiscal Federalism 
Fiscal federalism refers to the way that different levels of government organise 
collection of taxes and provision of public services and thus coordinated 
responsibility is crucial to maximise the outputs of income and expenditure 
assignment (Hyman, 2008 p.690-691).  This is relevant for the current study 
because approximately two thirds of revenues in Latin America derive from 
central government transfers. Hence, understanding the approach taken at 
different levels of government towards organising, distributing and applying 
resources is necessary in order to understand public finances at a local level.  In 
this respect, according to Shah (2006 p.16) stabilization programmes should be 
conducted by the central government because the mobility of resources makes it 
difficult to develop an effective policy at the local level.  Furthermore, local 
governments’ reduced capability to borrow or their inability to issue money 
makes it difficult for them to pursue stabilization.  In light of this, central 
governments focus on macroeconomic stability including monetary, fiscal and 
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redistribution policies, while the provision of public services is undertaken by 
local authorities. Although the central government plays a fundamental role in 
redistribution of income, local governments must guarantee the effective 
implementation of such policies (Oates, 1999 p.1121-1122).  Additionally, Bird 
(2002 p.899) averred that the efficient provision of local services is possible 
when there is a clear mandate, suitable resources and accountability.  Thus, the 
need for transparency in expenditure makes accountability for any resources 
canalised to local public authorities’ essential.  Local authorities need to raise 
taxes in the most efficient and strategic way based on their potential sources of 
income (charges for public services and local taxes).  In the next chapter, this 
current study links the opinion people have regarding the satisfaction of 




Barro and Redlick (2011 p.77, 99) found that when the unemployment rate is 
above 12 percent the multiplier is closer to one.  Christiano determines that when 
the zero bound is reached, the multiplier can be up to ten (Canova, 2011a).  
Measurement and results concerning fiscal multipliers are very diverse, however, 
taking into account the results of Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010) regarding 
the size of fiscal multipliers, fiscal policy seems to be considerably more 
effective in recessions than in expansions.  
 
Keynes’ opponents stated that the price of goods is not only related to the amount 
produced, but also to the amount offered or supplied in the market (Robinson, 
1933, p. 519-521).  Additionally, Pigou contended that the level of private 
investment has no impact on employment and argued that cutting wages 
promotes greater employment.  Explanations of unemployment based on a single 
cause can be misleading, and Pigou mentioned “expansionary policies” as a short 




In a non-Keynesian world, where agents look at their permanent income rather 
than their disposable income at a specific time, an expansionary fiscal policy 
means that eventually debt or future taxes will rise and government spending will 
fall.  Subsequently, private consumption can drop and offset the benefits of the 
fiscal expansion. In this case, more debt increases the financial risk to the 
country, elevates interest rates, decreases private investment, increases family 
savings and eventually shrinks aggregate demand and economic activity 
(Mendoza et al., 2007, p. 99-126). 
 
As a matter of simplification, in a perfect labour market, the value of a job is 
equal to the reservation wage.  The total surplus of a job is zero.  The total 
surplus of a job is the worker’s surplus plus the firm’s surplus.  The value of a 
job refers to the value of the production derived from the labour of the worker, in 
other words, the revenue derived from a job.   The surplus of the worker is the 
difference between the wage received by the worker and his reservation wage, 
which is the minimum wage that the worker is willing to accept in order to work.  
The surplus of the firm is the difference between the value of a job and the wage 
paid to the worker.  However, in an imperfect labour market, the total surplus is 
positive.  Furthermore, labour market institutions refer to legislation, norms, 
regulations and outcomes from a collective choice mechanism to fix the pay rate, 
that is, it is the result of a political process.  Labour market institutions exist as a 
result of a democracy in order to improve efficiency since there are market 
imperfections – information asymmetries and externalities.  These institutions 
promote redistribution through labour taxes and transfers and/or function to meet 
the needs of particular interest groups in the employment protection legislation 
framework (Boeri & Van Ours, 2013, p.6-8, 20-21). 
 
Blanchard & Wolfers (2000, p.1-32) analysed the relationship between labour 
market institutions and labour markets in 15 OECD countries from 1965 to 1990 
and revealed considerable heterogeneity among institutions across Europe, 






The informal sector refers to the non-observed economy, however, it is 
distinguished from the underground and/or black-market economy. The 
underground economy refers to those activities that are hidden from public 
authorities while the black market refers to illegal activities.  Complex 
legislation, administration, taxation and corruption encourage an underground 
economy (Mueller, 2003, p.560).  The size of the informal sector in developing 
countries accounts for about 40 per cent of GDP (ibid) but is neither underground 
nor illegal, but rather is perceived as a survival economy (i.e. street sales).  
Governments have been increasingly interested in incorporating this sector to the 
overall development of their economies.  Informality arises also in the 
employment sector.  Although the informal sector was perceived originally as the 
residual economy since the economy did not have capacity to absorb all 
economic activity, it has risen in developing economies due to bureaucracy as 
well as there being complex and unclear regulations.  In Latin America, this 
sector accounts for 29 per cent of non-agricultural GDP. The impact of 
informality on growth is still inconclusive.  Informal firms are perceived as 
unfair competitors of formal enterprises due to their tax evasion and non-
compliance.  Additionally, considering informal small-scale provision of goods 
and services, their production results ineffective (CUTS International, 2009, p.1-
6).  Across countries there is a strong negative correlation between revenue and 
informality, particularly in low and middle-income countries.  Although for the 
case of Mexico I was unable to find a proxy to measure informal economy, in 
Latin America I find a significant and negative association of informal labour 
market and growth (Woodruff, 2013, p.2).  
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➢ Personal income tax does not have any effect on growth. 
 
➢ Corporate income tax displays a positive and significant effect on growth. 
Ormaechea, 
M. Yoo (2012) 
69 countries  
(1970-2009)  
21 high income 
23 middle-income 





➢ A percentage point increase in the income tax while reducing 
consumption and property tax is associated with a decrease in the long-
run growth rate of GDP per capita by 0.07 percentage points. 
 
➢ Among income taxes, personal income taxes and social security 
contributions present a stronger negative association with growth, 0.17 
and 0.14 percentage points respectively; a shift from income taxes to 
property taxes by one percentage point has a strong positive association 
with growth of 0.04-0.07 percentage points, while reducing income taxes 






Method Main Results 
Johansson  
et al (2009) 
30 OECD 
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Tax revenue and tax 






➢ Most OECD countries receive their revenue from three main sources: 
income taxes, excises on goods and services and social security 
contributions 
➢ Corporate taxes have been found to be the most harmful for growth, 
followed by personal income taxes and consumption taxes 
➢ A pragmatic tax reform would need to take into consideration efficiency, 










➢ Fiscal policy has Keynesian effects on private consumption expenditure 











GDP and GDP per 
capita growth  
Descriptive &  
Analytic  
➢ Elaborates a classification of the studies according to their coverage, their 
methodology and the ranking of the journals in which they were published, 
trying to address general conclusions.  
➢ The effect of fiscal policy on growth is not strong  
➢ The positive effect of education and infrastructure on growth is confirmed  
  
Bose et al  
(2003)  
  
30 Developing  
(1983-1988)  
  
GDP Growth  
PANEL 
➢ Strong positive effect of investment in education on growth  
➢ Government capital expenditure and private investment are positively 











15 EU, 13 OECD  
7 5-year periods 





& Time fixed 
effects 
➢ Income and expenditures are significant for growth 
 
A detrimental effect on growth is given by 
 
➢ Indirect taxes (size and volatility)  
➢ Social contributions (size and volatility)  
➢ Government consumption (size and volatility) 
➢ Subsidies (size) and  




4.3 Some growth methodologies 
 
4.3.1 Vector Autoregressive 
VAR models have been very popular since the 1980’s as a practical option to the 
traditional macro econometric models which were based upon a number of 
theoretical considerations.  In the ancestries of this type of approach, there was 
not much theoretical support since the identification of causality among different 
sets of variables seemed unclear.  Therefore, VAR literature has increasingly 
developed in order to have a practical way of analysing economic phenomena 
considering some theoretical fundamentals.  VAR models have been used to 
determine the reaction of specific variables to a structural shock; to estimate the 
impact of a real shock on the variability of the data available; to derive historical 
development of various shocks related to the variables analysed and to develop 
diverse scenarios according to feasible real shocks (Kilian, 2011 p.1). 
 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) develop a structural VAR approach in order to 
determine the effect of government spending and taxation  shocks on economic 
development in the United States for the post war period (1947-1997 quarterly), 
considering institutional information, and hence constructing estimates of fiscal 
policy shocks (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002 p.1329-1336).  In this respect, both 
government expenditure and taxation have an impact on GDP, therefore, they 
construct a basic VAR specification: 
Yt= A(L,q)Yt-1 + Ut                                                                                                                                      (4.1) 
where  
A(L,q) = Quarterly distributed lag polynomial that allows each coefficient of a 
lag to depend on the quarter q that considers the dependant variable 
Yt = A three-dimensional vector including Tt (taxes), Gt (expenditure) and Xt 
(GDP) in real, per capita terms. 
Ut = Vector of residuals [tt, gt, xt] 
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Their results show that government spending shocks have a positive effect on 
output while tax shocks have an adverse effect on it.  However, expenditure and 
tax shocks have a negative effect on investment.  Their model has been widely 
used and cited in the current literature and has proved to be of significant value 
to the analysis of fiscal policy.  Nonetheless, the major drawback in this kind of 
models is that they only consider the time trend of the dependant variable 
without additional information or cross section data.  The current study will 
analyse the development of fiscal variables in 17 years, which is a very short 
period of time to develop a time series analysis. 
 
4.3.2 Instrumental Variable 
Lee and Sung (2007 p.442-444) analyse the fiscal position of 94 countries from 
1972 to 1998 with the following responsiveness fiscal policy equation: 
∆ ln(𝑍it) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1∆ ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃it)  + 𝛼2𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛾𝑗 𝐷𝑗
𝑗≠1
+  ∑ 𝜕𝑠 𝑇𝑠 +𝑠≠1  ∈𝑖𝑡   (4.2) 
Where 𝑍𝑖𝑡 is the fiscal position of country i at time t, 𝛼1 is the elasticity of the 
fiscal position to changes in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), a de-trended 
variable function of time t, 𝐷𝑗  is the country j dummy variable and 𝑇𝑠 is the year 
dummy variable for years.  They utilise as an instrumental variable, the weighted 
average of GDP growth rates in neighbouring countries, weighted by the inverse 
of the geographic distance between the two countries, finding high correlation 
between GDP growth rate in neighbouring countries and the country’s GDP 
growth rate.   
 
Additionally, they estimate an effectiveness of fiscal policy equation by 
regressing the standard deviation of GDP growth, considering as independent 
variables the log of GDP, the log of GDP growth rates, the log of GDP per 
capita, government size as a percentage of GDP, trade openness, the ratio of 
military expenditure and of oil production, economic fluctuations in 




 𝑆𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑣(∆𝑙𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖 = 𝛽0 +  β1𝑙𝐺𝐷𝑃i +  β2∆𝑙𝐺𝐷𝑃i + β3𝑙𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶i 
+ β4(𝐺𝑜𝑣i/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖) +  β5𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛i + β6𝑀𝑖𝑙i +  β7𝑂𝑖𝑙i +  β8𝑆𝐷i +  β9𝑅𝑠𝑝i  ∈𝑖  (4.3) 
  
In the current study, the growth regression does not have proper instruments for 
the fiscal variables, therefore it utilises their first lag.  Therefore, in order to 
account for endogeneity, this study is limited to partial correlations and not 
causality. 
 
4.3.3 Pooled Mean Group 
In the case of heterogeneous panels with T time-series observations and N 
groups, there could be two useful approaches: a) to estimate N distinct 
regressions and calculate the coefficient means, which would be a “mean group 
estimation”; or b) to pool the data and consider that the slope coefficients and 
error variances are homogeneous along the sample.  However, an intermediate 
procedure could consist of a “pooled mean group estimation”, which enables 
different short-run coefficients and error variances among groups but restrains 
long-run coefficients to be the same (Pesaran et al., 1999 p.621). 
 
Johansson et al. (2008 p.43,58) estimate cross-country effects of the tax mix on 
long-run GDP per capita in 21 OECD countries from 1970-2005 applying Pooled 
Mean Group analysis as well to the following growth equation: 
 
∆𝑙𝑛y𝑖,𝑡 = −∅𝑖(𝑙𝑛y𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝜃1𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑘 − 𝜃2𝑙𝑛ℎ𝑖,𝑡 
 + 𝜃3𝑛𝑖,𝑡 
 + ∑ 𝜃𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝑗 − 𝑎𝑖𝑡) +
𝑏1,𝑖∆𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑘 + 𝑏2,𝑖∆𝑙𝑛ℎ𝑖,𝑡 
 + 𝑏3,𝑖∆𝑛𝑖,𝑡 
 +  ∑ 𝑏𝑗𝑖∆𝑙𝑛𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝑗 + ∈𝑖𝑡                             (4.4) 
 
Where y is output per capita,  𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑘 , investment rate into physical capital, h human 
capital and n population.  Vector V refers to a set of policy variables.  In their 
analysis, they are interested in the different structure of taxes, therefore, 
Johansson et al. distinguish between personal and corporate income taxes, 
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consumption and property taxes.  In the present study, the focus is the 
composition of revenues without any distinction among personal and corporate.  
Moreover, this research will include expenditure variables in order to measure 
their effect on output simultaneously. 
 
4.3.4 Panel Data 
 
Sutherland et al. (2010 p.73) describe the results of fiscal policy reaction 
functions from OECD countries considering fixed effect OLS where the 
dependant variable is the cyclically adjusted government balances as a 
percentage of potential output and the explanatory variables are lagged 
governmental balances, public debt, real house and stock pricing growth, 
openness, population, public sector size, debt service, GDP volatility and 
inflation.  However, in the present study the fact that a particular locality has a 
balanced budget or not, is not the issue “per se”, but the way that each local 
government manipulates income and expenditure variables in order to achieve 
governmental objectives.  In fact, two localities could have similar fiscal 
positions but a different manner of allocating resources, which would in turn lead 
to different outcomes. 
 
Afonso and Furceri  (2010 p.6-12) consider GDP per capita growth in terms of a 
set of revenue and expenditure components and their respective volatility and a 
set of control variables (initial level of GDPP, output volatility, investment share, 
human capital, average growth rate of population and openness) as well as a 
squared term for income and expenditure components in order to determine the 
existence of an “optimal government size”.  
 
The original equations they consider are: 
𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = ∝1+ 𝛽1𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑅𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛿1𝜎𝑖𝑡
𝑅 + 𝜗1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + ∅1𝑇𝑡 + 𝜗1𝑆𝑖 +∈𝑖𝑡                  (4.5) 
𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = ∝2+ 𝛽2𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐸𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛿2𝜎𝑖𝑡
𝐸 + 𝜗2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + ∅2𝑇𝑡 + 𝜗2𝑆𝑖 +∈𝑖𝑡                  (4.6) 
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Where i denote country and t periods (1970-1974, 1975-1979….1999-2004) 
𝑔𝑖,𝑡 is the real GDP per capita growth rate 
∝1  and  ∝2  are the individual effects estimated for each country 
R is a set of governmental revenue variables as a percentage of GDP 
E is a set of governmental expenditure variables as a percentage of GDP 
𝜎𝑖𝑡
𝑅   and   𝜎𝑖𝑡
𝐸    are the volatility variables for income and expenditure 
X is a set of control variables: initial level of output per capita, output volatility, 
investment share, human capital, average population growth and openness 
 
The square terms for R and E test the effect of different government sizes on 
economic growth. 
 
In a preliminary approach, this work was developed using this model but taking 
income and expenditure effects simultaneously, however, the number of 
variables in the right-hand side were too much, therefore, the final model keeps 
only the fiscal variables of interest without the squared and the deviation terms.  
Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge that the current analysis considers a 
simultaneous analysis of revenue and spending variables but also develops 
separate regressions for income and expenditure.  Results are different in each 
case, which proves that it is not the same to take income or expenditure variables 
simultaneously or separately; therefore, it is important to consider the main 
income and expenditure components when analysing fiscal policy to have a full 
picture of the budgeting process. 
 
According to Bassanini and Duval (2006 p.11-14) the most common factors 
which affect unemployment are several policy and institutional determinants 
such as: unemployment benefits, taxes, trade union bargaining power, 
employment legislation, market regulation framework, employment policies, 
minimum wage and housing policies. Their reduced unemployment equation 
estimated for 20 OECD countries over the period 1982-2003 is: 
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𝑈it =  ∑ 𝛽𝑗  𝑋𝑖,𝑡
𝑗  
𝑗
+ 𝜒𝐺it + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + ∈𝑖𝑡                                                     (4.7) 
Where 𝑈it is the rate of unemployment, 𝐺it is the output gap, 𝛼𝑖 and 𝜆𝑡 are 
country and time fixed effects, while  𝑋𝑖,𝑡
𝑗
 are indicators for policies and 
institutions: tax burden, an average measure of unemployment benefits, rigidity 
of employment legislation, market regulation inflexibility across seven non-
manufacturing industries, union membership rates and degree of centralisation of 
wage negotiation, a proxy for corporatism. 
 
They use pooled cross country/time series with country and time fixed effects, 
where tax burden, average unemployment benefits and market regulation rigidity 
have a positive and significant relationship with unemployment, while the degree 
of corporatism and the output gap are negatively related with unemployment.  
Employment legislation and union concentration were not significant.  Regarding 
policy interactions, Bassanini and Duval conclude that reform packages have a 
higher impact on reducing unemployment than isolated reforms.  If reforms are 
“employment friendly” they will be complimentary to similar reforms in the 
same direction and reduce overall unemployment.  They also find a high 
correlation between the rate of home ownership and unemployment, 
acknowledging the fact of endogeneity.  No significant impact is found among 
minimum wage and unemployment.  Average labour market policy expenditures 
per unemployed as a percentage of GDP per capita are linked to lower levels of 
unemployment.  Moreover, different structural policy frameworks will generate 
distinctive employment outcomes. 
 
Labour market performance is related to unemployment and employment as well, 
since people decide to work according to education, leisure, policies and 
institutional framework. 
 
In this work, the approach is to use the same model utilised in my growth 
regression and simply change the dependent variable to employment in the case 
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of Mexican localities and to unemployment in the case of Latin American 
countries, although regression for employment and unemployment were 
estimated for both, data availability for employment is better in the case of 
Mexico and more observations are available for the case of unemployment in 
Latin America.  
 
4.4 Fiscal Policy Mix Country Analysis 
4.4.1 Fiscal policy model, methodology and data 
 
My empirical analysis considers 20 Latin American economies from 1994 to 
2010, with the purpose of outlining different income and expenditure trends and 
their impact on economic development.  The period of analysis is the same as in 
my Mexican states and municipalities study in order to be able to make it 
comparable.  As I did in my previous two chapters, I analyse the main income 
and expenditure components simultaneously, when evaluating changes in GDP 
per capita growth.  In order to test my hypothesis, I run regressions considering 
income or expenditure components separately and then together (detailed in the 
appendix) and my findings show that there is a difference between the 
coefficients in all three regressions with slightly more significant coefficients in 
my broader model. 
 
I apply a fixed effects panel data model with and without allowing for cross 
sectional dependence in my dataset, and it also includes as a matter of 
comparison the system GMM.  The corresponding Stata commands are “xtreg”, 
“xtabond2” and “xtscc”.  The specification tests are included before the 






Fiscal Policy Model 
 
The framework for my analysis is Gemmell’s Budget Government Constraint 
Model detailed in chapter two, however, I utilise a fixed effects panel data model 
allowing for cross sectional dependence in my baseline specification. 
 
Regression equation 
In this thesis in order to properly analyse fiscal variables, the estimation equation 
is as follows: 
 




i  = country 
 t  = time 
 ∝𝑖  = Fixed effect for each country i 
Y             = GDP per capita level 
R = Direct and indirect taxes or taxes on income, payroll and 
other income 
E = Acquisition of fixed assets and capital transfers or 
government consumption 
X          = Control variables (Trade, foreign direct investment, 
informal employment, poverty, time to start a business, 
expenditure per student, health expenditure per capita, 
R&D expenditure, roads paved and internet) 
             lit                = Country fixed effects component 
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             yit                = Year fixed effects component 
 
The main hypothesis is: 
 
∆𝑋𝑖𝑡 =  f(R𝑖𝑡−1 , 𝐸𝑖𝑡−1,   X 𝑖𝑡−1)                                                                     (4.9) 
 
The main income and spending variables should be considered when analysing 
the development of GDP per capita. 
 
Additionally, this study will analyse unemployment and its correlation with 
transfers and taxes levied as follows: 
𝐿𝑈𝑖,𝑡 = ∝𝑖 + 𝜃1𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1(𝑅)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2(𝐸)𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝜃2𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡(4.10)  
Where 
 𝐿𝑈 = Rate of formal unemployment in locality i at time t 
 
Data and choice of variables 
The Latin American countries analysed according to their level of government 
were:  Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.  The fiscal policy variables 
included were direct and indirect taxes, social contributions, current and capital 
expenditures in the case of central government; taxes on income, social security 
contributions, taxes on payroll, other taxes and government consumption in the 
case of general government.  The central government includes the institutional 
units which are controlled and financed by the central government.  The general 
government includes central, state and local government.  A detailed description 





The regression equation links growth with the fiscal variables afore mentioned as 
a share of total revenue or expenditure.  The control variables employed reflect 
the country level of development. 
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Table 4.9 List of Variables, Latin America Central Government 
 
Definition Mean Std. Dev. CV SourceSource
Growth Annual real gross domestic product per capita growth in percentage 0.0675 0.1242 183.8572 United Nations (2014); author's calculations.
Employment rate Employment rate 53.6400 5.2100 9.7129 International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT Database (2015); author´s calculations.
Unemployment rate Unemployment rate 8.6400 4.1800 48.3796 International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT Database (2015); author´s calculations.
Direct tax Direct taxes as a percentage of total goverment Income, multiplied by 100 0.0156 0.0642 412.2413 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC (2014); author's calculations.
Indirect tax Indirect taxes as a percentage of total government Income, multiplied by 100 0.0160 0.0653 407.2154 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC (2014); author's calculations.
Social contributions Social contributions as a percentage of total government Income, multiplied by 100 0.0203 0.0822 404.7652 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC (2014); author's calculations.
Current expenditure Current expenditure as a percentage of total government expenditure, multiplied by 100,000 0.8079 0.0876 10.8416 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC (2014); author's calculations.
Capital expenditure Capital investment as a percentage of total governement expenditure, multiplied by 100,000 0.1854 0.0863 46.5420 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC (2014); author's calculations.
Real gdp per capita Annual gross domestic product per capita level (2005=100), divided by 100,000 0.0360 0.0197 54.6522 United Nations (2014); author's calculations.
Minimum wage Average annual minimum wage (2005=100), divided by 100,000 0.0010 0.0002 24.3762 Latin America Economic Observatory, OBELA (2015); author's calculations.
Life expectancy Life expectancy at birth, in years, divided by 1,000 0.0719 0.0045 6.2397 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC (2014); author's calculations.
Population growth Annual percentage population growth rate, divided by 1,000 0.0015 0.0006 41.0270 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC (2014); author's calculations.
Primary education enrollment Primary education enrollment, in years 0.1403 0.0272 19.3844 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC (2014); author's calculations.
Total investment Total investment, private and public, as a percentage of GDPP, multiplied by 1,000 0.0200 0.0067 33.5185 IMF World Economic Outlook by Country, WEO (2013); author's calculations.
Potable water Proportion of the population using improved drinking water sources, divided by 10,000 0.0867 0.0091 10.4916 United Nations (2015); author's calculations.
Electric power consumption Electric power consumption (kWh per capita), divided by 100,000 0.0120 0.0079 65.7421 United Nations (2015); author's calculations.
Trade Trade as a share of gross domestic product, divided by 10,000 0.0619 0.0338 54.6421 World Bank (2015); author's calculations.
Foreign direct investment Foreign direct investment, net inflows as a percentage of GDPP, multiplied by 1,000 0.0031 0.0024 79.0899 World Bank (2015); author's calculations.
Informal employment Informal urban employment  as a percentage of urban employed population, divided by 10,000 0.0481 0.0086 17.9759 United Nations (2015); author's calculations.
High technology exports High technology exports as a percentage of manufactured exports, divided by 10,000 0.0008 0.0011 142.0201 United Nations (2015); author's calculations.
Poverty Poverty headcount ratio at $2 a day, percentage of population, divided by 10,000 0.0190 0.0115 60.3893 World Bank, World Development Indicators (2015); author's calculations.
Time to Start a Business Time required to start a business, in days 0.0009 0.0006 74.1422 World Bank, World Development Indicators (2015); author's calculations.
Expenditure per student, primary Government expenditure per student in primary as a percentage of GDP per capita 0.0107 0.0073 68.3881 World Bank, World Development Indicators (2015); author's calculations.
Health expenditure per capita Health expenditure per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international dollars) 0.0431 0.0278 64.3884 World Bank, World Development Indicators (2015); author's calculations.
Trns R&D expenditure Research and development expenditure as percentage of GDP 0.0232 0.0272 117.3559 World Bank, World Development Indicators (2015); author's calculations.
Road paved Roads paved as percentage of total roads 0.0256 0.0128 50.0762 World Bank, World Development Indicators (2015); author's calculations.
Telephone Fixed-telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants 0.0120 0.0079 65.4876 World Bank, World Development Indicators (2015); author's calculations.
Waste collection Total population served by municipal waste collection 0.0055 0.0038 67.7700 United Nations (2015); author's calculations.
Area sown Agricultural land as percentage of total land area 0.3535 0.6354 179.7228 World Bank, World Development Indicators (2015); author's calculations.







Table 4.10 List of Variables, Latin America General Government 
 
Definition Mean Std. Dev. CV SourceSource
Growth Annual real gross domestic product per capita growth in percentage 0.0670 0.1223 182.5024 United Nations (2014); author's calculations.
Employment rate Employment rate 53.6400 5.2100 9.7129 International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT Database (2015); author´s calculations.
Unemployment rate Unemployment rate 8.6400 4.1800 48.3796 International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT Database (2015); author´s calculations.
Taxes on income Direct taxes as a percentage of total goverment Income, multiplied by 100 3.6800 1.6425 44.6333 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC (2014); author's calculations.
Social security contributions Indirect taxes as a percentage of total government Income, multiplied by 100 2.9325 2.0240 69.0179 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC (2014); author's calculations.
Taxes on payroll Social contributions as a percentage of total government Income, multiplied by 100 0.2758 0.3316 120.2383 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC (2014); author's calculations.
Other taxes Current expenditure as a percentage of total government expenditure, multiplied by 100,000 0.2012 0.3558 176.8955 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC (2014); author's calculations.
Government consumption Capital investment as a percentage of total governement expenditure, multiplied by 100,000 11.7738 3.4666 29.4434 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC (2014); author's calculations.
Real gdp per capita Annual gross domestic product per capita level (2005=100), divided by 100,000 0.0347 0.0200 57.6465 United Nations (2014); author's calculations.
Minimum wage Average annual minimum wage (2005=100), divided by 100,000 0.0010 0.0002 23.9569 Latin America Economic Observatory, OBELA (2015); author's calculations.
Life expectancy Life expectancy at birth, in years, divided by 1,000 0.0714 0.0048 6.6831 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC (2014); author's calculations.
Population growth Annual percentage population growth rate, divided by 1,000 0.0015 0.0006 40.0788 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC (2014); author's calculations.
Primary education enrollment Primary education enrollment, in years 0.1416 0.0271 19.1656 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC (2014); author's calculations.
Total investment Total investment, private and public, as a percentage of GDPP, multiplied by 1,000 0.0198 0.0066 33.3925 IMF World Economic Outlook by Country, WEO (2013); author's calculations.
Potable water Proportion of the population using improved drinking water sources, divided by 10,000 0.0864 0.0091 10.4836 United Nations (2015); author's calculations.
Electric power consumption Electric power consumption (kWh per capita), divided by 100,000 0.0116 0.0078 67.7848 United Nations (2015); author's calculations.
Trade Trade as a share of gross domestic product, divided by 10,000 0.0616 0.0331 53.6892 World Bank (2015); author's calculations.
Foreign direct investment Foreign direct investment, net inflows as a percentage of GDPP, multiplied by 1,000 0.0032 0.0026 80.9425 World Bank (2015); author's calculations.
Informal employment Informal urban employment  as a percentage of urban employed population, divided by 10,000 0.0489 0.0091 18.6844 United Nations (2015); author's calculations.
High technology exports High technology exports as a percentage of manufactured exports, divided by 10,000 0.0009 0.0012 139.8221 United Nations (2015); author's calculations.
Poverty Poverty headcount ratio at $2 a day, percentage of population, divided by 10,000 0.0195 0.0114 58.3857 World Bank, World Development Indicators (2014); author's calculations.
Time to Start a Business Time required to start a business, in days 0.0008 0.0006 73.8440 World Bank, World Development Indicators (2015); author's calculations.
Expenditure per student, primary Government expenditure per student in primary as a percentage of GDP per capita 0.0109 0.0072 66.0231 World Bank, World Development Indicators (2015); author's calculations.
Health expenditure per capita Health expenditure per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international dollars) 0.0418 0.0277 66.0930 World Bank, World Development Indicators (2015); author's calculations.
Trns R&D expenditure Research and development expenditure as percentage of GDP 0.0234 0.0264 112.9873 World Bank, World Development Indicators (2015); author's calculations.
Road paved Roads paved as percentage of total roads 0.0246 0.0132 53.5990 World Bank, World Development Indicators (2015); author's calculations.
Telephone Fixed-telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants 0.0117 0.0078 66.6032 World Bank, World Development Indicators (2015); author's calculations.
Waste collection Total population served by municipal waste collection 0.0054 0.0035 64.7724 United Nations (2015); author's calculations.
Area sown Agricultural land as percentage of total land area 0.3542 0.6192 174.8061 World Bank, World Development Indicators (2015); author's calculations.










In this section, the proposed panel data model will be applied to my sample with 
the aim of determining the fiscal policy mix in two levels of government during 
the period of study and its impact on economic development.  This empirical 
estimation analyses the development of real GDP per capita growth as a function 
of taxes, expenditures and a set of control variables such as: lagged value of real 
GDP per capita, life expectancy, population growth and primary education 
enrollment.  
 
My estimations for countries are done considering cross-sectional dependence 
estimator which allowed me to account for autocorrelation and cross sectional 
dependence (Table 4.14 for central government and Table 4.18 for general 
government).  The variables added in my robustness checks are: trade, foreign 
direct investment, informal employment, poverty, time to start a business, 
expenditure per student, health expenditure per capita, R&D expenditure, roads 
paved and internet.  The specification tests are included before the regressions. 
 
Overall, the effect of taxes on growth was not significant at a central government 
level, however, in the case of general government the effect of taxes on income 
was negative and significant.  In Acosta-Ormaechea and Jiae Yoo study (2012) 
overall tax burden has a clear negative effect on growth, however they consider 
that there is a positive association of VAT with growth.  Although consumption 
taxes (indirect) have been seen as promoting savings, the empirical evidence is 
inconclusive (Johansson et al., 2008). Conversely, Fricke and Süssmuth (2014) 
find a positive long run revenue elasticity of income tax (personal and corporate) 
and VAT (internal and external) for 11 Latin American economies.  Canavire-
Bacarreza et al. (2013) find that personal income tax has a positive effect in Latin 
American growth, and small negative effects in the case of corporate income tax, 
while mixed effect on VAT.  In my case, since I am pooling countries which 




when I recalculate my regression by splitting the sample in two groups (low and 
middle income), my regression do not work. 
 
Martin-Mayoral and Uribe (2010) results show that the main factors to increase 
revenue in 18 Latin American economies are: the level of development, 
investment specialisation and trade, however, institutions, democracy and 
inequity play a fundamental role on government revenue.  Besides, Becerra 
(2013) study focus on several social factors which affect tax collection in 18 
Latin American economies such as: perception of evasion by peers, as well as 
government trust and approval, which are significant determinants of tax morale. 
 
In relation to government expenditure, acquisition of fixed assets has negative 
and significant effect on growth while capital transfers have a positive and 
significant effect at a central level, while government consumption coefficient is 
not significant at a general government level.  These results should be taken with 
caution since within the same country there are several problems when 
comparing similar concepts due to differences in reporting.  Likewise, when 
comparing statistics of different countries with several sources of information 
and with dissimilar methodological procedures, data might be misleading.  As 
mentioned throughout my dissertation, the lack of data has been a major 
drawback to further comparisons.  In my three empirical chapters, available 
variables have been different in each database, therefore, only partial 
comparisons have been possible.  Considering also the weak exogeneity within 
my variables, I can only provide partial correlations but not causality.  Clements 
et al. (2007) and Lora (2009) find that primary expenditures in Latin America 
have increased in a decade, particularly, social expenditures, however, there is a 
substantial opportunity to increase government efficiency.  Besides, Fernández‐
Arias and Montiel (2011) results suggest that productive public spending have 
been utilised during fiscal expansions in a sample of Latin American nations.  
Nonetheless, when I recalculate my regression by splitting the sample in two 
groups, so I can differentiate among the different economies (low and middle 





Turning to the control variables utilised, I find trade (Frankel and Romer, 1999) 
and foreign direct investment (Sala-i-Martin, 2004) have a positive impact on 
growth; while primary education enrollment (Barro and Lee, 1994) and informal 
employment have a negative coefficient; while roads paved coefficient (Barrios, 






Table 4.11 Fisher Unit Root Test 
 
 
Table 4.12 Heteroskesdasticity Test 
 
 
Table 4.13 Collinearity Test 
 
Unit Root Test I chi-squared p-value
Growth 169.00 0.00
Direct tax (Corporate) 50.38 0.03
Indirect tax 119.14 0.00
Wages and salaries 119.89 0.00
Aquisition of fixed assets 90.80 0.00
Capital transfers 83.71 0.00
Trade            111.24 0.00
Foreign direct investment 140.45 0.00
Informal employment 96.33 0.00
Poverty          100.82 0.00
Time to start a business          73.59 0.00
Expenditure per student 115.13 0.00
Health expenditure per capita 68.46 0.00
R&D expenditure 75.57 0.00
Roads paved 96.42 0.00
Internet          36.47 0.45
Test Value p-value
Mod. Wald test 86.25 0.00
Tolerance VIF
Direct tax (Corporate) 0.87 1.15
Indirect tax  0.59 1.69
Wages and salaries 0.38 2.60
Aquisition of fixed assets 0.67 1.50
Capital transfers 0.75 1.34
Real gdp per capita 0.20 4.98
Life expectancy 0.27 3.70
Population growth 0.50 1.99




















Poverty           
added
Time to start 















Internet           
added
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
-208.85 20.34* -208.85 -281.07 -333.68 -188.76 -259.71 -209.74 -267.93 -181.10 -550.70* -232.76 -247.15
(229.31) (12.20) (264.87) (215.04) (279.01) (247.17) (252.17) (265.25) (285.95) (243.64) (290.88) (264.93) (221.48)
-42.87 -8.85 -42.87 -0.98 -36.62 -16.91 -80.83 -50.96 -54.67 -54.78 -42.74 41.78 -35.02
(106.00) (43.18) (75.44) (67.19) (73.68) (63.57) (78.65) (74.82) (70.21) (78.99) (70.58) (86.02) (67.64)
-0.62** 0.12 -0.62*** -0.70*** -0.59** -0.60** -0.57** -0.63*** -0.59** -0.55** -0.41* -0.70*** -0.51*
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Notes: Dependent variable is real GDP per capita annual percentage growth rate. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Annual data for 1994-2010. All regressions also contain 
year dummies. Standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the country level, are reported in parentheses.  The estimators used are Fixed Effects, system GMM and the Discroll and Kraay 
(1998) which accounts for fixed cross-sectional effects, autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and cross sectional dependence.  ***(**/*) denotes statistically significant at the 1%(5%/10%).   
Countries included are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, 




Table 4.15 Fisher Unit Root Test 
 
 
Table 4.16 Heteroskesdasticity Test 
 
 
Table 4.17 Collinearity Test 
 
Unit Root Test I chi-squared p-value
Growth 85.89 0.00
Taxes on income 107.94 0.00
Taxes on payroll 77.73 0.00
Other taxes 113.66 0.00
Government consumption 112.40 0.00
Trade            111.24 0.00
Foreign direct investment 140.45 0.00
Informal employment 96.33 0.00
Poverty          100.82 0.00
Time to start a business          73.59 0.00
Expenditure per student 115.13 0.00
Health expenditure per capita 68.46 0.00
R&D expenditure 75.57 0.00
Roads paved 96.42 0.00
Internet          36.47 0.45
Test Value p-value
Mod. Wald test 92.70 0.00
Tolerance VIF
Taxes on income 0.42 2.41
Taxes on payroll 0.61 1.65
Other taxes 0.61 1.64
Government consumption 0.47 2.13
Real gdp per capita 0.30 3.34
Life expectancy 0.44 2.30
Population growth 0.39 2.60
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Notes: Dependent variable is real GDP per capita annual percentage growth rate. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Annual data for 1994-2010. All regressions also contain 
year dummies. Standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the country level, are reported in parentheses.  The estimators used are Fixed Effects, system GMM and the Discroll and Kraay 
(1998) which accounts for fixed cross-sectional effects, autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and cross sectional dependence.  ***(**/*) denotes statistically significant at the 1%(5%/10%).   
Countries included are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 







In this section, the proposed panel data model will be applied to my sample, with 
the aim of determining the fiscal policy mix in two levels of government during 
the period of study and its impact on economic development.  This empirical 
estimation analyses the development of unemployment as a function of taxes, 
expenditures and a set of control variables such as: lagged value of real GDP per 
capita, growth, minimum wage, life expectancy, population growth and primary 
education enrollment.  
 
My estimations for countries were done considering cross-sectional dependence 
estimator which allowed me to account for autocorrelation and cross-sectional 
dependence (Table 4.14 for central government and Table 4.18 for general 
government).  The variables added in my robustness checks are: trade, foreign 
direct investment, informal employment, poverty, time to start a business, 
expenditure per student, health expenditure per capita, R&D expenditure, roads 
paved and internet.  The specification tests are included before the regressions. 
 
Taxes are not significant in the central government but when analysing the 
General Government, other taxes show a significant and positive effect on 
unemployment which is consistent with the explanation given in section 3.2.1.  
Additionally, current expenditure is positive and significant while acquisition of 
fixed assets presents fixed results in the central government.  However, 
government consumption increases unemployment considering the general 
government. 
 
Turning to other regressors, minimum wage impacts negatively unemployment, 






Table 4.19 Fisher Unit Root Test 
 
 
Table 4.20 Heteroskesdasticity Test 
 
 
Table 4.21 Collinearity Test 
 
Unit Root Test I chi-squared p-value
Unemplpoyment 85.89 0.00
Direct tax (Corporate) 50.38 0.03
Indirect tax 119.14 0.00
Other current expenditure 218.41 0.00
Aquisition of fixed assets 90.80 0.00
Trade            111.24 0.00
Foreign direct investment 140.45 0.00
Informal employment 96.33 0.00
Poverty          100.82 0.00
Time to start a business          73.59 0.00
Expenditure per student 115.13 0.00
Health expenditure per capita 68.46 0.00
R&D expenditure 75.57 0.00
Roads paved 96.42 0.00
Internet          36.47 0.45
Test Value p-value
Mod. Wald test 128.98 0.00
Tolerance VIF
Direct tax (Corporate) 0.83 1.21
Indirect tax  0.66 1.52
Other current expenditure 0.94 1.06
Aquisition of fixed assets 0.62 1.63
Real gdp per capita 0.33 3.06
Minimum wage 0.78 1.28
Life expectancy 0.32 3.15
Population growth 0.50 2.00








































Internet           
added
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
0.08* 3.04* 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.13** 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.06
(0.04) (1.68) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07)
-0.69 -83.96*** -0.69 -0.71 -0.76 -0.94 -1.76 1.27 0.13 -1.73 0.10 0.61 -0.65
(3.81) (12.71) (3.08) (3.22) (3.21) (2.95) (2.97) (3.31) (4.01) (2.76) (2.98) (3.70) (3.57)
0.41*** 0.74*** 0.41** 0.41** 0.41** 0.41** 0.39* 0.46** 0.41** 0.28 0.31 0.42** 0.45**
(0.14) (0.07) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.24) (0.19) (0.17)
-0.05 -0.18*** -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 0.00 -0.07 -0.10** -0.14*** -0.07 -0.07
(0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07)
-0.85 -150.19*** -0.85* -0.81* -0.87* -0.81 -0.61 -1.43*** -0.40 -2.30*** -0.33 -0.95** -0.82*
(0.56) (10.83) (0.43) (0.46) (0.41) (0.49) (0.40) (0.41) (0.34) (0.68) (1.07) (0.41) (0.43)
-33.70*** -1.32*** -33.70*** -36.12*** -34.51*** -32.48** -34.10** -22.01** -51.73*** -32.55** -38.16** -33.04** -38.02**
(11.21) (0.08) (10.97) (11.22) (11.51) (11.24) (11.74) (7.97) (6.46) (11.90) (13.70) (12.24) (15.02)
12.18** 53.86*** 12.18** 13.03*** 11.65** 11.83** 12.72** 6.03* 13.55*** 18.72*** 10.61 12.06** 13.72**
(4.85) (2.30) (4.18) (3.97) (4.53) (4.09) (4.33) (3.21) (4.34) (3.73) (6.34) (4.49) (5.24)
3.51 -31.16*** 3.51 4.70 4.37 0.50 -1.87 34.86 14.30 14.93 8.65 7.83 1.02
(19.25) (3.81) (18.49) (17.95) (19.10) (16.97) (18.91) (24.19) (21.70) (19.39) (23.93) (19.41) (20.81)
0.22 -0.45*** 0.22 0.21 0.23 0.19 0.23 0.20 0.23 0.10 0.19 0.22 0.27





















147 157 147 147 147 147 147 147 136 147 125 147 138
13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 12 13 11 13 12
3.711*** 318.1*** 9984*** 26492*** 4414*** 13157*** 14564*** 19292*** 1958*** 24447*** 33310*** 2646*** 799.4***
0.447 --- 0.447 0.454 0.449 0.453 0.458 0.540 0.496 0.506 0.430 0.451 0.463
F - statistic
Real gdp per capita
Expenditure per student





Poverty          
Time to start a business          






Aquisition of fixed assets
Fiscal policy variables
Direct tax (Corporate)









Notes: Dependent variable is Unemployment rate. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Annual data for 1994-2010. All regressions also contain year dummies. Standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the 
country level, are reported in parentheses.  The estimators used are Fixed Effects, system GMM and the Discroll and Kraay (1998) which accounts for fixed cross-sectional effects, autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity 
and cross sectional dependence.  ***(**/*) denotes statistically significant at the 1%(5%/10%).   Countries included are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 





Table 4.23 Fisher Unit Root Test 
 
 
Table 4.24 Heteroskesdasticity Test 
 
 
Table 4.25 Collinearity Test 
 
 
Unit Root Test I chi-squared p-value
Unemployment 85.89 0.00
Taxes on income 107.94 0.00
Taxes on payroll 77.73 0.00
Other taxes 113.66 0.00
Government consumption 112.40 0.00
Trade            111.24 0.00
Foreign direct investment 140.45 0.00
Informal employment 96.33 0.00
Poverty          100.82 0.00
Time to start a business          73.59 0.00
Expenditure per student 115.13 0.00
Health expenditure per capita 68.46 0.00
R&D expenditure 75.57 0.00
Roads paved 96.42 0.00
Internet          36.47 0.45
Test Value p-value
Mod. Wald test 40.24 0.00
Tolerance VIF
Taxes on income 0.38 2.63
Taxes on payroll 0.60 1.66
Other taxes 0.57 1.76
Government consumption 0.52 1.94
Real gdp per capita 0.30 3.34
Minimum wage 0.71 1.41
Life expectancy 0.43 2.33
Population growth 0.33 2.99
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Notes: Dependent variable is Unemployment rate. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Annual data for 1994-2010. All regressions also contain year dummies. Standard errors, adjusted for 
clustering at the country level, are reported in parentheses.  The estimators used are Fixed Effects, system GMM and the Discroll and Kraay (1998) which accounts for fixed cross-sectional effects, 
autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and cross sectional dependence.  ***(**/*) denotes statistically significant at the 1%(5%/10%).   Countries included are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 







The effect of the fiscal variables on growth and employment in Latin American 
countries might be offsetting because I am pooling countries which have 
different levels of development, but unfortunately, due to lack of data, I was 
unable to run separate regressions by income group.  Overall my results in this 
section are weak since different countries have different methods of reporting 
and I use several sources of information with different methodological 
procedures.  The idea of comparing two different levels of government was to be 
able to get an insight of the different effect of fiscal variables in each level of 
government but my figures are inconsistent and unreliable.  As mentioned 
throughout my dissertation, the lack of data has been a major drawback to further 
comparisons.  Latin America also presents corruption, weak institutional 
framework and informal employment.  However, an interesting insight that can 
be derived from the analysis of Latin American countries is that in order to get 
better results and understand the particular reality of several economies, the local 
analysis of countries is essential, since the aggregate data can give misleading 
results.  Consequently, the relevance of focalised fiscal policy turns to be 






5. A Social Perspective of Public Finances 
 
The first part of the chapter refers to several surveys of public opinion conducted 
to understand public policy, the challenges, the limitations and the use of surveys 
to complement statistics and public financial reports.  The second part makes a 
general description of survey methodologies.  The third part of the chapter refers 
to the perception "policy makers" have regarding different kinds of taxes levied 
and several types of expenditure utilised and their impact on GDPpc.  The fourth 
part of the chapter refers to the opinion people have of the development of fiscal 
policy, tax levied, governmental resources, spending efficiency, degree of 
satisfaction of services provided, considering the regional surveys provided by 
Latinobarómetro 2008-2010. 
 
5.1 Challenges and limitations of Surveys of Public Opinion 
 
Brooker and Schaefer (2006) emphasise that there has been a new academic 
interest of public opinion in order to study in a systematised way what people 
think about their governments.  In reality, there are several channels that 
government leaders have in order to learn what people think about certain issues.  
Informal ways to measure public opinion can be elections, interest groups and 
lobbying, the media, letters and calls, protests and straw polls.  Formal 
quantitative methods include sample surveys, for example, face to face 
interviews, telephone interviews and mail surveys. In this respect, it is important 
to consider the population, the sample and the randomness because if not 
everybody is given an equal chance of being selected, the sample can be biased.  
Questions addressed have to be clear and impartial.  The main advantage of 
survey research is that it enables the projection or generalisation of the entire 
population. Likewise, when surveys are properly utilised, they can predict 
behaviour very accurately.  Some drawbacks of surveys are superficiality, lack of 
time to reflect, not enough information and problems in operationalising the 




mail analysis.  Formal qualitative methods include in-depth interviews and focus 
groups which allow the researcher to understand the perspective and thought 
pattern of people.  However, the main disadvantage of qualitative research is that 
results are not projectable.   
 
According to Braun and Straw (2009), in modern politics there is a continuous a 
flow of information between politics, media and the general public, possible only 
in democratic governments.  Braun (2011) considers that surveys have 
demonstrated to be a tool to understand the point of view of different segments of 
the society, to detect attitudes, preferences, values and population behaviour 
among very diverse societies.  Research on public opinion in Latin America 
refers in some cases to successful management such as Ibope in Brazil, Datos in 
Venezuela, Admirak in Chile or Apoyo in Peru.  The corporation 
Latinobarómetro, the Centro de Estudios Públicos or the Centro de Estudios de la 
Realidad Contemporánea of Chile have also been a successful approach.  The 
importance of debates and research on public opinion can certainly enrich 
democracies and allow citizens get involved and feel part of their community.  In 
order to exercise the liberty of developing surveys, a normative and legal 
framework has to be properly established.  Moreover, surveys can democratise 
public action since they put in hands of the citizens relevant information and 
empowers them to be part of the public life. 
 
Surveys of public opinion are a technique of social research that has reached a 
solid position in modern societies and they have had an increasing role in the 
public agenda.  Surveys have become a tool to orientate the decision of public 
and private agents; they are used by politicians, parties and governments and are 
valuable to understand the opinion and trust of a society in certain topics of 
public interest, public policy for example (Huneeus, 2010). 
 
In the last 15 years, we have witnessed an increment in social participation in 




development and consolidate the democratic system.  However, Latin America is 
still behind compared to other developed nations.  Mexico in particular, has 
shown some progress in its regulations and legal framework, however, effective 
participation of citizens and social groups is still not fully developed in the 
evaluation of public policies.  There is still not enough experience in the 
promotion of social participation and low confidence in its effectiveness 
(Cardozo, 2008). 
 
Tolosa et al. (2012, p.77) propose a qualitative survey addressed to experts with 
the aim of constructing an index that evaluates public administration 
continuously.  Their methodology considers seven topics to analyse in a different 
context to financial, the perception of institutional performance. They consider a 
simplified survey so as to follow up responsibilities and good practices in the 
design of surveys of public opinion.  The main result is the development of an 
evaluation instrument of public affairs that is alternative to financial reports and 
useful to understand and identify the impact of public policy in society.   
 
De Haan et al. (2013, p.423) utilise a panel fixed-effects model to analyse 15 
members of the European Union between 1984 and 2003.  Their results suggest 
that a strong budget establishment reduces the deficit propensity and promotes 
fiscal discipline even in case of ideological fragmentation.  Moreover, when 
analysing public sector reform in Denmark, Greve (2003, p.269) finds that it is 
important to consider the organisational transformation and evaluation of the 
public sector in a systematic way.  Lybek and Morris (2004, p.37) conduct a 
survey of 101 central bank laws in 113 countries and conclude that an 
appropriate balance between functions of the governing entities, simplicity and 
country specific factors should be taken into account in order to achieve good 
governance that complies efficiently with the objectives, tasks and functions of 






An interesting result derived from the panel data research of Bhattacharyya and 
Hodler (2014, p.101) in 133 economies during the period 1970-2005 is that when 
countries have natural resources and weak political institutions, this combination 
can inhibit financial development.  El Anshasy et al. (2013, p.285) analyse 79 
countries from 1984 to 2008 with a panel data approach to study the relationship 
between natural resources, corruption and bad economic performance.  Their 
findings show that better governance, a solid democracy, strong institutions, 
transparency and accountability of resources, lead to a good financial 
performance and higher economic growth.  Eslava (2011, p.645) suggests that 
conflicts of interest between different groups or regions can enhance fiscal 
deficits. Kirchgässner, G. (2001, p.1) finds that an adequate constitutional 
framework and proper budget procedures are effective in promoting fiscal 
discipline and considers that citizens approve sound fiscal policy.  
 
According to the work of Hayo and Neumeier (2014, p.198), recent 
developments in behavioural economics have showed that psychology and 
sociology, among other social sciences, have become useful tools to understand 
empirical and economic models.  Their most robust finding in their panel data 
approach in Germany, suggests that a prime’s minister socioeconomic 
background influences fiscal performance.  Prime ministers from a poorer 
socioeconomic upbringing are more prone to higher public spending and debt.  
Jochimsen, B. and Thomasius, S. (2014, p.390) test with a dynamic panel data 
the personal characteristics of finance ministers in German states from 1960 to 
2009 and find that their professional background and field of experience 
influence the fiscal position of a locality.  Besides, Remund (2010, p.276) talks 
about the importance of strategies to improve financial literacy of public policy 
officials. 
 
During the process of evaluating the public administration in Mexico, not only 
the quantitative measurement of goals and impact of a particular policy was 
considered but also some interviews of public servants in their area of influence.  




of each federal program, has been a major development in accountability and 
transparency (Lira, 2005).  However, according to the Ministry of Finance 
(SHCP, 2017), the system is developing gradually in Mexican states and 
municipalities during 2017 and 2018, respectively.  The 2017 diagnostic of the 
32 Mexican states shows that state average has a progress of 65.3 points and 
among the 62 municipalities of the sample, 22 have a high degree of 
implementation.  May (2004, p.1) describes that Ministers of Finance have to 
prioritise the allocation of resources among different suitable options, have to 
identify the optimal policy, provide evidence for their macroeconomic strategy, 
consider diverse scenarios and long-term impact.  In this respect, the 
involvement of civil society in the formulation and monitoring of public policies 
is essential for the provision of the expected outcomes.   
 
5.2 Survey methodologies at a glance 
 
Small surveys can give a rough idea of what people think instead of guessing.  
They are most commonly used to collect data.  Surveys are even considered as 
social research because they require collection of information from individuals 
with a structured questionnaire.  In developing countries, surveys are applied in 
person, by telephone or mail and respondents are carefully selected.  The number 
of questions and the population sample is typically kept small.  Probability 
sample would be desirable but sometimes it is not possible because of time and 
cost constraints.  Among the advantages of mini surveys, we can find that they 
are fast, require low time to be completed and analysed, present minimum errors 
and provide low cost; while their disadvantages are that is it not possible to 
generalise, or make thorough statistical analysis and credibility.  Mini surveys 
are not a substitute for large surveys that study social and economic phenomena, 
however, they are useful when there is limited time and resources.  Mini surveys 
can be a preface for more developed surveys.  There are basically seven steps to 
develop a Mini Survey: 1) Formulate a study objective 2) Review the literature 
3) Prepare survey questions 4) Design the questionnaire 5) Choose the type of 






However, bigger scale surveys can be conducted for a broader analysis in order 
to understand particular financial and economic activity.  Graham and Harvey 
(2001, p. 187-191, p.232) survey 392 Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) regarding 
the cost of capital, capital budgeting, and capital structure (9% response rate).  
Their findings show that large companies rely on Net Present Value (NPV) and 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) while small firms use the payback 
principle. A considerable number of companies evaluate firm instead of project 
risk when considering new investments.  Corporations ponder financial 
flexibility and credit ratings when making debt decisions.  In a pilot survey, 
Duke University Graduate MBA students provided feedback to make corrections, 
so the final survey contained 15 questions.  The survey was delivered by mail to 
each CFO in the 1998 Fortune 500 list.  The Financial Executives Institute faxed 
out 4,440 surveys to their members.  To encourage the rate of response, they 
offered copy of the results.  The sample of companies contrast from very small 
(26%) with sales of less than $100 million, to very large (42%) that have sales of 
at least $1 billion.  Their results confirm that small companies are less 
sophisticated when evaluating risky projects.  
 
Moran et al. (2007, p.42-45), contrast two different methods for determining 
priorities in agri-environmental Scottish policy.  Multifunctional agriculture 
establishes a new balance among traditional commodity support and the payment 
for manufacturing non-market goods.  The latter presents inconveniences for 
optimal policy design.  Considering public focus groups, certain key 
characteristics were established of Scottish public’s preferences for agri-
environmental reform. This information was combined in two separate survey 
methods using the analytical hierarchy process and choice experiments. Their 






Pollitt, C. (1995, p.149-151) considers that there are underpinnings of the new 
public management because further analysis needs to be made regarding 
benchmarking, properly quantification of costs, inequity in the provision of 
public services, self-interest and dishonest behaviour, organised crime and 
corruption.  Therefore, large-scale surveys to public service government officials 
and citizens should be undertaken in a systematised way over a long period of 
time.  Furthermore, considering the difference among localities, low income 
localities population may lack the time and resources to make good decisions and 
do not have enough experience to evaluate adequately certain service delivery 
(Abadzi, 2013, p.115).  Hence, local governments must understand the provision 
of public services within the context of people of limited literacy. 
  
Garb et al. (2007, p.3), develop 32 Environmental Impact Assessment in order to 
evaluate the prospective effects of certain policy measures on the natural 
environment.  These types of instruments are useful to ponder the realisation of 
certain project or not, involving complex trade-offs among natural resources, 
society and economy i.e. a new highway that is planned to run through a natural 
reserve that can alter endangered species and affect local inhabitants; the 
preventive measures for the development of a new airport which generates high 
pollution and affects the surrounding environment. 
 
A topic that has increasingly brought attention is the role of corruption in the 
health sector, therefore, policymakers should establish certain parameters to 
make the process of service delivery to the population transparent and 
monitorable to fight corruption in the health sector.  Behavioural scientists 
describe the individual and social characteristics which influence the behaviour 
of government agents and individuals. Vian, T. (2008, p.83) describes several 
methodologies that measure how opportunities and pressures motivate corruption 





5.3 Mexican framework 
 
Mexico has a complex network of intergovernmental fiscal relations with a high 
degree of centralization of public revenue and with limited taxing powers for 
states and municipalities.  Own income for the latter is limited, which poses an 
extremely complex situation in terms of the resources that are available to 
perform public expenditure.  During 1988 and as part of an exercise in 
strengthening federalism and modernization of the states in Mexico, the federal 
government promoted a strategy of decentralization to encourage a balanced 
regional development by the coordination between both the federal and state 
levels as explained in chapter four. 
 
Mexico has been promoting during the last decades a scheme for greater 
autonomy, fiscal responsibility and accountability for their local governments.  
Article 40 of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States provides 
that "it is the will of the Mexican people to become a Republic representative, 
democratic, federal, composed of free and sovereign states in everything 
concerning his regime inside but states in a Federation".  Each entity has its own 
Constitution, which is subject to the Federal Constitution.  Within each state the 
municipalities are autonomous, with capacity to manage freely their finance, 
which integrates with the contributions on the ownership of real estate, the 
federal shares and the income derived from the provision of public services 
(Amieva-Huerta, 2002). 
 
Regarding budget design, it is relevant to consider not only fiscal planners’ 
perspectives, but also the particular needs of the local population, since they must 
be satisfied with the services provided by their local government.  Sørensen 
(1995 p.137-138) stated that spending preferences are related to existing public 
service levels and the demographic characteristics of the local population.  
Certain parties influence politicians’ resource allocations, considering legislative 
committees and public-sector employment framework, therefore, the demand 




link the actual revenue and spending figures from the 32 Mexican States to the 
perception people have of taxes levied and government spending, considering the 
regional survey provided by Latinobarómetro 2008, 2009 and 2010.  Moreover, a 
survey has been conducted in the 32 Mexican States to understand the opinion of 
government officials with respect the tax-expenditure mix, therefore, this 
analysis will allow me to somehow link voter’s preference to politician 
preferences and actual public service satisfaction. 
 
Governments in different countries function within diverse types of democracy, 
institutions and degrees of participation by citizens.  The national, state and local 
framework for citizens is much more complex than it used to be decades ago.  In 
addition, the relationship between economic performance and the size of the 
public sector is positive when additional infrastructure and labour is required to 
reach an optimal production in a given economy.  This means that if a 
government is too small, more infrastructure would be necessary in order to 
provide the population with the necessary public services, generate more 
employment and be able to increase productivity of the economy measured as 
GDP per capita. However, production will only increase until it reaches a 
maximum and beyond that point a negative effect is reached, where government 
activity offsets the positive performance.  Regarding which, developed 
economies seem to have reached the negative situation (Mueller, 2003, p.530-
531, 560).  As this current thesis suggest, the satisfaction of services provided, 
accountability and transparency of the use of resources are vital ingredients in 
order to achieve compliance with the taxation regime and hence, increase 
government revenue.  This in turn could generate a virtuous circle, major 
accountability and transparency, major credibility, major tax compliance and 
better services provided. This current study will illustrate that lack of confidence 
in the local government is related with lower levels of growth. 
 
In recent years, there has been a systematic deterioration in local public finances 
in several Mexican states and municipalities, therefore there was a need to amend 




would enable states and municipalities acquire healthy, sound and sustainable 
public finances (Diario Oficial de la Federación 25/05/2015).  Moreover, the 
Congress approved the “Law of Financial Discipline for States and 
Municipalities” in March 2016, which entered into force on April 27 of 2016.  
The main objectives of this law are to promote sustainable local finances, 
establish rules of financial discipline, the responsible use of indebtedness and 
transparency.  This legislation allows local finances to be sustainable in the 
medium and long-term.  Citizens can have access to the public information 
regarding debt levels of all local public entities which have contracted debt. This 
law lowers the cost of funding for responsible local governments.  The Law of 
Financial Discipline allows Mexicans to monitor the use of public resources and 
have a better idea of how debt in their state or municipality is being invested. 
(Diario Oficial de la Federación 27/04/2016).  The process of implementation of 
this law, has been gradual in local states and municipalities during 2017 but it is 
important in order to improve accountability, transparency and the responsible 
use of resources. 
 
According to Zamora Saenz (2017, p.2), Mexico has a grade of 30 points in the 
public-sector corruption perception index of Transparency International.  
Corruption is the 6th most important problem in the country as stated by Mexican 
citizens.  Three out of ten Mexicans were affected in 2016 by a corruption act.  
Fifty-five percent of the affected population, had a corruption issue in relation to 
public security.  Forty-three percent of the interviewed population is willing to 
pay money to have an agile public service.  Furthermore, María Amparo Casar, 
President of “Mexicans against Corruption and Impunity” demands justice for 
the 11 prosecuted ex-governors that have been charged of money laundering, 
organised crime, operations with resources of illicit origin, diversion of funds, 
influence trading and abuse of functions (Becerril, 2017, p.1).  Although this 
work does not explicitly measure corruption or has a variable that attempts to 
quantity it, the fact that my analysis shows low confidence and trust in local 
governments, could be explained by lack of transparency, accountability and 





Moreover, on July 2016 new anti-corruption legislation is introduced: The 
General Law of Administrative Liabilities, the General Law of the National Anti-
Corruption System, the Organic Law of the Administrative Justice Federal Court, 
and the Federal Accounting and Accountability Law.  Additional reforms have 
been implemented in existing legislation such as the Federal Criminal Code, the 
Organic Law of the Federal Public Administration, among others.  Some of these 
anti-corruption measures were first presented to the Congress at the beginning of 
2016 through a citizen petition process promoting transparency in the public 
sector (Sean Hecker et al., 2016, p.1).  In the first control system plenary meeting 
during June 2017, the Auditor General of Mexico, condemned the fraudulent 
attempts by local governments to hide their real budget circumstances and 
compromised with transparency, accountability and sound public finances (Red 
por la Rendición de Cuentas, 2017, p.8).   
 
For the first time in Mexico, during 2009 the Government Survey of Public 
Security and Justice is launched.  Its objective is to collect, generate and 
distribute information of local public administration and offer timely specialised 
information with good quality and design.  This survey would be a tool for the 
design of public policy at a municipal level, their organisational structure, their 
regulatory framework and their process for public security and justice (INEGI, 
2017).  Although this survey is important to understand local organisation, the 
focus is mainly for security and justice, therefore, the Mini Survey I conduct with 
Ministries of Finance is a noteworthy attempt to understand their opinion 
regarding local finances.  Numbers and reports are a valuable tool for measuring 
the development of local public finances, however, it is sensible to take into 
account the perspective of decision makers which are involved in the process of 
budgeting and spending. 
 
Although I didn´t find in the literature another similar survey as the one I 
conducted in this work, in my professional experience in several local ministries 




public servants with the mission and vision of the Ministry, the proper and 
adequate functional and administrative organisation  and the synergies developed 
within different areas (revenue, spending, audit, control and legal teams) are a 
vital ingredient in the success of local fiscal policy.  The role of the Minister as a 
leader, his background and experience, is substantial in the accomplishment of 
sound public finances.  In the next section, I will explain in further detail how do 
I develop my survey.   
 
This present study considers people´s satisfaction with the services provided in 
Mexican states during the period 1998-2010, finding that around 50% of the 
people in the 162 localities included in the Latinobarómetro surveys do not think 
that paying taxes makes them good citizens.  Moreover, about 70% of the people 
interviewed do not trust or have little confidence on the local government.  For 
half of the people considered in the surveys, the satisfaction with municipal 
service provision is marginal or people is not satisfied with overall services. 
 
5.3.1 Rationale of the Survey 
 
Legislation cannot be isolated from the manner that resources are received and 
channelled in practice.  Therefore, as an exercise to link public finances with 
growth I conduct a survey in the 32 Mexican states to understand the opinion of 
government officials with respect to the tax-expenditure mix.  The survey is 
carried out during 2014-2015 and administered by the author, after considering 
suggestions of field-experts from INEGI in Mexico.  In the meetings held with 
experts of INEGI during 2013, they told me that it was not until 2011 that the 
National Census of Governmental Municipalities was made, although a pilot 
survey of security and justice was held in 2009.  The objective of INEGI’s 
survey is to collect and disseminate statistical information regarding management 
and performance of public institutions at a municipal level, in order to be able to 
monitor and evaluate government activities.  However, questions are mostly 





Conversely, the intention of my survey is actually to address several sources of 
revenue and expenditure, and listen to governmental official voice regarding 
their perspective on the impact of fiscal policy variables on growth.  Financial 
and periodic reports of local public finances are available through the Congress, 
the Ministry of Finance, the Institute of Technical Development of the Public 
Budget (INDETEC) or the National Institute of Statistics and Geography, 
though, they are most likely to be analysed and discussed by technicians and 
experts in public affairs.  A more approachable and friendly description of the 
most relevant issues in local public finances can be found in diverse media, 
research institutes or consultancy firms, nonetheless, a systematic follow up 
through surveys to public finance government officials could be considered as an 
additional tool for understanding the context of local public finances. 
 
Objective of my survey: Understand the perception of fiscal policy makers with 
respect to certain income and expenditure components and their impact on 
growth. 
 
Preparation and design of survey questions:  I interviewed José Luis Guzmán 
Tellez, in charge of the sociodemographic surveys and administrative registers in 
the National Institute of Statistics and Geography and Gabriel Quintero Ramírez, 
advisor in statistics and attention to the public.  I held 5 interviews in July and 
August of 2013 with Mr. Guzmán Tellez.  He told me which questions were not 
clear in order to make them more precise and specific.  During the same period, I 
had 2 talks with Mr. Quintero Ramirez to consider his recommendations in 
making my survey clearer and understandable.  Additionally, throughout the last 
quarter of 2013,  I questioned Juan Amieva Huerta (former Minister of Finance 
of Veracruz), Silvano Espíndola (former Treasurer of Mexico City’s Ministry of 
Finance), Luis Octavio Alvarado (former Chief of Advisors of the Mexican State 
Ministry), Luis García Sotelo (former Director of the Institute of Technical 
Development of the Public Budget) and Alejandro Pérez Hernández 




receive their feedback in relation to my survey and have a more in-depth 
understanding of their own personal experience in the public administration with 
respect to the decision making process. 
 
Informal sampling and mode of contact: I decided to contact the 32 Ministries of 
Finance and the chief advisor in the state local governments.  Considering time 
and cost constraints, I distributed the survey by email and made telephone calls 
in order to assure that my email had been received.   
 
Among the questionnaires I directed to the Ministers of Finance and chiefs of 
advisors, there was a considerable amount of distrust of several local government 
officials regarding the real purpose of my survey.  Only 25 percent of the states 
where covered and the other 75 percent were reluctant to provide any 
information at all.  Amongst the Ministers of Finance and their staff, forty-four 
questionnaires were completed.  The reduced size of my sample does not allow 
me to develop further data or regression analysis and the results cannot be 
generalised.  This survey has been useful to have an insight of a few policy 
makers’ perception concerning   the income-expenditure mix but certainly can be 
an outline to a more in-depth analysis and research development.  For instance, it 
would be desirable to analyse weather their perception of the tax-mix matches 
the actual figures and to extend the survey to organisational income-expenditure 
teams so the consistency of the fiscal policy can be examined. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the rationale for conducting the survey was to understand 
to what extent fiscal policy operators in localities believe fiscal variables affect 
growth or not.  The survey focused on own source fiscal variables but there was 
also one question related to the impact of federal fiscal policy on growth.  The 








As explained in chapter two, the central government plays a fundamental role in 
the redistribution of income, but local governments are the closest providers of 
public services and must guarantee the effective implementation of public 
policies (Oates, 1999). 
 
Table 5.1 Fiscal policy planners’ opinion of fiscal variables effect  
on GDP growth 
 
 
Policy makers in my sample, acknowledge the fact that Federal Fiscal Policy is 
relevant in locality growth (40-56 %) and that there is scope for improving the 
local taxing power (33-37%).  The significance of the effect of taxes on GDP 
growth is (19-65%) in the case of direct taxation and (26-51%) for indirect 
taxation.  The relevance of local income is (21-40%). The higher the percentage 








Effect of Direct Taxes on GDP growth 19% 65% 14% 2%
Effect of Indirect Taxes on GDP growth 26% 51% 19% 5%
Effect of Local Income on GDP growth 21% 40% 40% 0%
Effect of Federal Income on GDP growth 49% 44% 7% 0%
Effect of Current Expenditure on GDP growth 21% 40% 35% 5%
Effect of Capital Expenditure on GDP growth 28% 47% 23% 2%
Effect of Federal Fiscal Policy on GDP growth 56% 40% 2% 2%





Rank or position 70% 21% 5% 5%
Up to 3 years 4 to 6 years 7 to 10 years
More than 11 
years
Years of Experience 23% 23% 19% 35%




the percentage of own resources, the higher dependence on federal transfers and 
the less possibility of local action. 
 
In the case of current and capital expenditure and its effect on growth the results 
were (28-47%) and (40-56%).  In several interviews held during the development 
of the survey, fiscal planners said that the effect of cutting expenditures or 
implementing new taxes had an immediate impact on local productive activities, 
therefore on growth.  For instance, when there were periods of layoffs or 
adjustments of expenditures, several local businesses closed and economic 
activity in the locality decreased.  Simple taxes that were easy to administrate 
where the most efficient in increasing revenue of the local government.  
Summarizing, the government officials that answered the survey considered that 
fiscal policy had a significant effect on growth and only (2-5%) thought it was 
not significant. 
 
Among the sample of government officials that participated in my questionnaire, 
70% were advisors while only 10% were in the category of Minister and 
Undersecretary.  Considering the years of experience in public finances, 23% had 
up to three years of experience and 54% had practiced more than seven years in 
the field.  Public finance is a specialised field where the professionals that work 
in the local government at an advisory level are more likely to stay working in 
the local governments and develop their expertise, while the top-level 
government officials change every six years in states and every three years in 
municipalities.   
 
There is a high level of rotation in the local governments.  The Governor for 
instance, might select its Ministers considering loyalty, partisan interests and 
ideology.  Sometimes even if the technical staff belongs to the same party, upper 
and middle management levels change significantly with a new government, 
particularly at a municipal level.  Furthermore, when the ruling party switches, 




professional career service has been working since 2003, but it would be 
desirable to implement a similar system at a local level in order to guarantee the 
technical capacity required to develop public services efficiently (Alcaldes de 
México, 2013, p.1). 
 
Considering that the municipality is the closest provider of public services, it 
would be necessary that the use of its resources to projects, programs and 
investment is clear and transparent, hence local public officials should be 
accountable for the use of funds.  As mentioned in the previous section, new 
regulation in the area of accountability, transparency and anti-corruption have 
been enacted during 2016, which will certainly help in the process of fighting 
opacity in the use of public money and encourage trust among the local 
community.  As an extension to my study, it would be helpful to promote a 
survey for municipal government officials, as a supplement to financial and 
budget reports, because this type of instruments, organised in a systematic way 
can allow people of the general public to better understand local public finances 
and enables public action to bridge the gap with the society. 
 
Finally, according to the feedback obtained during the development of my 
survey, it would be advisable that local government officials take advantage of 
the prevalent technological instruments, available training programs, broaden the 
cooperation and coordination within the different areas of the Ministry of 
Finance and with other Ministries, develop strategic alliances with universities, 
research and statistics institutes and keep up to date their organisational and 







Graph 5.1 Fiscal policy planners’ opinion of fiscal variables effect  





































































































































Source: Own elaboration with self-developed survey in 32 Mexican states (2014)
Mean by Group
Effect of Direct Taxes on GDP growth
































































































































Source: Own elaboration with self-developed survey in 32 Mexican states (2014)
Mean by Group
Effect of Indirect Taxes on GDP growth

































































































Source: Own elaboration with self-developed survey in 32 Mexican states (2014)
Mean by Group
Effect of Local Income on GDP growth



































































































Source: Own elaboration with self-developed survey in 32 Mexican states (2014)
Mean by Group
Effect of Federal Income on GDP growth
































































































































Source: Own elaboration with self-developed survey in 32 Mexican states (2014)
Mean by Group
Effect of Current Expenditure on GDP growth






























































































































Source: Own elaboration with self-developed survey in 32 Mexican states (2014)
Mean by Group
Effect of Capital Expenditure on GDP growth































































































































Source: Own elaboration with self-developed survey in 32 Mexican states (2014)
Mean by Group
Effect of Federal Fiscal Policy on GDP growth
































































































Source: Own elaboration with self-developed survey in 32 Mexican states (2014)
Mean by Group
Use of Local Taxing Power




5.3.3 Taxpayers view 
 
As discussed in chapter two, Mexican institutions have developed in a context 
where there is a lack of transparency and accountability.  Institutions are very 
diverse among different states and localities in Mexico. This situation can 
produce diverse outcomes depending on the degree of transparency and 
accountability of these sub-national organisations.  As Persson and Tabellini 
(2000) stress, the structure of the institutions is relevant for policy making. 
 
Additionally, Bird (2002) points out that the efficient provision of local services 
is possible when there is a clear mandate, suitable resources and accountability.  
Thus, the need for transparency in expenditure makes accountability for any 
resources canalised to local public authorities’ essential.  Taxpayers are more 
likely to contribute and the level of tax compliance can be higher when people 
understand how and where public money is spent.   
 
Ugalde (2015) in his analysis of the Mexican democracy considers that although 
important steps have been developed in order to have better legislation in matters 
of transparency and anti-corruption programmes, the most relevant action is to 
guarantee the application of the law without exception.  During the last 15 years, 
Transparency International in its Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Mexico 
with failing grades among 3.3 and 3.7 and in 2014 the country was in place 103 
among 175 countries (Transparency International, 2014).  These results indicate 
that bribes and corruption, unfortunately, have become part of several 
administrative procedures in governmental activities and confidence on local 
governments is hampered. 
 
Analysing people´s satisfaction with the services provided in Mexican States 
during the period 2008-2010, considering Latinobarómetro surveys I find that 
around 50% of the people in the 162 localities included in the survey do not think 




interviewed do not trust or have little confidence on the local government.  For 
half of the people considered in the surveys, the satisfaction with municipal 
service provision is marginal or people are not satisfied with overall services. 
 
Graph 5.2 People´s satisfaction with Local Services, Trust and Taxes 
 
 
To understand the linkage between fiscal variables and the level of satisfaction of 
local services, trust and taxes, I use an ordered probit regression where the 
dependent variable is a categorical variable which reflects the response for each 
question regarding the importance of paying taxes, confidence and satisfaction 
from 1 to 4 from 2008 until 2010 in 162 Mexican localities, which I classified as 
high, middle or low income as in chapter two.  The independent variables in my 
model are the income and expenditure variables considered in my baseline 




similar exercise in establishing a relationship between taxpayer’s satisfaction and 
fiscal policy figures.  Research has focused on analysing surveys on the one 
hand, or statistic figures on the other hand but when they mix, the categorical 
variables are most commonly found in the right-hand side related to one 
statistical variable in the left-hand side.  
 
Olken (2010, p.243) presents an experiment in 49 Indonesian villages regarding 
development projects through direct election plebiscites or representative 
meetings.  Direct election is related to more knowledge about the project, 
increased satisfaction, higher benefits and willingness to contribute.  
Consequently, direct participation in political decision making can noticeably 
increment satisfaction and legitimacy.  Iyer et al. (2005, p.1015) study 24,000 
individuals in the USA grouped in nine regions and the relationship between 
social capital, economic growth and regional development. They find that 
education is significant for nearly all indicators of social capital and emphasise 
the importance of region-specific analysis.  Lederman et. al (2005, p.1) study the 
determinants of corruption utilising several Gallup, Global Competitiveness, 
Country Risk, Standard & Poor’s and World Bank indicators, considering 
political institutions that increase accountability.  Their results confirm the 
importance of institutions in determining the incidence of corruption.  
Democracy, parliamentarian system, stability, and freedom of press are related 
with lower corruption.  Kanbur et al. (2009, p.303) find that the possibility of 
promotion of provincial leaders in China increases with their economic 





Table 5.2 People’s satisfaction with Local services, Trust and Taxes.  
Questions
High income Middle income Low income High income Middle income Low income High income Middle income Low income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
-4.47 6.10** -0.97 1.36 1.91*** 1.26 3.22 2.15* 4.11
(7.06) (2.59) (7.80) (1.48) (0.66) (1.70) (2.87) (1.24) (2.73)
-86.29** -0.88 11.81 -25.32*** -2.15* -3.54 -20.39 -4.97** -0.54
(38.76) (4.43) (11.48) (8.24) (1.12) (2.51) (15.11) (2.13) (4.02)
0.03 0.62 0.03 -0.42 -0.06 -0.18 -0.99 -0.3 -0.57*
(1.79) (0.60) (0.88) (0.38) (0.15) (0.19) (0.74) (0.29) (0.31)
0.35 0.99*** -0.22 0.05 0.03 0.21* -0.04 -0.03 0.2
(0.81) (0.34) (0.54) (0.17) (0.09) (0.12) (0.33) (0.16) (0.19)
-0.95 -1.44*** -0.41 0.09 -0.43*** 0.12 0.98** -0.39* -0.09
(1.07) (0.49) (0.77) (0.20) (0.13) (0.17) (0.39) (0.23) (0.27)
-2.51* -1.74** -0.4 -0.06 -0.62*** 0.12 0.78 -0.62* -0.04
(1.29) (0.73) (0.85) (0.27) (0.19) (0.18) (0.52) (0.35) (0.29)
-4.09*** -1.21* -0.96 -0.34 -0.33** 0.05 1.01* -0.32 0.05
(1.51) (0.65) (0.86) (0.29) (0.16) (0.18) (0.55) (0.31) (0.30)
-3.58*** 0.02 0.03 -0.75*** -0.01 0.02 -0.76 0.01 -0.01
(1.30) (0.06) (0.07) (0.28) (0.01) (0.02) (0.51) (0.03) (0.02)
-1.55*** 0.03 0.07 -0.24*** -0.04*** 0.02 -0.26 -0.04 0.03
(0.46) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.01) (0.02) (0.17) (0.02) (0.03)
2.15*** -0.04 -0.01 0.44*** 0.02 -0.00 0.42 0.00 -0.03
(0.75) (0.07) (0.06) (0.15) (0.02) (0.01) (0.28) (0.03) (0.02)
806 1,553 1,078 806 1,553 1,078 806 1,553 1,078
0.0363 0.0143 0.0143 0.0336 0.0154 0.0109 0.0143 0.0098 0.0099
-536.67*** -1044.97*** -712.18*** -965.71*** -1880.43*** -1295.98*** -1001.11*** -2024.3*** -1350.29***
 Expenditure
Log likelihood
Notes : Dependent variable i s  a  categorica l  variable which reflects  the responses  for each question regarding importance of paying taxes , confidence and satis facion from 1 to 4. Independent variables  have one period lagged va lues . Annual  
data  for 1998-2010.  Al l  regress ions  a lso conta in year dummies  and a  constant term. SE are reported in parentheses .  Regress ions  are estimated by ordered probit.  ***(**/*) denotes  s tatisca l ly s igni ficant at the 1%(5%/10%) level .




















The Table 5.2 reflects the influence of fiscal variables on the categorical variable 
which reflects the response for each question regarding the importance of paying 
taxes, confidence and satisfaction. In the case of the question referring to good 
citizenship and taxes, where the localities identified weather they thought paying 
taxes made them good citizens or not, the effects are mixed among the income 
groups.  In the low-income group, the fiscal variables did not show any effect on 
the perception of paying taxes as to being a good citizen.  In the case of the 
middle-income group, higher level of direct taxes and non-earmarked transfers 
are linked with the will of paying taxes because of considering such payment as a 
part of being a good citizen; however, higher levels of spending are related with 
lower compliance.  Moreover, in the high-income group, the relationship is 
negative with fiscal variables, which implies that when the level of resources 
received or spent is high, people is unlikely willingly to pay taxes as part of 
being a good citizen.  These results could be explained because of the opacity in 
local public resources, corruption, the diversion of public funds, and the 
perception of people that some government officials abuse of their functions and 
look for their own self-interest instead of the community benefit, as explained 
earlier in this chapter. 
 
In relation to the question that ranks the confidence in local government from no 
local confidence to a lot of confidence, the low-income group results show only a 
slight positive effect of earmarked transfers, perhaps because they know that 
since those resources have to be spent according to the federation mandate, the 
state is unable to spend those resources carelessly.  The middle-income group 
presents a negative relationship between indirect taxes, the levels of spending 
and confidence in the local government and only a slight positive effect in the 
case of direct taxes.  In the high-income group, the development of the fiscal 
variables does not show any incidence on the confidence in local governments, 
however, I find a negative impact of indirect taxes on confidence in local 
governments.  This situation could be result of the high tax evasion that exists in 
this type of resources, as explained earlier in this work (chapters one and two).  
In my understanding and considering the analysis developed in this work, higher 




government officials, could increase confidence in the local governments in 
Mexico.  
 
Considering the question that positions satisfaction with municipal services from 
not at all satisfied to very satisfied, no relationship is found between the fiscal 
variables and municipal service satisfaction in low-income states, with the 
exception of a slightly negative effect of non-earmarked transfers on municipal 
satisfaction.  As mentioned in chapter two, this type of resource refers to a free 
outlay transfer that the local government can spend without restriction, therefore, 
if people perceive that this resource is not properly monitored and spent, there is 
no trust that the local authority will spend it on the benefit of the population.  
Furthermore, a slightly positive effect can be seen in middle-income states in the 
case of direct taxes, but a negative effect is detected in the case of indirect taxes, 
current and capital expenditure.  My findings can be explained by the fact that 
government corruption is linked with public construction contracts and 
concessions (Ugalde, 2015).  Additionally, there is no link of any kind between 
income variables and satisfaction of public services in high-income localities, 
however, in this group higher subsidies and capital expenditures are related to 
higher levels of taxpayers’ satisfaction.  Perhaps the explanation to this last result 
is that even though people do not trust their local authorities and are not willing 
to pay taxes because of the perceived corruption, richer states have a higher 
capacity to deliver proper services to their population. 
   
Government employees must focus on providing a good service to the taxpayers 
while policies implemented have to be attentive to the conditions under which 
they take place.  Strategic planning in governmental management needs to have a 
clear vision of service and people should be able to understand where their taxes 
have been spent. 
 
According to Article 31 fracc. IV of the Political Constitution of the United 




federation, states, Mexico City and municipalities according to their place of 
residence, in a proportional and equitable manner provided by law”.  In this 
sense, it is essential to raise the awareness among the population to pay taxes.  
However, if public finances are sound, transparent and government officials are 
accountable for taxpayers’ money, most likely people would be willing to pay 
taxes, otherwise they won’t pay them regardless of the law.  The transparency, 
certainty, equity and justice in the governmental rules and procedures allows 
citizens to clarify their participation in the process of paying taxes and public 
service delivery. 
 
Graph 5.3 Administrative and institutional framework  



























High income Middle income Low income
Source: Own elaboration with data of INEGI (Mexico's National Institute of Statistics and Geography)
Mean by Group
Municipal Public Administration Procedures








High income Middle income Low income
Source: Own elaboration with data of INEGI (Mexico's National Institute of Statistics and Geography)
Mean by Group
Anti-corruption program
Procedures prone to corruption Analysis of corruption acts
Risk reduction of corruption acts Evaluation of the anti-corruption program
Creation of specialised units for corruption Regulatory provisions to combat corruption
Training of public servants in the code of ethics Citizen complaint mechanisms








High income Middle income Low income
Source: Own elaboration with data of INEGI (Mexico's National Institute of Statistics and Geography)
Mean by Group
Citizen Participation Bodies
Community meetings Public consultation meetings
Citizens advice Advisory board
Public safety council Citizen commitee
Social organizations Municipal development council
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Source: Own elaboration with data of INEGI (Mexico's National Institute of Statistics and Geography)
Mean by Group
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Source: Own elaboration with data of INEGI (Mexico's National Institute of Statistics and Geography)
Mean by Group
Municipal Public Administration Official, level of studies
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Source: Own elaboration with data of SIADEM (System for Municipal Development Agenda)
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As stated by De la Torre (2012), regional disparities among regions are immense.  
González (2003) ponders that the responsibilities of different levels of 
government should be revisited to harmonise public administration in the three 
levels of government.  Accountability and transparency should be addressed to 
have sound local public finances.  In his study, he finds a contrast between urban 
and rural municipalities whose spending patterns follow distinct trends.  Urban 
municipalities expenditure follows a spending trend more related to their own 
source income, while rural municipalities expenditure relies heavily on central 
government transfers. 
 
As described in Graph 5.3, high income localities can handle a higher amount of 
procedures to provide public services to local inhabitants, while low income 
states, in contrast, do not have the capacity to provide enough local services.  
Anti-corruption programs can be instrumented by high income states but low-
income localities can hardly manage anti-corruption activities.  Participation 
bodies are more active in high income states and regulatory provisions are 
stronger as well in high income localities compared to low income states.  Not 
surprisingly, government officials are also more qualified in high income 
localities. 
 
As mentioned in chapter three, only 309 municipalities in Mexico out of 2,247 
generate 74 percent of national GDP and concentrate 53 percent of the 
population.  Overall, localities in Mexico show an important difference in 
administrative capacity, anti-corruption programs, citizen participation and 







The effectiveness of a particular fiscal policy would depend upon its feasibility 
and implementation. The scarcity of resources is a reality in poor localities, 
therefore a better allocation of the available resources is fundamental.  Local tax 
offices should become units of service, quality and transparency in the eyes of 
taxpayers. 
 
People should be able to trust their local authorities; the integrity and impartiality 
of the government officials could become a guarantee for the citizens that the law 
is being enforced correctly.  The fact that local authorities in the states change 
every six years and in municipalities every three years without a proper 
development plan for long term projects, gives inhabitants uncertainty about the 
continuity of local policies. 
 
Government officials must carry out their tasks and responsibilities with an 
attitude of service and ethics; and their training programs must promote 
continuous updating.  With the objective of giving certainty to taxpayers, public 
finances must be reliable and transparent. 
 
This current work gives us a wider picture of the policy making process.  The 
linkage with policy making perception regarding fiscal policy variables and the 
opinion that people have regarding tax levied and spending efficiency.  This 
work intends to become a bridge between growth macroeconomic models and 
fiscal policy practice. 
 
Consequently, as a result of the analysis of diverse fiscal policies, which in turn 
reflect different income and expenditure patterns, this study will contribute to the 
discussion of achieving higher levels of growth by fiscal policy management.  
Nonetheless, the impact of fiscal policy variables is diverse among the different 




to account for these differences when formulating fiscal policy.  The results of 
the study suggest that fiscal policy must properly recognise capabilities, 
allocation of resources, strategies, needs and disparities among localities.  
Strategic management, Innovation techniques, accountability, transparency, a 
better institutional framework, and a more accurate legislation is fundamental 






6.  Concluding Remarks, Recommendations and 
Future Research.  
6.1 Introduction 
 
Effective local fiscal policy needs to take into account particular characteristics 
of a region and its level of development. This study finds that a complete 
specification -detailed description- of the government budget constraint is 
necessary to identify the budget effects which take place at different levels of 
government.  Each locality has its own particular combination of resources, 
capabilities and needs.  This work estimates the impact of fiscal policy through a 
number of income and expenditure variables on output per capita growth and 
employment/unemployment using fixed- effects panel data econometric 
methodology in 32 states and 2,247 municipalities of Mexico from 1994 to 2010, 
and country data in 20 Latin American economies during the same period.  
Besides, this analysis computes the impact on growth of the 1998 Federal 
Reform to the Fiscal Coordination System in Mexico, since it is the most 
significant reform in the decade regarding transfers from central to local 
governments.  The main result in this research is that local fiscal policy is 
inaccurate if it does not take into account income and expenditure components in 
the budget constraint when analysing the effect of fiscal policy variables on 
Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP per capita) and 
employment/unemployment at a sub-national level.  This study will suggest that 
localised and targeted fiscal policy works when taking into account the particular 
characteristics of a locality.  Additionally, this research discusses the linkage 
between policy makers’ perception, public finances and the local inhabitants’ 
opinion regarding public services provided -considering a self-developed survey 
in the 32 Mexican states and Latinobarómetro surveys from 2008 to 2010.  The 
aim of this study might contribute to the discussion of a pragmatic application of 
fiscal policy management.  The impact of fiscal policy variables is not equal 
among the different levels of government, which suggests that 1) policy makers 




inequalities; 2) a lack of local government capacity building and 3) relevance of 
institutional framework. 
 
6.2 Major findings and Implications 
 
Fiscal policy mix 
Between the different levels of government, the links and impact of fiscal policy 
variables are diverse. National policy is implemented under a general framework 
and state governments serve as a bond between federal government and local 
authorities.  According to Tiebout (1956) local governments are the closest to 
voters’ preferences and serve as the ultimate providers of goods and services for 
their inhabitants.  This current research serves as a bridge between growth 
macroeconomic models and local fiscal policy in practice.  As explained in 
chapter two, previous empirical growth studies focus either on the evolution of 
income or expenditure variables exclusively and only a few like Gemmell (2012) 
and Kneller (1999) use a full disaggregation of fiscal components, however, they 
have alternated between either tax or expenditure components and have not 
considered them simultaneously.  As discussed in chapter two as well, it is vital 
to acknowledge the different legislative, institutional, political, administrative 
and social frameworks, which in turn, lead to the differentiated impact of fiscal 
policy variables on growth according to the level of government analysed. 
 
The level of fiscal centralisation in Mexico is high, situation that generates 
problems of continuity in the governance at the three levels of government.  
Additionally, around seventy percent of employment depends upon small and 
medium enterprises.  Around forty two percent of the Mexican population lives 
in a certain level of poverty, which limits human capital investment.  As 
described in the municipality and state analysis, the disparity among regions is 
huge not only between localities but also between urban and rural settings.  For 
instance, in 2013, productivity in Campeche, was twelve times higher than in 




contributes to regional disparities as well.  Low income regions are not integrated 
to the global economy and their growth is modest compared to the average of the 
national economy.  Conversely, the northern and central regions have a higher 
level of specialisation, investment, technology and innovation.  In the Mexican 
economy, forty one percent of GDP is concentrated in only ten percent of its 
regions, while the resultant ninety percent are behind average development 
(OECD, 2016).  There are no cross sectoral policy programmes, and although 
approaches like “Micro-Regions” and “Prospera” are important to alleviate 
regional disparities, local and regional development should be enhanced through 
a three level of government strategy in an integrated way, alienated with the 
National Development Plan. 
 
The innovative contribution of this study is to analyse the combined effects of 
different kinds of disaggregated expenditure and taxes on output per capita and 
employment/unemployment at a sub-national level and acknowledging their 
differences.  In order to test my hypothesis, I run panel fixed effects regressions 
considering income or expenditure components separately and then jointly and 
My findings provide evidence that there is a difference between the coefficients 
in all three regressions with slightly more significant coefficients in my broader 
model. 
 
Additionally, I find mixed effects of taxes in local governments in Mexico and 
the relative importance of public investment for less developed localities, which 
means that developing the adequate infrastructure can have a strong and positive 
impact for their economic improvement.  These results are consistent with 
Devarajan et al. (1996) that find that current expenditure can boost growth in less 
developed economies, and the relationship between government capital 
expenditure and growth is negative in developing countries due to misallocations 
of public spending.  The effect of the fiscal variables is mixed among the 
different levels of government in Mexico and in the case of Latin American 
countries, the effects might be offsetting because I am pooling countries which 




unable to run separate regressions by income group.  Transfers have a positive 
effect in less developed municipalities while the effect becomes negative in more 
developed localities.  In the case of Mexico this would imply transfers from the 
rich to the poor. 
 
Regarding the effects of fiscal policy on employment, the literature is scarce; 
fiscal policy variables have rarely been considered to influence levels of 
employment. Labour and growth have been seen as exclusively a central 
government concern, however, in practice, local authorities implement actions 
that affect production and employment in the local economy.  The effect of taxes 
in local employment in Mexico is mixed and in Latin American economies 
higher taxes reflect in higher levels of unemployment.  Capital expenditure effect 
on the labour market is mixed in both cases, which can lead to further detailed 
analysis in understanding how do local markets operate. 
 
Overall, local governments have the mandate to enact the potential tax sources, 
and as discussed along this work, in order to have the possibility to optimise the 
management of their resources.  Depending on the income and substitution 
effects in the supply of labour force (positive or negative slope), the distinct 
municipalities have the possibility of raising or decreasing taxes and affect 
households’ disposable income, which is an important component that directly 
affects consumption, investment and savings in the local economy.  For instance, 
when the local government increases local government consumption, the demand 
for goods and services expands as well in the local economy. Since the aggregate 
demand goes up, local production increases and there is a positive effect on local 
employment.  Conversely, the opposite happens in the case the local government 
decides to diminish government consumption. 
 
In the case of Mexico, government spending is complimentary with private 
spending (Amieva Huerta, 2010), although, according to my group state analysis, 




expenditure can be a means for fraud in the procurement process of public works.  
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, transfers play an important and positive role in 
local governments, nevertheless, local authorities can have an active role in 
promoting local employment, particularly in small localities, where the 
government is the provider of local jobs by spending money on building new 
roads, parks, or even hiring bureaucrats. 
 
Therefore, as explained in my work, this study intends to be a bridge between 
theory and practice, since I recognize that prevalent growth models can be useful 
to understand the partial effects of income and expenditure variables, it would be 
desirable in the future to construct new theoretical models that adapt theory to 
day to day public finances.  The choice to raise revenue and channel expenditure 
takes place in the same fiscal year and more realistic theoretical approaches 
would be very useful for fiscal policy decision making.  Additionally, to explore 
new possibilities of linking local fiscal policy to employment and unemployment 
indicators remain a question for future research. 
 
Mexican Federal Reform of 1998 
For the case of Mexico in particular, the impact on output per capita of the 1998 
Federal Reform to the Fiscal Coordination System is analysed.  The data 
available for 17 years is limited, therefore, a dummy variable is included in states 
and municipalities in 1998 to account for this reform.  It is a very simple method 
but it is a reform that cannot be left aside due to its importance for the federalism 
system in Mexico.  The results of the current study show that this reform has a 
positive effect, particularly on low income localities, while some negative effects 
in more developed municipalities.  According to Coneval (2011) no systematic 
evaluation and analysis of Branch 33 (earmarked transfers) exists, information is 
heterogeneous and clear and specific objectives should be designed.  Many 
localities don’t have the financial capacity to undertake these type of tasks, 
however, simple controls should be implemented to be able to track the use of 
these resources.  The implementation of suitable indicators that allow the 




aforementioned study recognizes that the resources canalised through Brach 33 
do not reflect adequately the requirements of particular localities.  Abud and 
Rodriguez (2012) find that GDP per capita at a state level is negatively correlated 
with the efficiency of earmarked transfers.  Ramírez (2013) states the importance 
of controls in the three level of governments in order to adequately coordinate 
efforts to canalize Branch 33 resources efficiently.  Therefore, the resources of 
Branch 33 should not follow inertial patterns from historic trends but Human 
Development Index, locality needs and measurable achievements in local tax 
collection. 
 
A social perspective 
The linkage between policy makers’ perception regarding fiscal variables, public 
finances and the local inhabitants’ opinion in relation to public services provided 
is crucial to understanding the way resources are utilised according to the 
priorities of the local authorities and the perceived benefit of governmental 
services among people within a certain locality. This in turn gives a broader 
picture of the use of public funds by involving both actors: local authorities and 
the people affected by the local policies. 
 
As I state along the development of my thesis, local governments must guarantee 
the effective implementation of public policies (Oates, 1999), and according to 
the results of my self-developed survey in Mexico during 2014-2015, 
government officials considered that fiscal policy had a significant effect on 
growth (up to 65%) and only (2-5%) thought it was not significant.  With respect 
to the analysis of Latinobarómetro surveys 2008-2010 for localities in Mexico, I 
utilise an ordered probit regression where the dependent variable reflects the 
response to questions regarding taxes, confidence and satisfaction of local 
services and the independent variables in my model are the fiscal variables.  In 
my understanding, there has not been a similar exercise in establishing a 
relationship between taxpayer’s satisfaction and fiscal policy variables.  My 
results show a lack of confidence in the local government and poor taxpayer 





To a large degree, the effectiveness of a particular fiscal policy depends upon its 
feasibility and implementation.  The scarcity of resources is a reality in poor 
localities, therefore a better allocation of the available resources is fundamental.  
Local tax offices should become units of service, quality and transparency in the 
eyes of taxpayers.  People should be able to trust their local authorities; the 
integrity and impartiality of the government officials could become a guarantee 
for the citizens that the law is being enforced correctly. 
 
Government officials must carry out their tasks and responsibilities with an 
attitude of service and ethics; and their training programs must promote 
continuous updating.  With the objective of giving certainty to taxpayers, public 
finances must be reliable and transparent. 
 
6.3 Recommendations, limitations and future research 
 
According to Oates (1999) local governments actively seek satisfactory provision 
of public goods to inhabitants because they are close to them.  However, in my 
opinion, his statement would only be true given an adequate institutional 
framework, where people have confidence in local governments and are satisfied 
with municipal services.  From this perspective, empowering and incentivising 
local governments and actors to actively enhance growth and development within 
a locality can be an area of opportunity and challenge for new government policy 
(Bowley, 2010).  For example, in Mexico City during 2001, the Major promoted 
a social program for elderly, which was later copied by other local governments 
and even adopted at a national level in 2007.  Local governments could initiate 
changes to the tax system, improve tax administration and compliance, have 
better budget practices, increase transparency and accountability of resources, 
eliminate discretionary provisions and opaque public auctions.  Additionally, 
measures to promote investment, employment and actions to support innovation 




Frederiksen (1981) findings suggest that public investment is the initiating 
element in local development. 
 
It would be desirable that fiscal policy played a more active role at a local level 
and each municipality and state could acknowledge their unique characteristics, 
relative advantages and core competencies in order to enhance synergies within 
the same local government, different private and public actors and among regions 
to overcome disparities and promote growth and development within Mexico as 
a whole.  Municipal and local capacity should be enhanced in order to form 
specialised public government officials that can serve efficiently in the provision 
of public services and have continuity in the development of local programs that 
go beyond the election cycle.  As mentioned along the development of my work, 
transparency in the use of public funds is fundamental in order to build trust 
between the three levels of government and the local community.  Furthermore, 
universities, research centres, other organised civil associations and civil society 
should participate more actively in local, regional and national development. 
 
The institutional framework, the inequality and the high level of heterogeneity 
between states and municipalities has to be considered in order to properly 
understand intergovernmental relationships in Mexico.  Moreover, when 
evaluating trends of income and government expenditure components and their 
impact on growth and employment, no straight-forward approach can be used in 
order to maximise local revenue, guarantee local service provision and overcome 
regional inequalities.  Although Mexico has a large centralized federation 
history, equilibrium responsibilities between the three levels of government have 
to be tackled to attain sound public finances, efficiency, transparency, 
accountability, adequate reporting, supervision and compliance with an adequate 
legal framework. 
 
Mexico is one of the eight founding governments of the Open Government 




technology and innovation, however, there are huge challenges to overcome, 
particularly at a local level, in the context of lack of confidence of the 
community in their representatives, political leaders and the use and application 
of public funds. 
 
Consequently, as a result of the analysis of diverse fiscal policies, which in turn 
reflect different income and expenditure patterns, this study contributes to the 
discussion of achieving higher levels of growth and employment by fiscal policy 
management.  Nonetheless, the impact of fiscal policy variables is diverse among 
the different levels of government, which implies that particular attention should 
be addressed to account for these differences when formulating fiscal policy.  
The results of this thesis suggest that fiscal policy must properly recognise 
capabilities, allocation of resources, strategies, needs and disparities among 
localities.  Strategic management, innovation techniques, accountability, 
transparency, a better institutional framework, and a more accurate legislation is 
fundamental during this process. 
 
This study has several limitations regarding the interpretations of results, since 
the variables utilised in Mexico do not cover the informal economy, indicators of 
corruption and transparency, externalities and the fiscal variables utilised are 
likely to be endogenous; therefore, although the lag of the fiscal variables is one 
year, I am only able to provide conditional correlations among my fiscal 
variables, growth and employment.  Additionally, the results of the Mexican 
surveys are only true for the sample considered and cannot be generalised 






7. Appendix A. States, Additional Tables 



























































Real GDP per capita







Notes: Dependent variable is real GDP per capita annual percentage growth rate. Independent variables 
have one period lagged values. Annual data for 1994-2010.  All regressions also contain year dummies and 
a constant term. SE are reported in parentheses.  The estimators used are fixed effects, system and the 
Discroll and Kraay (1998) that accounts for autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and cross sectional 
dependence.  Fisher Unit Root Test was conducted to all regression variables and accepting in most of them 
the alternative hypothesis of at least one Panel being stationary at a 10% level.  ***(**/*) denotes 




Table 7.2 Income - Expenditure Growth Regression with State Group 
















































Notes: Dependent variable is real GDP per capita annual percentage growth rate. All explanatory 
variables are lagged by one year. Annual data for 1994-2010. All regressions also contain year 
dummies. Standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the state level, are reported in parentheses.  
The estimator used is the Discroll and Kraay (1998) which accounts for fixed cross-sectional effects, 
autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and cross sectional dependence.  ***(**/*) denotes 
statistically significant at the 1%(5%/10%).
Indirect tax, Middle income





Real GDP per capita 
Population growth 
Subsidies, transfers and aid, High income
Subsidies, transfers and aid, Middle income
Subsidies, transfers and aid, Low income
Fiscal reform 
Personal services, Middle income
Personal services, Low income
Capital expenditure, High income
Capital expenditure, Middle income





Indirect tax, High income
Indirect tax, Low income
Fiscal policy variables
Notes: Dependent variable is re l GDP per capita annual percentag  growth rate. Independent variables 
have one period lagged values. Annual data for 1994-2010.  All regressions also contain year dummies 
and a constant term. SE are reported in parentheses.  The estimators used are fixed effects and the Discroll 
and Kraay (1998) that accounts for autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and cross sectional dependence.  
Fisher Unit Root Test was conducted to all regression variables and accepting in most of them the 
alternative hypothesis of at least one Panel being stationary at a 10% level.  ***(**/*) denotes statistically 





Table 7.3 Income - Expenditure Employment Regression across Mexican 


































Notes: Dependent variable is formal employment rate. Independent variables have one period lagged values. 
Annual data for 1994-2010.  All regressions also contain year dummies and a constant term. SE are reported in 
parentheses.  The Discroll and Kraay (1998) estimator accounts for autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and cross 
sectional dependence.  Levin, Lin & Chu Panel Unit Root Test was conducted to all regression variables and 
accepting the alternative hypothesis of Panels being stationary at a 10% level.  ***(**/*) denotes statiscally 
significant at the 1%(5%/10%) level.
R - squared



















otes: ependent variable formal employment rate per capita annual percentage growth rate. Independent variables 
have one period lagged values. Annual data for 1994-2010.  All regressions also contain year dummies and a constant 
term. SE are reported in parentheses.  The esti ators used are fixed effects and the Discroll and Kraay (1998) that 
accounts for autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and cross sectional dependence.  Fisher Unit Root Test was conducted 
to all regression variables and accepting in most of them the alternative hypothesis of at least one Panel being 





Table 7.4 Income - Expenditure Employment Regression with State Group 
















































Notes: Dependent variable is formal employment rate. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Annual data for 
1994-2010. All regressions also contain year dummies. Standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the state level, are 
reported in parentheses.  The estimator used is the Discroll and Kraay (1998) which accounts for fixed cross-sectional 




Indirect tax, High income
Indirect tax, Low income
Fiscal policy variables
Direct tax, High income
Direct tax, Middle income
Direct tax, Low income
Non-earmarked transfers, High income
Non-earmarked transfers, Middle income
Indirect tax, Middle income
Observations
Number of states
Non-earmarked transfers, Low income
Fiscal reform 
Capital expenditure, High income
Capital expenditure, Middle income
Capital expenditure, Low income
R - squared
Recession dummy 
Real GDP per capita 
F - statistic




Notes: Dependent variable formal employment rate per capita annual percentage growth rate. Independent 
variables have one period lagged values. Annual data for 1994-2010.  All regressions also contain year dummies 
and a constant term. SE are reported in parentheses.  The estimators used are fixed effects and the Discroll and 
Kraay (1998) that accounts for autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and cross sectional dependence.  Fisher Unit 
Root Test was conducted to all regression variables and accepting in most of them the alternative hypothesis of at 






8. Appendix B. Municipalities, Additional Tables 
Table 8.1 Income-Expenditure Growth Regression considering Cross Sectional Dependence for Municipalities in Mexico 1994-2010 
  
Complete Income Expenditure Complete Income Expenditure Complete Income Expenditure Complete Income Expenditure Complete Income Expenditure Complete Income Expenditure Complete Income Expenditure
2.01 3.28** 5.47 5.84 3.51** 3.54** 5.35** 5.70* 0.03 0.15 0.73* 0.75* 1.70* 1.75*
(1.34) (1.37) (4.78) (4.86) (1.58) (1.63) (2.24) (2.74) (0.28) (0.25) (0.39) (0.42) (0.86) (0.86)
9.34*** 12.37** 4.72*** 6.21** 6.57** 7.08** 8.22*** 9.13*** 2.11 3.42 9.00*** 9.69*** 7.41*** 7.03**
(3.01) (4.37) (1.38) (2.32) (2.93) (3.19) (1.52) (1.32) (2.75) (2.81) (2.24) (2.39) (1.66) (2.41)
-0.60 -0.95* -0.40 -1.04 -0.23 -0.89 5.68 5.46 -0.13 -0.20 -0.43 -0.44* -0.54 -0.64
(0.70) (0.53) (0.56) (0.77) (0.66) (0.72) (4.60) (4.72) (0.57) (0.51) (0.25) (0.24) (0.35) (0.40)
-4.40 -9.55** -3.12* -7.42** -0.77 -4.41 -7.39*** -10.47*** -2.00* -2.84 -3.09 -4.44* -1.74 -2.91
(2.60) (4.19) (1.76) (3.28) (2.15) (3.30) (2.46) (2.88) (1.08) (1.73) (1.81) (2.28) (1.96) (2.42)
5.63 8.57** -0.18 1.87 -1.85 -0.36 -4.21 -2.54 4.36 4.72 3.14 3.93 -4.24 -2.31
(3.73) (3.52) (2.40) (2.72) (3.46) (3.78) (3.83) (3.58) (4.12) (4.01) (2.48) (2.32) (9.11) (9.56)
28.60*** 18.66*** 11.61 -1.68 13.62*** 25.95 61.02*** 40.87** -52.89 -42.18 -79.36** -21.19 -11.53 5.24
(4.46) (1.61) (6.88) (2.13) (4.43) (37.79) (8.49) (14.97) (43.17) (37.32) (27.87) (27.09) (91.78) (3.09)
27.50 2.80 26.75** 19.00 8.85 -5.96 -18.61 -33.77** 5.02 2.26 16.23*** 4.92* 6.89 -3.50
(20.26) (17.58) (12.37) (11.46) (15.77) (12.74) (12.08) (14.36) (9.03) (6.79) (5.22) (2.60) (6.79) (7.05)
0.76 1.48 0.19 3.36 2.91 4.24 -1.44 -1.44 -2.66* -4.69 -0.99 -4.71 0.15 -0.98 0.09 -14.09 -19.94* -10.84 27.60 25.20 -47.80
(1.19) (1.12) (1.12) (2.77) (2.70) (2.69) (1.58) (1.82) (1.51) (3.77) (0.82) (4.10) (3.42) (3.66) (3.46) (8.40) (11.01) (6.50) (51.63) (53.55) (61.16)
22.37 30.17 10.23 4.55 4.22 -4.71 -18.50 -18.64 -24.66** 0.76 -3.16 5.27 12.74 13.42 9.36 7.94 14.12 -1.79 86.41* 74.53 92.09**
(15.77) (17.24) (10.82) (10.57) (11.10) (6.84) (10.79) (10.92) (9.66) (4.82) (2.05) (4.89) (10.31) (9.79) (7.43) (11.70) (12.33) (14.59) (45.46) (50.20) (38.71)
11.35 11.56 11.94 12.13 12.38 13.61 8.75 8.43 9.11 5.83 6.70 3.79 2.37 1.79 2.50 9.12 8.89 8.33 13.39** 12.24* 17.19*
(8.68) (8.69) (7.90) (9.26) (9.42) (9.27) (8.39) (8.04) (8.07) (5.99) (6.41) (6.03) (2.09) (2.20) (2.28) (8.04) (7.97) (8.10) (6.21) (6.17) (8.16)
-1.29 -2.95 0.78 -1.48 -1.20 -1.20 -3.73 -3.51 -2.87 4.53** 2.81 5.99** -0.60 -0.44 -0.79 0.91* 0.91** 0.79 -22.95 -21.85 -19.77
(3.08) (3.26) (2.85) (0.86) (0.74) (0.88) (2.25) (2.04) (1.98) (1.62) (2.46) (2.23) (0.69) (0.83) (0.66) (0.45) (0.41) (0.59) (14.89) (14.68) (11.73)
0.22 0.64 -0.06 -0.45** -0.43** -0.39 -0.62* -0.64* -0.31 -0.24 0.28 0.03 -0.55 -0.74 -0.41 1.04** 0.83** 1.26** 0.03 0.07 0.18
(1.19) (1.32) (0.97) (0.21) (0.18) (0.24) (0.33) (0.30) (0.39) (0.46) (0.38) (0.35) (0.39) (0.52) (0.35) (0.43) (0.37) (0.52) (0.41) (0.40) (0.48)
1.60 4.87 -6.02 -4.35 -4.89 -5.37 0.20 2.07 -8.70 -4.05 6.92 10.46 38.18** 36.47** 39.40** -0.46 -5.73 -13.71 -39.28 -51.27 -23.11
(5.28) (5.21) (6.46) (10.35) (9.55) (10.71) (18.16) (15.99) (16.47) (22.46) (15.77) (27.59) (14.66) (12.62) (14.32) (22.05) (20.22) (16.45) (43.12) (58.13) (38.78)
-1.63*** -1.80*** -1.14* -0.66 -0.59 -0.94 1.16** 1.06** 0.62 -0.20 -0.43 -0.13 0.27 0.45 0.42 1.25 1.29 1.15 0.28 0.23 1.22
(0.54) (0.60) (0.61) (0.69) (0.73) (0.72) (0.46) (0.40) (0.42) (0.51) (0.46) (0.52) (0.77) (0.67) (0.60) (0.90) (1.01) (0.89) (1.76) (1.64) (1.63)
542 542 542 766 766 766 816 816 816 654 654 654 552 552 552 390 390 390 308 308 308
78 78 78 99 99 99 123 123 123 100 100 100 83 83 83 71 71 71 48 48 48
0.526 0.518 0.506 0.418 0.414 0.380 0.331 0.330 0.303 0.204 0.0998 0.175 0.397 0.384 0.394 0.423 0.408 0.345 0.216 0.202 0.143










Notes: Dependent variable is real gross revenue per capita annual percentage growth rate. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Annual data for 1994-2010. Group classification was done according to municipalities socioeconomic characteristics where Group 1 is the least developed and Group 7 is the most developed. All regressions also contain year 
dummies. Standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the state level, are reported in parentheses.  The estimator used is the Discroll and Kraay (1998) which accounts for fixed cross-sectional effects, autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and cross sectional dependence.  ***(**/*) denotes statistically significant at the 1%(5%/10%) level.
F - statistic
Tax  




Public infrastructure  
Drainage and sewerage 
system
Aquisition of movable and 





Group 5 Group 6 Group 7Group 1
 VARIABLES
Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
Notes: Dependent variable is real gross revenue per capita annual percentage growth rate. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Annual data for 1994-2010. Group classification was done 
according to municipalities socioeconomic characteristics where Group 1 is the least developed and Group 7 is the most developed. All regressions also contain year dummies. SE are reported in parentheses.  
The estimators used are Fixed Effects and the Discroll and Kraay (1998) which accounts for fixed cross-sectional effects, autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and cross sectional dependence.  ***(**/*) 




Table 8.2 Income-Expenditure Employment Regression considering Cross Sectional Dependence for Municipalities in Mexico 1994-2010 
 
Complete Income Expenditure Complete Income Expenditure Complete Income Expenditure Complete Income Expenditure Complete Income Expenditure Complete Income Expenditure Complete Income Expenditure
9.23*** 7.55*** 8.87* 8.62* 8.58*** 5.56 -21.90 -25.41* 19.23* 17.94* 7.97 7.07 7.41 7.34
(2.35) (1.65) (4.80) (4.82) (2.54) (4.10) (13.61) (12.47) (9.42) (10.13) (23.87) (23.55) (32.56) (28.18)
1.69 1.20 0.94** 0.89** 7.67*** 4.21** -3.87 -6.14** -0.41 -0.53 -9.56 -10.69 -32.29 -30.76
(1.10) (0.86) (0.37) (0.35) (2.20) (1.88) (3.74) (2.60) (5.36) (2.91) (11.49) (11.70) (20.91) (20.73)
-3.53 -4.47 1.61 0.48 1.46 -4.43 25.76 25.74 15.83 15.00 -18.99 -16.44 -14.13 -9.76
(2.84) (3.15) (1.18) (0.76) (4.98) (5.30) (25.24) (24.65) (15.55) (15.07) (19.63) (18.62) (15.92) (13.65)
1.25* 0.23 0.13 -0.67 8.54** 5.22 9.18 10.35 -7.47 -7.39 -0.85 0.80 -14.97 -11.25
(0.63) (0.23) (0.38) (0.44) (3.98) (3.83) (12.34) (11.58) (8.58) (6.49) (5.47) (5.70) (8.58) (7.72)
-0.89 0.03 0.59 1.00 -7.26*** -5.66** -7.35 -10.02* -15.90 -15.37** -12.75 -16.52 -6.00 -11.07
(0.79) (0.54) (0.63) (0.66) (1.99) (2.20) (5.59) (4.93) (9.15) (6.62) (10.19) (11.41) (26.59) (26.51)
0.01*** 0.00*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.24*** 0.23*** 0.12*** 0.08***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.24*** -0.24*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.39*** -0.37*** -0.28*** -0.22***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
1.91* 1.82* 2.39** 1.81** 1.75** 2.00** -2.47 -2.36 -3.77 10.10 10.57 9.77 29.20** 19.60 30.09** 59.63* 58.30* 59.36* 242.86** 190.26* 187.36
(0.96) (0.96) (1.04) (0.83) (0.76) (0.85) (2.92) (3.47) (3.50) (7.54) (8.48) (7.83) (13.68) (14.16) (13.28) (31.91) (29.94) (30.89) (112.60) (106.78) (124.66)
-23.67***-24.55*** -25.14*** -4.70* -4.27* -5.83** -2.81 -6.56 -1.81 -11.59 -13.80 -12.02 -216.62**-206.36** -223.65** 32.18 28.20 33.89 213.72 212.35 192.48
(7.34) (7.36) (6.87) (2.26) (2.35) (2.06) (12.17) (13.03) (13.86) (14.71) (16.73) (14.53) (88.72) (91.04) (87.76) (48.28) (48.47) (49.77) (183.56) (177.19) (156.14)
2.76 2.90 3.24 0.39 0.38 0.27 -1.26 -2.05 -1.59 -3.33 -2.24 -3.74 -0.50 0.13 -0.40 0.20 -0.40 0.26 -41.45 -43.12 -29.56
(1.83) (1.82) (2.02) (2.13) (2.12) (2.13) (2.62) (2.66) (2.68) (13.53) (14.16) (13.49) (2.66) (2.28) (2.46) (3.21) (2.96) (3.18) (24.05) (28.43) (19.31)
3.78 2.47 2.20 13.18*** 12.99*** 13.76*** -7.03 -6.44 -4.45 16.70*** 15.47*** 16.97*** -3.77 -2.72 -0.22 28.45** 28.95*** 27.94** 1.34 2.08 1.87
(6.27) (6.42) (6.80) (2.78) (2.84) (2.78) (9.76) (9.92) (9.81) (3.24) (4.78) (3.18) (7.83) (7.20) (6.46) (9.79) (9.04) (10.06) (2.23) (2.02) (2.74)
-0.45** -0.42** -0.39** -0.77*** -0.77*** -0.82*** -2.73* -3.18* -3.12* -1.10 -1.30 -1.22 2.51 1.35 2.80 2.43 1.51 2.20 7.60 7.61 6.29
(0.19) (0.17) (0.18) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (1.55) (1.68) (1.59) (2.39) (2.55) (2.31) (2.48) (2.56) (2.58) (5.82) (6.09) (5.98) (22.77) (22.89) (22.23)
659 659 659 787 787 787 849 849 849 1,975 1,975 1,975 619 619 619 1,346 1,346 1,346 537 537 537
56 56 56 94 94 94 128 128 128 208 208 208 100 100 100 207 207 207 78 78 78
0.163 0.157 0.152 0.0981 0.0968 0.0895 0.104 0.0900 0.0925 0.193 0.185 0.191 0.129 0.116 0.124 0.139 0.137 0.138 0.120 0.116 0.106






Drainage and sewerage 
system
Length of road network
Other expenditure
Aquisition of movable and 
immovable goods  
Public infrastructure  
Notes: Dependent variable is annual employment rate. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Annual data for 1994-2010. Group classification was done according to municipalities socioeconomic characteristics where Group 1 is the least developed and Group 7 is the most developed. All regressions also contain year dummies. 












Group 1 Group 7Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6
Notes: Dependent variable is employment rate. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Annual data for 1994-2010. Group classification was done according to municipalities socioeconomic characteristics 
where Group 1 is the least developed and Group 7 is the most developed. All regressions also contain year dummies. SE are reported in parentheses.  The estimators used are Fixed Effects and the Discroll and Kraay 




9. Appendix C. Latin America, Additional Tables 
Table 9.1 Income-Expenditure Growth Regression across Latin American 




























Notes: Dependent variable is real GDP per capita annual percentage growth rate. All explanatory 
variables are lagged by one year. Annual data for 1994-2010. All regressions also contain year 
dummies. Standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the country level, are reported in parentheses.  
The estimator used is the Discroll and Kraay (1998) which accounts for fixed cross-sectional effects, 
autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and cross sectional dependence.  ***(**/*) denotes statistically 








Real gdp per capita








Notes: Dependent variable is real GDP per capita annual percentage growth rate. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Annual data for 
1994-2010. All regressions also contain year dummies. Standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the country level, are reported in parentheses.  The 
estimators used are Fixed Effects and the Discroll and Kraay (1998) which accounts for fixed cross-sectional effects, autocorrelation, 
heteroskedasticity and cross sectional dependence.  ***(**/*) denotes statistically significant at the 1%(5%/10%).   Countries included are: 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, 




Table 9.2 Income-Expenditure Growth Regression across Latin American 






































Notes: Dependent variable is real GDP per capita annual percentage growth rate. All explanatory 
variables are lagged by one year. Annual data for 1994-2010. All regressions also contain year 
dummies. Standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the country level, are reported in parentheses.  
The estimator used is the Discroll and Kraay (1998) which accounts for fixed cross-sectional effects, 
autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and cross sectional dependence.  ***(**/*) denotes statistically 







Notes: Dependent variable is real GDP per capita annual percentage growth rate. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Annual 
data for 1994-2010. All regressions also contain year dummies. Standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the country level, are reported in 
parentheses.  The estimators used are Fixed Effects and the Discroll and Kraay (1998) which accounts for fixed cross-sectional effects, 
a tocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and cross sectional dep ndence.  ***(**/*) denotes statistically significant at the 1%(5%/10%).   
Countries included are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 





Table 9.3 Income-Expenditure Unemployment Regression across Latin 
































Aquisition of fixed assets
Fiscal policy variables
Direct tax (Corporate)
Indirect tax  
Control variables
F - statistic
Notes: Dependent variable is Unemployment rate. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. 
Annual data for 1994-2010. All regressions also contain year dummies. Standard errors, adjusted for 
clustering at the country level, are reported in parentheses.  The estimator used is the Discroll and 
Kraay (1998) which accounts for fixed cross-sectional effects, autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and 
cross sectional dependence.  ***(**/*) denotes statistically significant at the 1%(5%/10%).






Notes: Dependent variable is Unemployment rate. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Annual data for 1994-2010. All regressions also contain 
year dummies. Standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the country level, are reported in parentheses.  The estimators used are Fixed Effects and the 
Discroll and Kraay (1998) which accounts for fixed cross-sectional effects, autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and cross sectional dependence.  ***(**/*) 
denotes statistically significant at the 1%(5%/10%).   Countries included are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, 





Table 9.4 Income-Expenditure Unemployment Regression across Latin 






























Notes: Dependent variable is Unenployment rate. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. 
Annual data for 1994-2010. All regressions also contain year dummies. Standard errors, adjusted for 
clustering at the country level, are reported in parentheses.  The estimator used is the Discroll and 
Kraay (1998) which accounts for fixed cross-sectional effects, autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and 
cross sectional dependence.  ***(**/*) denotes statistically significant at the 1%(5%/10%).

















Notes: Dependent variable is Unemployment rate. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Annual data for 1994-2010. All regressions also 
contain year dummies. Standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the country level, are reported in parentheses.  The estimators used are Fixed Effects and 
the Discroll and Kraay (1998) which accounts for fixed cross-sectional effects, autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and cross sectional dependence.  
***(**/*) denotes statistically significant at the 1%(5%/10%).   Countries included are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, 




10. Appendix D. Self-developed Survey 
 
Table 10.1 Survey to Public Government Officials 
 
My name is Lizbeth Pérez Fuentes Alemán and I am currently a 
PhD in economics student at the University of Bath, England. I 
am a graduate in economics and public accountancy by the 
ITAM and earned an MBA at Alliant University of California. I 
have more than 15 years of experience in fiscal matters, 
because I worked in the Ministry of Finance and the Secretariats 
of Finance of Veracruz and Mexico City. 
 
My thesis discusses the evolution of income and expenditures 
and their impact on the growth of the gross domestic product 
per capita at the state level. It is important for my study to 
know the opinion of the tax officials with regard to various taxes 
and expenses, in order to have direct information of decision 
makers.  Therefore, I request you to kindly support me in 
answering this survey. The individual results of my survey are 
anonymous.  My study will be at your disposal. 
 
1. Effect of Direct Taxes on GDP per capita growth in your 
State: 
 Very significant  Significant Slightly significant Not significant 
 2. Effect of Indirect Taxes on GDP per capita growth in your 
State: 
Very significant  Significant Slightly significant Not significant 
 
3. Effect of Own-source Income on GDP per capita growth in 
your State: 
 







4. Effect of Transfers on GDP per capita growth in your 
State: 
 
Very significant  Significant Slightly significant Not significant 
 
5. Effect of Current Expenditure on GDP per capita growth in 
your State: 
Very significant  Significant Slightly significant Not significant 
 
6. Effect of Capital Expenditure on GDP per capita growth in 
your State: 
Very significant  Significant Slightly significant Not significant 
 
7. Effect of Federal Fiscal Policy on GDP per capita growth in 
your State:  
Very significant  Significant Slightly significant Not significant 
 
8. Use of local taxing power in your State: 
Very significant  Significant Slightly significant Not significant 
 
Rank or position: 
Advisor Director Undersecretary Secretary 
  
Years of Experience: 
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